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— Eating Meat and Eating People - Oxford Scholarship Oxford Scholarship Online Biology History Mathematics Philosophy Public Health and Epidemiology ANIMAL RIGHTS CASS R. SUNSTEIN MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM Business and Management Law Music Physics Religion Print publication date: 2005 Print ISBN-13: 9780195305104 Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum Eating Meat and Eating People Cora Diamond Classical Studies Linguistics Neuroscience Political Science Social Work Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 DOI: 10.1093/acprof: oso/9780195305104.001.0001 DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195305104.003.0005 Abstract and Keywords 8/26/15 2:10 PM Economics and Finance Literature Palliative Care Psychology Sociology Go to page: Go This chapter presents commentaries on Peter Singer's approach to animal rights. It contends that Singer's attack on 'speciesism' mischaracterises the moral issues at stake and contends that if people are to be on the side of animals, it must be for reasons different from those used by Singer and others who object to the current human use and mistreatment of animals. The chapter argues against the call to stop the killing of animals for food and the use of animals in scientific research. Keywords: animal rights, Peter Singer, moral issues, speciesism, misuse of animals, animals for food, scientific research This essay is a response to a certain sort of argument defending the rights of animals. Part I is a brief explanation of the background and of the sort of argument I want to reject; part II is an attempt to characterize those arguments: They contain fundamental confusions about moral relations between people and people and between people and animals. And part III is an indication of what I think can still be said on as it were-the animals' side. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.../acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001/acprof-9780195305104-chapter-4 I The background to this chapter is the discussions of animals' rights by Peter Singer and Tom Regan and a number of other philosophers.¹ The basic type of argument in many of these discussions is encapsulated in the word speciesism. The word, I think, is originally Richard Ryder's, but Peter Singer is responsible for making it popular in connection with an obvious sort of argument: that in our attitude to members of other species we have prejudices which are completely analogous to the prejudices people may have with regard to members of other races, and these prejudices will be connected with the ways we are blind to our own exploitation and oppression of the other group. We are blind to the fact that what we do to them deprives (p.94) them of their rights; we do not want to see this because we profit from it, and so we make use of what are really morally irrelevant differences between them and ourselves to justify the difference in Page 1 of 9 Eating Meat and Eating People - Oxford Scholarship 8/26/15 2:10 PM treatment. Putting it fairly crudely; if we say, "You cannot live here because you are black," this would be supposed to be parallel to saying, "You can be used for our experiments, because you are only an animal and cannot talk." If the first is unjustifiable prejudice, so equally is the second. In fact, both Singer and Regan argue, if we, as a justification for differential treatment, point to things like the incapacity of animals to use speech, we should be committed to treating in the same way as animals those members of our own species who (let us say) have brain damage sufficient to prevent the development of speech- committed to allowing them to be used as laboratory animals or as food or whatever. If we say, "These animals are not rational, so we have a right to kill them for food," but we do not say the same of people whose rationality cannot develop or whose capacities have been destroyed, we are plainly not treating cases alike. The fundamental principle here is one we could put this way (the formulation is based on Peter Singer's statements): We must give equal consideration to the interests of any being which is able of having interests; and the capacity to have interests is essentiall dependent only on the capacity for suffering and enjoyment. This we evidently share with animals. Here I want to mention a point only to get it out of the way. I disagree with a great deal of what Singer and Regan and other defenders of animals' rights say, but I do not wish to raise the issue how we can be certain that animals feel pain. I think Singer and Regan are right that doubt about that is, in most ordinary cases, as much out of place as it is in many cases in connection with human beings. It will be evident that the form of argument I have described is very close to what we find in Bentham and Mill; and Mill, in arguing for the rights of women, attacks Chartists who fight for the rights of all men and drop the subject when the rights of women come up, with an argument of exactly the form that Singer uses. The confinement of your concern for rights to the rights of men shows that you are not really concerned with equality, as you profess to be. You are only a Chartist because you are not a lord.² And so too we are told more than a century later that the confinement of moral concern to human animals is equally a denial of equality. Indeed the description of human beings as "human animals" is a characteristic part of the argument. The point being made there is that just as our language may embody prejudices against blacks or against women, so may it against nonhuman animals. It supposedly embodies our prejudice, then, when we use the word animal to set them apart form us, just as if we were not animals ourselves. It is on the basis of this sort of claim, that the rights of all animals should be given equal consideration, that Singer and Regan and Ryder and the others have argued that we must give up killing animals for food, and (p.95) most drastically cut back-at least-the use of animals in scientific research. And so on. That argument seems to me to be confused. I do not dispute that there are analogies between the case of our relations to animals and the case of a dominant group's relation to some other group of human beings which it exploits or treats unjustly in other ways. But the analogies are not simple and straightforward, and it is not clear how far they go. The Singer-Regan approach makes it hard to see what is important either in our relationship with other human beings or in our relationship with animals. And that is what I shall try to explain in part II. My discussion will be limited to eating animals, but much of what I say is intended to apply to other uses of animals as well. II Discussions of vegetarianism and animals' rights often start with discussions of human rights. We may then be asked what it is that grounds the claims that people have such rights, and whether similar grounds may not after all be found in the case of animals. All such discussions are beside the point. For they ask why we do not kill people (very irrational ones, let us say) for food, or why we do not treat people in ways which would cause them distress or anxiety and so on, when for the sake of meat we are willing enough to kill animals or treat them in ways which cause them distress. This is a totally wrong way of beginning the discussion, because it ignores certain quite central facts-facts which, if attended to, would make it clear that rights are not what is crucial. We do not eat our dead, even when they have died in automobile accidents or been struck by lightning, and their flesh might be first class. We do not eat them; or if we do, it is a matter of extreme need, or of some special ritual-and even in cases of obvious extreme need, there is very great reluctance. We also do not eat our amputated limbs. (Or if we did, it would be in the same kinds of special circumstances in which we eat our dead.) Now the fact that we do not eat our dead is not a consequence-not a direct one in any event-of our unwillingness to kill people for food or other purposes. It is not a direct consequence of our unwillingness to cause distress to people. Of course it would cause distress to people to think that they might be eaten when they were dead, but it causes distress because of what it is to eat a dead person. Hence we cannot elucidate what (if anything) is wrong-if that is the word-with eating people by appealing to the distress it would cause, in the way we can point to the distress caused by stamping on someone's toe as a reason why we regard it as a wrong to him. Now if we do http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.../acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001/acprof-9780195305104-chapter-4 Page 2 of 9 Eating Meat and Eating People - Oxford Scholarship 8/26/15 2:10 PM not eat people who are already dead and also do not kill people for food, it is at least prima facie plausible that our reasons in the two cases might be related, and hence must be looked into by anyone who wants to claim that we have no good (p.96) reasons for not eating people which are not also good reasons for not eating animals. Anyone who, in discussing this issue, focuses on our reasons for not killing people or our reasons for not causing them suffering quite evidently runs the risk of leaving altogether out of his discussion those fundamental features of our relationship to other human beings which are involved in our not eating them. It is in fact part of the way this point is usually missed that arguments are given for not eating animals, for respecting their rights to life and not making them suffer, which imply that there is absolutely nothing queer, nothing at all odd, in the vegetarian eating the cow that has obligingly been struck by lightning. That is to say, there is nothing in the discussion which suggests that a cow is not something to eat; it is only that one must not help the process along. One must not, that is, interfere with those rights with which we should usually have to interfere if we are to eat animals at all conveniently. But if the point of the Singer-Regan vegetarian's argument is to show that the eating of meat is, morally, in the same position as the eating of human flesh, he is not consistent unless he says that it is just squeamishness, or something like that, which stops us eating our dead. If he admitted that what underlies our attitude to dining on ourselves is the view that a person is not something to eat, he could not focus on the cow's right not to be killed or maltreated, as if that were the heart of it. I write this as a vegetarian, but one distressed by the obtuseness of the normal arguments, in particular, I should say, the arguments of Singer and Regan. For if vegetarians give arguments which do not begin to get near the considerations which are involved in our not eating people, those to whom their arguments are addressed may not be certain how to reply, but they will not be convinced either, and really are quite right. They themselves may not be able to make explicit what it is they object to in the way the vegetarian presents our attitude to not eating people, but they will be left feeling that beyond all the natter about "speciesism" and equality and the rest, there is a difference between human beings and animals which is being ignored. This is not just connected with the difference between what it is to eat the one and what it is to eat the other. It is connected with the difference between giving people a funeral and giving a dog one, with the difference between miscegenation and chacun à son goût with consenting adult gorillas. (Singer and Regan give arguments which certainly appear to imply that a distaste for the latter is merely that, and would no more stand up to scrutiny than a taboo on miscegenation.) And so on. It is a mark of the shallowness of these discussions of vegetarianism that the only tool used in them to explain what differences in treatment are justified is the appeal to the capacities of the beings in question. That is to say, such-and-such a being- a dog, say-might be said to have, like us, a right to have its interests taken into account, but its interests will be different because its capacities are. Such an appeal may then be used by the vegetarian to explain why he need not in consistency demand votes for dogs (though even there it is not really adequate), but as (p.97) an explanation for the appropriateness of a funeral for a child two days old and not for a puppy it will not do; and the vegetarian is forced to explain that-if he tries at all-in terms of what it is to us, a form of explanation which for him is evidently dangerous. Indeed, it is normally the case that vegetarians do not touch the issue of our attitude to the dead. They accuse philosophers of ignoring the problems created by animals in their discussions of human rights, but they equally may be accused of ignoring the hard cases for their own view. (The hardness of the case for them, though, is a matter of its hardness for any approach to morality deriving much from utilitarianism-deriving much, that is, from a utilitarian conception of what makes something a possible object of moral concern.) I do not think it an accident that the arguments of vegetarians have a nagging moralistic tone. They are an attempt to show something to be morally wrong, on the assumption that we all agree that it is morally wrong to raise people for meat, and so on. Now the objection to saying that that is morally wrong is not, or not merely, that it is too weak. What we should be going against in adopting Swift's "Modest Proposal" is something we should be going against in salvaging the dead more generally: useful organs for transplantation, and the rest for supper or the compost heap. And "morally wrong" is not too weak for that, but in the wrong dimension. One could say that it would be impious to treat the dead so, but the word "impious" does not make for clarity; it only asks for explanation. We can most naturally speak of a kind of action as morally wrong when we have some firm grasp of what kind of beings are involved. But there are some actions, like giving people names, that are part of the way we come to understand and indicate our recognition of what kind it is with which we are concerned. And "morally wrong" will often not fit our refusals to act in such a way, or our acting in an opposed sort of way, as when Gradgrind calls a child "Girl number twenty." Doing her out of a name is not like doing her out of an inheritance to which she has a right and in which she has an interest. Rather, Gradgrind lives in a world, or would like to, in which it makes no difference whether she has a name, a number being more efficient, and in which a human being is not something to be named, not numbered. Again, it is not "morally wrong" to eat our pets; people who ate their pets would not have pets in the same sense of that term. (If we call an animal that we are fattening for the table a pet, we are making a crude joke of a familiar sort.) A pet is not something to eat; it is given a name, is let into our http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.../acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001/acprof-9780195305104-chapter-4 Page 3 of Eating Meat and Eating People - Oxford Scholarship 8/26/15 2:10 PM houses, and may be spoken to in ways in which we do not normally speak to cows or squirrels. That is to say, it is given some part of the character of a person. (This may be more or less sentimental; it need not be sentimental at all.) Treating pets in these ways is not at all a matter of recognizing some interest which pets have in being so treated. There is not a class of beings, pets, whose nature, whose capacities, are such that we owe it to them to treat them in these ways. Similarly, it is not out of respect for the interests of beings of the class to which we belong that we give names to each other, or that we treat (p.98) human sexuality or birth or death as we do, marking them in their various ways-as significant or serious. And again, it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other. These are all things that go to determine what sort of concept “human being" is. Similarly with having duties to human beings. This is not a consequence of what human beings are; it is not justified by what human beings are. It is itself one of the things which go to build our notion of human beings. And so too-very much so-with the idea of the difference between human beings and animals. We learn what a human being is in-among other ways-sitting at a table where we eat them. We are around the table and they are on it. The difference between human beings and animals is not to be discovered by studies of Washoe or the activities of dolphins. It is not that sort of study or ethology or evolutionary theory that is going to tell us the difference between us and animals: The difference is, as I have suggested, a central concept for human life and is more an object of contemplation than observation (though that might be misunderstood; I am not suggesting it is a matter of intuition). One source of confusion here is that we fail to distinguish between "the difference between animals and people" and "the differences between animals and people"; the same sort of confusion occurs in discussions of the relationship of men and women. In both cases people appeal to scientific evidence to show that "the difference" is not as deep as we think; but all that such evidence can show, or show directly, is that the differences are less sharp than we think. In the case of the difference between animals and people, it is clear that we form the idea of this difference, create the concept of the difference, knowing perfectly well the overwhelmingly obvious similarities. It may seem that by the sort of line I have been suggesting, I should find myself having to justify slavery. For do we not learn-if we live in a slave society-what slaves are and what masters are through the structure of a life in which we are here and do this, and they are there and do that? Do we not learn the difference between a master and a slave that way? In fact I do not think it works quite that way, but at this point I am not trying to justify anything, only to indicate that our starting point in thinking about the relationships among human beings is not a moral agent as an item on one side, and on the other a being capable of suffering thought, speech, etc; and similarly (mutatis mutandis) in the case of our thought about the relationship between human beings and animals. We cannot point and say, "This thing (whatever concepts it may fall under) is at any rate capable of suffering, so we ought not to make it suffer." (That sentence, Jonathan Bennett said, struck him as so clearly false that he thought I could not have meant it literally; I shall come back to it.) That "this" is a being which I ought not to make suffer, or whose suffering I should try to prevent, constitutes a special relationship to it, or rather, any of a number of such relationships-for example, what its suffering is in relation to me might depend on its being my mother. That I ought to attend to a being's sufferings and enjoyments is not the fundamental moral relation to determining how I ought to act toward (p.99) it—no more fundamental than that this man, being my brother, is a being about whom I should not entertain sexual fantasies. What a life is like in which I recognize such relationships as the former with at any rate some animals, how it is different from those in which no such relationships are recognized, or different ones, and how far it is possible to say that some such lives are less hypocritical or richer or better than those in which animals are for us mere things would then remain to be described. But a starting point in any such description must be understanding what is involved in such things as our not eating people: No more than our not eating pets does that rest on recognition of the claims of a being simply as one capable of suffering and enjoyment. To argue otherwise, to argue as Singer and Regan do, is not to give a defense of animals; it is to attack significance in human life. The Singer-Regan arguments amount to this: Knee-jerk liberals on racism and sexism ought to go knee-jerk about cows and guinea pigs; and they certainly show how that can be done, not that it ought to be. They might reply: If you are right, then we are, or should be willing to let animals suffer for the sake of significance in our life-for the sake, as it were, of the concept of the human. And what is that but speciesism again-more highfalutin perhaps than the familiar kind but no less morally disreputable for that? Significance, though, is not an end, is not something I am proposing as an alternative to the prevention of unnecessary suffering, to which the latter might be sacrificed. The ways in which we mark what human life is belong to the source of moral life, and no appeal to the prevention of suffering which is blind to this can in the end be anything but self-destructive. III Have I not then, by attacking such arguments, completely sawn off the branch I am sitting on? Is there any other way of showing anyone that he does have reason to treat animals better than he is treating them? http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.../acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001/acprof-9780195305104-chapter-4 Page 4 of 9 Eating Meat and Eating People - Oxford Scholarship 8/26/15 2:10 PM I shall take eating them as an example, but want to point out that eating animals, even among us, is not just one thing. To put it at its simplest by an example, a friend of mine raises his own pigs; they have quite a good life, and he shoots and butchers them with help from a neighbor. His children are involved in the operations in various ways, and the whole business is very much a subject of conversation and thought. This is obviously in some ways very different from picking up out of the supermarket freezer one of the several billion chicken breasts we Americans eat every year. So when I speak of eating animals I mean a lot of different cases, and what I say will apply to some more than others. What then is involved in trying to show someone that he ought not to eat meat? I have drawn attention to one curious feature of the Peter Singer sort of argument, which is that your Peter Singer vegetarian should be perfectly happy to eat the unfortunate lamb that has just been hit by a car. I want to (p.100) connect this with a more general characteristic of the utilitarian vegetarians' approach. They are not, they say, especially fond of, or interested in, animals. They may point that out they do not "love them." They do not want to anthropomorphize them, and are concerned to put their position as distinct from one which they see as sentimental anthropomorphizing. Just as you do not have to prove that underneath his black skin the black man has a white man inside in order to recognize his rights, you do not have to see animals in terms of your emotional responses to people to recognize their rights. So the direction of their argument is: We are only one kind of animal; if what is fair for us is concern for our interests, that depends only on our being living animals with interests—and if that is fair, it is fair for any animal. They do not, that is, want to move from concern for people to concern for four-legged people or feathered people-to beings who deserve that concern only because we think of them as having a little person inside. To make a contrast, I want to take a piece of vegetarian propaganda of a very different sort: Learning to be a Dutiful Carnivore Dogs and cats and goats and cows, Ducks and chickens, sheep and sows Woven into tales for tots, Pictured on their walls and pots. Time for dinner! Come and eat All your lovely, juicy meat. One day ham from Percy Porker (In the comics he's a corker), Then the breast from Mrs. Cluck Or the wing from Donald Duck. Liver next from Clara Cow (No, it doesn't hurt her now). Yes, that leg's from Peter Rabbit Chew it well; make that a habit. Eat the creatures killed for sale, But never pull the pussy's tail. Eat the flesh from "filthy hogs" But never be unkind to dogs. Grow up into double-think- Kiss the hamster; skin the mink. Never think of slaughter, dear, That's why animals are here. They only come on earth to die, So eat your meat, and don't ask why. -Jane Legge3 What that is trying to bring out is a kind of inconsistency, or confusion mixed with hypocrisy-what it sees as that-in our ordinary ways of thinking (p.101) about animals, confusions that come out, not only but strikingly, in what children are taught about them. That is to say, the poem does not ask you to feel in this or the other way about animals. Rather, it takes a certain range of feelings for granted. There http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/view/10.../acprof:oso/9780195305104.001.0001/acprof-9780195305104-chapter-4 Page 5 of