On one interpretation faith and reason are opposed since faith involves believing something without reason, while reason rejects belief that does not have evidence or other direct rational support. This, however, is a caricature of what are in fact complex and interconnected notions. On the one hand it is important to distinguish between a) believing something in the face of evidence and reasoning to the contrary, and b) believing it though evidence and reasoning are insufficient of themselves to determine its truth. On the other hand, reasoning does not operate in a mental vacuum. It has a context which involves assuming things for which one does not oneself have evidence or rational proof. Believing that there is a material world, that is has existed for a vast period of time, that one was born, that there are other people, that there are chemical elements, that 2+2=4, the English word ‘man’ means man, and so on are taken to be rational but they are all generally assumed rather than personally established by reason or empirical evidence. Indeed, in some cases it is hard to see how they could be established. So, believing without evidence or reason is a widespread phenomenon. Similarly, faith does not operate in isolation from empirical evidence and reasoning. Here it is also important to distinguish between faith-in, and faith-that. Mutually trusting partners have faith-in one another, subscribers to a set of beliefs (religious or otherwise) believe-that such and such is the case. As with faith and reason, these two phenomena are intertwined. If you have faith in someone then you have reason to believe that what they say on certain matters is true. Likewise, if you believe that someone is trustworthy then you have reason to have faith in them. Christians believe a number of things most centrally articles of faith as expressed in Creeds, but the opening words “I believe in God …’ in their original use, derived from Hebrew beliefs in the Abrahamic covenant, express both belief that there is one and only one God and trust in God. Natural theology refers to that field of thought which seeks to establish truths about God on the basis only of natural evidence and reason, i.e. without appeal to revelation. Its central preoccupation has been devising and assessing arguments for the existence of God such as from the existence and nature of the world.
147 results found (0.003 seconds)
— Follow Catholic Education Resource Center Explore Catholic Education Resource Center About Apologetics Marriage & Family Social Issues Religion Reflections Search About Apologetics Marriage & Family Social Issues Religion Reflections Search More We're sorry, the page you are looking for is missing. Here are some links you might find helpful. Home Contact
— Newman, Oxford Sermons on Faith and Reason: 7, 10, 11, 13 Sermon 7. Contest between Faith and Sight "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." John v. 4. THE danger to which Christians are exposed from the influence of the visible course of things, or the world (as it is called in Scripture), is a principal subject of St. John's General Epistle. He seems to speak of the world as some False Prophet, promising what it cannot fulfil, and gaining credit by its confident tone. Viewing it as resisting Christianity, he calls it the "spirit of anti-Christ," the parent of a numerous progeny of evil, false spirits like itself, the teachers of all lying doctrines, by which the multitude of men are led captive. The antagonist of this great tempter is the Spirit of Truth, which is "greater than he that is in the world;" its victorious antagonist, because gifted with those piercing eyes of Faith which are able to scan the world's shallowness, and to see through the mists of error into the glorious kingdom of God beyond them. "This is the victory that overcometh the world," says the text, "even our Faith." And if we inquire what are the sights which our faith sees, the Apostle answers by telling us of "the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is Truth." The world witnesses to an untruth, which will one day be exposed; and Christ, our Lord and Master, is the "Amen, the faithful and true witness," who came into the world "by water and blood," to "bear witness unto the Truth;" that, as the many voices of error bear down and overpower the inquirer by their tumult and importunity, so, on the other hand, Truth might have its living and visible representative, no longer cast, like the bread, at random on the waters, or painfully gained from the schools and traditions of men, but committed to One "come in the flesh," to One who has an earthly name and habitation, who, in one sense, is one of the powers of this world, who has His train and retinue, His court and kingdom, His ministering servants, bound together by the tie of brotherly love among themselves, and of zeal against the Prophets of error. "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" St. John then compares together the force of the world's testimony, and of that which the Gospel provides. "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater; for this is the witness of God which He has testified of His Son;" as if "the spirit, the water, and the blood," spoke for God more loudly than the world speaks for the Evil one. In the very opening of the Epistle, he had set before us in another form the same gracious truth, viz., that the Gospel, by affording us, in the Person and history of Christ, a witness of the invisible world, addresses itself to our senses and imagination, after the very manner in which the false doctrines of the world assail us. "That which was from the beginning, ... which we have looked upon, ... that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you." 2. Now, here we have incidentally suggested to us an important truth, which, obvious as it is, may give rise to some profitable reflections; viz., that the world overcomes us, not merely by appealing to our reason, or by exciting our passions, but by imposing on our imagination. So much do the systems of men swerve from the Truth as set forth in Scripture, that their very presence becomes a standing fact against Scripture, even when our reason condemns them, by their persevering assertions, and they gradually overcome those who set out by contradicting them. In all cases, what is often and unhesitatingly asserted, at length finds credit with the mass of mankind; and so it happens, in this instance, that, admitting as we do from the first, that the world is one of our three chief enemies, maintaining, rather than merely granting, that the outward face of things speaks a different language from the word of God; yet, when we come to act in the world, we find this very thing a trial, not merely of our obedience, but even of our faith; that is, the mere fact that the world turns out to be what we began by actually confessing concerning it. 3. Let us now direct our attention to this subject, in order to see what it means, and how it is exemplified in the ordinary course of the world. And let us commence with the age when men are first exposed, in any great degree, to the temptation of trusting the world's assertions�when they enter into life, as it is called. Hitherto they have learned revealed truths only as a creed or system; they are instructed and acquiesce in the great Christian doctrines; and, having virtuous feelings, and desiring to do their duty, they think themselves really and practically religious. They read in Scripture of "the course of the world," but they have little notion what it really is; they believe it to be sinful, but how it acts in seducing from the Truth, and making evil seem good, and good evil, is beyond them. Scripture, indeed, says much about the world; but they cannot learn practically what it is from Scripture; for, not to mention other reasons, Scripture being written by inspiration, represents things such as they really are in God's sight, such as they will seem to us in proportion as we learn to judge of them rightly, not as they appear to those "whose senses are" not yet "exercised to discern both good and evil." 4. Under these circumstances, youths are brought to their trial. The simple and comparatively retired life which they have hitherto enjoyed is changed for the varied and attractive scenes of mixed society. Its numberless circles and pursuits open upon them, the diversities and contrarieties of opinion and conduct, and of the subjects on which thought and exertion are expended. This is what is called seeing the world. Here, then, all at once they lose their reckoning, and let slip the lessons which they thought they had so accurately learned. They are unable to apply in practice what they have received by word of mouth; and, perplexed at witnessing the multiplicity of characters and fortunes which human nature assumes, and the range and intricacy of the social scheme, they are gradually impressed with the belief that the religious system which they have hitherto received is an inadequate solution of the world's mysteries, and a rule of conduct too simple for its complicated transactions. All men, perhaps, are in their measure subjected to this temptation. Even their ordinary and most innocent intercourse with others, their temporal callings, their allowable recreations, captivate their imaginations, and, on entering into this new scene, they look forward with interest towards the future, and form schemes of action, and indulge dreams of happiness, such as this life has never fulfilled. Now, is it not plain, that, after thus realizing to themselves the promises of the world, when they look back to the Bible and their former lessons, these will seem not only uninteresting and dull, but a theory too?�dull, colourless, indeed, as a sober landscape, after we have been gazing on some bright vision in the clouds�but, withal, unpractical, unnatural, unsuitable to the exigencies of life and the constitution of man? 5. For consider how little is said in Scripture about subjects which necessarily occupy a great part of the attention of all men, and which, being there unnoticed, become thereby the subject-matter of their trial. Their private conduct day by day; their civil, social, and domestic duties; their relation towards those events which mark out human life into its periods, and, in the case of most men, are the source of its best pleasures, and the material of its deepest affections, are, as if purposely, passed over, that they themselves may complete the picture of true faith and sanctity which Revelation has begun. 6. And thus (as has already been said) what is primarily a trial of our obedience, becomes a trial of our faith also. The Bible seems to contain a world in itself, and not the same world as that which we inhabit; and those who profess to conform to its rules gain from us respect indeed, and praise, and yet strike us withal in some sort as narrow-minded and fanciful; tenderly to be treated, indeed, as you would touch cautiously any costly work of art, yet, on the whole, as little adapted to do good service in the world as it is, as a weapon of gold or soft clothing on a field of battle. 7. And much more, of course, does this delusion hang about the mind, and more closely does it wrap it round, if, by yielding to the temptations of the flesh, a man predisposes himself to the influence of it. The palmary device of Satan is to address himself to the pride of our nature, and, by the promise of independence, to seduce us into sin. Those who have been brought up in ignorance of the polluting fashions of the world, too often feel a rising in their minds against the discipline and constraint kindly imposed upon them; and, not understanding that their ignorance is their glory, and that they cannot really enjoy both good and evil, they murmur that they are not allowed to essay what they do not wish to practise, or to choose for themselves in matters where the very knowledge seems to them to give a superiority to the children of corruption. Thus the temptation of becoming as gods works as in the beginning, pride opening a door to lust; and then, intoxicated by their experience of evil, they think they possess real wisdom, and take a larger and more impartial view of the nature and destinies of man than religion teaches; and, while the customs of society restrain their avowals within the bounds of propriety, yet in their hearts they learn to believe that sin is a matter of course, not a serious evil, a failing in which all have share, indulgently to be spoken of, or rather, in the case of each individual, to be taken for granted, and passed over in silence; and believing this, they are not unwilling to discover or to fancy weaknesses in those who have the credit of being superior to the ordinary run of men, to insinuate the possibility of human passions influencing them, this or that of a more refined nature, when the grosser cannot be imputed, and, extenuating at the same time the guilt of the vicious, to reduce in this manner all men pretty much to a level. A more apposite instance of this state of soul cannot be required than is given us in the celebrated work of an historian of the last century, who, for his great abilities, and, on the other hand, his cold heart, impure mind, and scoffing spirit, may justly be accounted as, in this country at least, one of the masters of a new school of error, which seems not yet to have accomplished its destinies, and is framed more exactly after the received type of the author of evil, than the other chief anti-Christs who have, in these last times, occupied the scene of the world. 8. The temptation I have been speaking of, of trusting the world, because it speaks boldly, and thinking that evil must be acquiesced in, because it exists, will be still stronger and more successful in the case of one who is in any situation of active exertion, and has no very definite principles to secure him in the narrow way. He was taught to believe that there was but one true faith, and, on entering into life, he meets with numberless doctrines among men, each professing to be the true one. He had learned that there was but one Church, and he falls in with countless religious sects, nay, with a prevalent opinion that all these are equally good, and that there is no divinely-appointed Church at all. He has been accustomed to class men into good and bad, but he finds their actual characters no how reducible to system; good and bad mixed in every variety of proportion, virtues and vices in endless combinations; and, what is stranger still, a deficient creed seemingly joined to a virtuous life, and inconsistent conduct disgracing a sound profession. Further still, he finds that men in general will not act on high motives, in spite of all that divines and moralists profess; and his experience of this urges him, till he begins to think it unwise and extravagant to insist upon the mass of mankind doing so, or to preach high morals and high doctrines; and at length he looks on the religious system of his youth as beautiful indeed in itself, and practical perhaps in private life, and useful for the lower classes, but as utterly unfit for those who live in the world; and while unwilling to confess this, lest he should set a bad example, he tacitly concedes it, never is the champion of his professed principles when assailed, nor acts upon them in an honest way in the affairs of life. 9. Or, should he be led by a speculative turn of mind, or a natural philanthropy, to investigate the nature of man, or exert himself in plans for the amelioration of society, then his opinions become ultimately impressed with the character of a more definite unbelief. Sometimes he is conscious to himself that he is opposing Christianity; not indeed opposing it wantonly, but, as he conceives, unavoidably, as finding it in his way. This is a state of mind into which benevolent men are in danger of falling, in the present age. While they pursue objects tending, as they conceive, towards the good of mankind, it is by degrees forced upon their minds that Revealed Religion thwarts their proceedings, and, averse alike to relinquish their plans, and to offend the feelings of others, they determine on letting matters take their course, and, believing fully that Christianity must fall before the increasing illumination of the age, yet they wish to secure it against direct attacks, and to provide that it no otherwise falls than as it unavoidably must, at one time or other; as every inflexible instrument, and every antiquated institution, crumbles under the hands of the Great Innovator, who creates new influences for new emergencies, and recognizes no right divine in a tumultuous and shifting world. 10. Sometimes, on the other hand, because he takes the spirit of the world as his teacher, such a one drifts away unawares from the Truth as it is in Jesus; and, merely from ignorance of Scripture, maintains theories which Scripture anathematizes. Thus he dreams on for a time, as loth to desert his first faith; then by accident meeting with some of the revealed doctrines which he learned when a child�the Incarnation, or the eternal punishment of the wicked�he stumbles. Then he will attempt to remove these, as if accidentally attached to the Scripture creed,�little thinking that they are its very peculiarities and essentials, nor reflecting that the very fact of his stumbling at them should be taken as a test that his views coincide but in appearance with the revealed system altogether; and so he will remain at the door of the Church, witnessing against himself by his lingering there, yet missing the reward bestowed even on the proselyte of the gate in heathen times, in that he might have "known the way of righteousness," yet has "turned from the holy commandment delivered unto him." 11. And some there are who, keeping their faith in the main, give up the notion of its importance. Finding that men will not agree together on points of doctrine and discipline, and imagining that union must be effected on any terms, they consent to abandon articles of faith as the basis of Christian fellowship, and try to effect what they call a union of hearts, as a bond of fellowship among those who differ in their notions of the One God, One Lord, One Spirit, One baptism, and One body; forgetful of the express condemnation pronounced by our Saviour upon those who "believe not" the preaching of His servants [Mark xvi. 16.]; and that he who denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father [1 John ii. 22.]. 12. And others, not being able to acquiesce in the unimportance of doctrinal truth, yet perplexed at the difficulties in the course of human affairs, which follow on the opposite view, accustom themselves gratuitously to distinguish between their public and private duties, and to judge of them by separate rules. These are often such as begin by assuming some extravagant or irrelevant test for ascertaining the existence of religious principle in others, and so are led to think it is nowhere to be found, not in the true Church more than in the sects which surround it; and thus, regarding all men (to speak generally) as equally far from the Truth, and strangers to that divine regeneration which Christ bestows on His elect few, and, on the other hand, seeing that men, as cast together in society, must cooperate on some or other principles, they drop the strict principles of Scripture in their civil relations, give no preference to those who honour the Church over those who profess opinions disrespectful towards it; perhaps take up the notion that the State, as such, has nothing to do with the subject of religion; praise and blame according to a different standard from that which Christianity reveals; and all this while cherish, perhaps, in their secret thoughts a definite creed, rigid in its decisions, stimulating in its influence, in spite of the mildness, and submissiveness, and liberality of sentiment, which their public mode of speaking and acting seems to evidence. 13. Nor are even the better sort of men altogether secure from the impression of the world's teaching, which is so influential with the multitude. He truly is a rare and marvellous work of heavenly grace, who when he comes into the din and tumult of the world, can view things just as he calmly contemplated them in the distance, before the time of action came. So many are the secondary reasons which can be assigned for and against every measure and every principle, so urgent are the solicitations of interest or passion when the mind is once relaxed or excited, so difficult then to compare and ascertain the relative importance of conflicting considerations, that the most sincere and zealous of ordinary Christians will, to their surprise, confess to themselves that they have lost their way in the wilderness, which they could accurately measure out before descending into it, and have missed the track which lay like a clear thread across the hills, when seen in the horizon. And it is from their experience of this their own unskilfulness and weakness, that serious men have been in the practice of making vows concerning purposes on which they were fully set, that no sudden gust of passion, or lure of worldly interest, should gain the mastery over a heart which they desire to present without spot or blemish, as a chaste virgin, to Christ. 14. Let the above be taken as a few illustrations out of many, of the influence exerted, and the doctrine enforced, in the school of the world; that school which we all set out by acknowledging to be at enmity with the school of Christ, but from which we are content to take our lessons of practical wisdom as life goes on. Such is the triumph of Sight over Faith. The world really brings no new argument to its aid,�nothing beyond its own assertion. In the very outset Christians allow that its teaching is contrary to Revelation, and not to be taken as authority; nevertheless, afterwards, this mere unargumentative teaching, which, when viewed in theory, formed no objection to the truth of the Inspired Word, yet, when actually heard in the intercourse of life, converts them, more or less, to the service of the "prince of the power of the air, the spirit which now worketh in the children of disobedience." It assails their imagination. The world sweeps by in long procession;�its principalities and powers, its Babel of languages, the astrologers of Chaldaea, the horse and its rider and the chariots of Egypt, Baal and Ashtoreth and their false worship; and those who witness, feel its fascination; they flock after it; with a strange fancy, they ape its gestures, and dote upon its mummeries; and then, should they perchance fall in with the simple solemn services of Christ's Church, and hear her witnesses going the round of Gospel truths as when they left them: "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life;" "Be sober, be vigilant;" "Strait is the gate, narrow the way;" "If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself;" "He is despised and rejected of men, a Man of sorrows and acquainted with grief:"�how utterly unreal do these appear, and the preachers of them, how irrational, how puerile!�how extravagant in their opinions, how weak in their reasoning!�and if they profess to pity and bear with them, how nearly does their compassion border on contempt! 15. The contempt of men!�why should we be unwilling to endure it? We are not better than our fathers. In every age it has been the lot of Christians far more highly endowed than we are with the riches of Divine wisdom. It was the lot of Apostles and Prophets, and of the Saviour of mankind Himself. When He was brought before Pilate, the Roman Governor felt the same surprise and disdain at His avowal of His unearthly office, which the world now expresses. "To this end was I born, � that I should bear witness unto the Truth. Pilate saith, What is Truth?" Again, when Festus would explain to King Agrippa the cause of the dispute between St. Paul and the Jews, he says, "The accusers ... brought no accusations of such things as I supposed, but certain questions against him of their own superstition, and of one Jesus, which was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive." 16. Such, however, are the words of men, who, not knowing the strength of Christianity, had not the guilt of deliberate apostasy. But what serious thoughts does it present to the mind, to behold parallels to heathen blindness and arrogance in a Christian country, where men might know better, if they would inquire!�and what a warning to us all is the sight of those who, though nominally within the Church, are avowedly indifferent to it! For all of us surely are on our trial, and, as we go forth into the world, so we are winnowed, and the chaff gradually separated from the true seed. This is St. John's account of it. "They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us: but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not of us." And our Lord stands by watching the process, telling us of "the hour of temptation which shall come upon all the earth," exhorting us to "try them which say they are apostles, and are not," and to "hold fast that which we have, that no man take our crown." 17. Meanwhile, it is an encouragement to us to think how much may be done in way of protest and teaching, by the mere example of those who endeavour to serve God faithfully. In this way we may use against the world its own weapons; and, as its success lies in the mere boldness of assertion with which it maintains that evil is good, so by the counter-assertions of a strict life and a resolute profession of the truth, we may retort upon the imaginations of men, that religious obedience is not impracticable, and that scripture has its persuasives. A martyr or a confessor is a fact, and has its witness in itself; and, while it disarranges the theories of human wisdom, it also breaks in upon that security and seclusion into which men of the world would fain retire from the thought of religion. One prophet against four hundred disturbed the serenity of Ahab, King of Israel. When the witnesses in St. John's vision were slain, though they were but two, then "they that dwelt on the earth rejoiced over them, and made merry, and sent gifts one to another, because these two prophets tormented them that dwelt on the earth." Nay, such confessors have a witness even in the breasts of those who oppose them, an instinct originally from God, which may indeed be perverted into a hatred, but scarcely into an utter disregard of the Truth, when exhibited before them. The instance cannot be found in the history of mankind, in which an anti-Christian power could long abstain from persecuting. The disdainful Festus at length impatiently interrupted his prisoner's speech; and in our better regulated times, whatever be the scorn or malevolence which is directed against the faithful Christian, these very feelings show that he is really a restraint on vice and unbelief, and a warning and guide to the feeble-minded, and to those who still linger in the world with hearts more religious than their professed opinions; and thus even literally, as the text expresses it, he overcomes the world, conquering while he suffers, and willingly accepting overbearing usage and insult from others, so that he may in some degree benefit them, though the more abundantly he loves them, the less he be loved. (Preached May 27, 1832.) Sermon 10. Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind "Now Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Heb. xi. 1. THE subject of Faith is one especially suggested to our minds by the event which we this day commemorate, and the great act of grace of which it was the first-fruits. It was as on this day that the wise men of the East were allowed to approach and adore the infant Saviour, in anticipation of those Gentile multitudes who, when the kingdom of God was preached, were to take possession of it as if by violence, and to extend it to the ends of the earth. To them Christ was manifested as He is to us, and in the same way; not to the eyes of the flesh, but to the illuminated mind, to their Faith. As the manifestation of God accorded to the Jews was circumscribed, and addressed to their senses, so that which is vouchsafed to Christians is universal and spiritual. Whereas the gifts of the Gospel are invisible, Faith is their proper recipient; and whereas its Church is Catholic, Faith is its bond of intercommunion; things external, local, and sensible being no longer objects to dwell upon on their own account, but merely means of conveying onwards the divine gifts from the Giver to their proper home, the heart itself. 2. As, then, Catholicity is the note, so an inward manifestation is the privilege, and Faith the duty, of the Christian Church; or, in the words of the Apostle, "the Gentiles" receive "the promise of the Spirit through Faith." 3. I shall not, then be stepping beyond the range of subjects to which this great Festival draws our attention, if I enter upon some inquiries into the nature of that special Gospel grace, by which Jews and Gentiles apprehend and enjoy the blessings which Christ has purchased for them, and which accordingly is spoken of in the Collect in the service, as the peculiarity of our condition in this life, as Sight will be in the world to come. And in so doing, I shall be pursuing a subject, which is likely to be of main importance in the controversies which lie before us at this day, and upon which I am not speaking now for the first time from this place. 4. It is scarcely necessary to prove from Scripture, the especial dignity and influence of Faith, under the Gospel Dispensation, as regards both our spiritual and moral condition. Whatever be the particular faculty or frame of mind denoted by the word, certainly Faith is regarded in Scripture as the chosen instrument connecting heaven and earth, as a novel principle of action most powerful in the influence which it exerts both on the heart and on the Divine view of us, and yet in itself of a nature to excite the contempt or ridicule of the world. These characteristics, its apparent weakness, its novelty, its special adoption, and its efficacy, are noted in such passages as the following:�"Have faith in God; for verily I say unto you, that whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea, and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass, he shall have whatsoever he saith. Therefore I say unto you, what things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them." And again: "If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth." Again: "The preaching of the Cross is to them that perish foolishness, but unto us which are saved it is the power of God. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." Again: "The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart, that is, the word of faith which we preach ... Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." And again: "Yet a little while, and He that shall come will come, and will not tarry; now the just shall live by faith." ... And then, soon after, the words of the text: "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." [Mark xi. 22-24; ix. 23. 1 Cor. i. 18-21. Rom. x. 8, 17. Heb. x. 37, 38.] 5. Such is the great weapon which Christianity employs, whether viewed as a religious scheme, as a social system, or as a moral rule; and what it is described as being in the foregoing texts, it is also said to be expressly or by implication in other passages too numerous to cite. And I suppose that it will not be denied, that the first impression made upon the reader from all these is, that in the minds of the sacred writers, Faith is an instrument of knowledge and action, unknown to the world before, a principle sui generis, distinct from those which nature supplies, and in particular (which is the point into which I mean to inquire) independent of what is commonly understood by Reason. Certainly if, after all that is said about Faith in the New Testament, as if it were what may be called a discovery of the Gospel, and a special divine method of salvation; if, after all, it turns out merely to be a believing upon evidence, or a sort of conclusion upon a process of reasoning, a resolve formed upon a calculation, the inspired text is not level to the understanding, or adapted to the instruction, of the unlearned reader. If Faith be such a principle, how is it novel and strange? 6. Other considerations may be urged in support of the same view of the case. For instance: Faith is spoken of as having its life in a certain moral temper, but argumentative exercises are not moral; Faith, then, is not the same method of proof as Reason. 7. Again: Faith is said to be one of the supernatural gifts imparted in the Gospel. "By grace have ye been saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God;" but investigation and proof belong to man as man, prior to the Gospel: therefore Faith is something higher than Reason. 8. Again:�That Faith is independent of processes of Reason, seems plain from their respective subject-matters. "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." It simply accepts testimony. As then testimony is distinct from experience, so is Faith from Reason. 9. And again:�When the Apostles disparage "the wisdom of this world," "disputings," "excellency of speech," and the like, they seem to mean very much what would now be called trains of argument, discussion, investigation,�that is, exercises of Reason. 10. Once more:�Various instances are given us in Scripture of persons making an acknowledgment of Christ and His Apostles upon Faith, which would not be considered by the world as a rational conviction upon evidence. For instance: The lame man who sat at the Beautiful gate was healed on his faith, after St. Peter had but said, "Look on us." And that other lame man at Lystra saw no miracle done by St. Paul, but only heard him preach, when the Apostle, "steadfastly beholding him, and perceiving that he had faith to be healed, said with a loud voice, Stand upright on thy feet." Again, St. Paul at Athens did no miracle, but preached, and yet "certain men clave unto him and believed." To the same purpose are our Lord's words, when St. John Baptist sent to Him to ask if He were the Christ. He wrought miracles, indeed, to reassure him, but added, "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in Me." And when St. Thomas doubted of His resurrection, He gave him the sensible proof which he asked, but He added, "Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." On another occasion He said, "Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe." [Acts iii. 4; xiv. 9, 10; xvii. 34. Matt. xi. 6. John xx. 29; iv. 48.] 11. On the other hand, however, it may be urged, that it is plainly impossible that Faith should be independent of Reason, and a new mode of arriving at truth; that the Gospel does not alter the constitution of our nature, and does but elevate it and add to it; that Sight is our initial, and Reason is our ultimate informant concerning all knowledge. We are conscious that we see; we have an instinctive reliance on our Reason: how can the claims of a professed Revelation be brought home to us as Divine, except through these? Faith, then, must necessarily be resolvable at last into Sight and Reason; unless, indeed, we agree with enthusiasts in thinking that faculties altogether new are implanted in our minds, and that perceptibly, by the grace of the Gospel; faculties which, of course, are known to those who have them without proof; and, to those who have them not, cannot be made known by any. Scripture confirms this representation, as often as the Apostles appeal to their miracles, or to the Old Testament. This is an appeal to Reason; and what is recorded, in some instances, was probably or certainly (as it is presumed from the necessity of the case) made in the rest, even when not recorded. 12. Such is the question which presents itself to readers of Scripture, as to the relation of Faith to Reason: and it is usual at this day to settle it in disparagement of Faith,�to say that Faith is but a moral quality, dependent upon Reason,�that Reason judges both of the evidence on which Scripture is to be received, and of the meaning of Scripture; and then Faith follows or not, according to the state of the heart; that we make up our minds by Reason without Faith, and then we proceed to adore and to obey by Faith apart from Reason; that, though Faith rests on testimony, not on reasonings, yet that testimony, in its turn, depends on Reason for the proof of its pretensions, so that Reason is an indispensable preliminary. 13. Now, in attempting to investigate what are the distinct offices of Faith and Reason in religious matters, and the relation of the one to the other, I observe, first, that undeniable though it be, that Reason has a power of analysis and criticism in all opinion and conduct, and that nothing is true or right but what may be justified, and, in a certain sense, proved by it, and undeniable, in consequence, that, unless the doctrines received by Faith are approvable by Reason, they have no claim to be regarded as true, it does not therefore follow that Faith is actually grounded on Reason in the believing mind itself; unless, indeed, to take a parallel case, a judge can be called the origin, as well as the justifier, of the innocence or truth of those who are brought before him. A judge does not make men honest, but acquits and vindicates them: in like manner, Reason need not be the origin of Faith, as Faith exists in the very persons believing, though it does test and verify it. This, then, is one confusion, which must be cleared up in the question,�the assumption that Reason must be the inward principle of action in religious inquiries or conduct in the case of this or that individual, because, like a spectator, it acknowledges and concurs in what goes on;�the mistake of a critical for a creative power. 14. This distinction we cannot fail to recognize as true in itself, and applicable to the matter in hand. It is what we all admit at once as regards the principle of Conscience. No one will say that Conscience is against Reason, or that its dictates cannot be thrown into an argumentative form; yet who will, therefore, maintain that it is not an original principle, but must depend, before it acts, upon some previous processes of Reason? Reason analyzes the grounds and motives of action: a reason is an analysis, but is not the motive itself. As, then, Conscience is a simple element in our nature, yet its operations admit of being surveyed and scrutinized by Reason; so may Faith be cognizable, and its acts be justified, by Reason, without therefore being, in matter of fact, dependent upon it; and as we reprobate, under the name of Utilitarianism, the substitution of Reason for Conscience, so perchance it is a parallel error to teach that a process of Reason is the sine quâ non for true religious Faith. When the Gospel is said to require a rational Faith, this need not mean more than that Faith is accordant to right Reason in the abstract, not that it results from it in the particular case. 15. A parallel and familiar instance is presented by the generally-acknowledged contrast between poetical or similar powers, and the art of criticism. That art is the sovereign awarder of praise and blame, and constitutes a court of appeal in matters of taste; as then the critic ascertains what he cannot himself create, so Reason may put its sanction upon the acts of Faith, without in consequence being the source from which Faith springs. 16. On the other hand, Faith certainly does seem, in matter of fact, to exist and operate quite independently of Reason. Will any one say that a child or uneducated person may not savingly act on Faith, without being able to produce reasons why he so acts? What sufficient view has he of the Evidences of Christianity? What logical proof of its divinity? If he has none, Faith, viewed as an internal habit or act, does not depend upon inquiry and examination, but has its own special basis, whatever that is, as truly as Conscience has. We see, then, that Reason may be the judge, without being the origin, of Faith; and that Faith may be justified by Reason, without making use of it. This is what it occurs to mention at first sight, 17. Next, I observe, that, whatever be the real distinction and relation existing between Faith and Reason, which it is not to our purpose at once to determine, the contrast that would be made between them, on a popular view, is this,�that Reason requires strong evidence before it assents, and Faith is content with weaker evidence. 18. For instance: when a well-known infidel of the last century argues, that the divinity of Christianity is founded on the testimony of the Apostles, in opposition to the experience of nature, and that the laws of nature are uniform, those of testimony variable, and scoffingly adds that Christianity is founded on Faith, not on Reason, what is this but saying that Reason is severer in its demands of evidence than Faith? 19. Again, the founder of the recent Utilitarian School insists, that all evidence for miracles, before it can be received, should be brought into a court of law, and subjected to its searching forms:�this too is to imply that Reason demands exact proofs, but that Faith accepts inaccurate ones. 20. The same thing is implied in the notion which men of the world entertain, that Faith is but credulity, superstition, or fanaticism; these principles being notoriously such as are contented with insufficient evidence concerning their objects. On the other hand, scepticism, which shows itself in a dissatisfaction with evidence of whatever kind, is often called by the name of Reason. What Faith, then, and Reason are, when compared together, may be determined from their counterfeits,�from the mutual relation of credulity and scepticism, which no one can doubt about. 21. In like manner, when mathematics are said to incline the mind towards doubt and latitudinarianism, this arises, according to the statement of one who felt this influence of the study, from its indisposing us for arguments drawn from mere probabilities. 22. Or, to take particular
— In Faithful Reason, the noted Catholic philosopher John Haldane explores various aspects of intellectual and practical life from a perspective inspired by Catho
— What can philosophy bring to religion? Philosophy is a systematic way of thinking about ideas and concepts, often fundamental features of the world. The philosophy of religion uses philosophical methodologies to examine religion, from the existence and attributes of God to the problems of evil, diverse religions, and conflicting belief systems. BROWSE THE CLOSER TO TRUTH STORE: https://www.bonfire.com/store/closertotruth/ - Limited time only. Taking orders from Nov 15 - Dec 5 2021. Free access to Closer to Truth's library of 5,000 videos: http://bit.ly/376lkKN Watch more interviews on philosophy and religion: https://bit.ly/3y1o9e2 Alvin Carl Plantinga is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College. Register for free at CTT.com for subscriber-only exclusives: http://bit.ly/2GXmFsP Closer to Truth, hosted by Robert Lawrence Kuhn and directed by Peter Getzels, presents the world’s greatest thinkers exploring humanity’s deepest questions. Discover fundamental issues of existence. Engage new and diverse ways of thinking. Appreciate intense debates. Share your own opinions. Seek your own answers.
— In 2019, Peter Kreeft published Socrates'' Children, a four-volume series on the hundred greatest philosophers of all time, spanning from ancient Greece to contemporary Germany. But he made a terrible mistake: he somehow left out women, and with this, he overlooked the greatest mind of them all.He forgot her--a mysterious housewife from a desert village--because he had forgotten what philosophy means. Philosophy is not the cultivation of cleverness, Kreeft explains, or the sophistications of scholarship, or the analysis of analysis, or the refutation of refutations, or the deconstruction of deconstructions. No, philosophy is a romance, a love affair--the love of wisdom.This book is a one-of-a-kind study on Mary of Nazareth, the mother of Jesus. If Jesus Christ is wisdom incarnate, and if Mary loved Him more than anyone else ever did, then it holds that Mary is the greatest philosopher, the greatest wisdom-lover. With precision and humor, Kreeft not only unpacks the thought and spirit of Mary as we know her through Scripture and Church doctrine, but offers a heartfelt crash course in the basics of philosophy--methodology, epistemology, logic, metaphysics, cosmology, ethics, politics, aesthetics, and more--all through the lens of the Mother of God.Fans of Kreeft will find here another fine example of his characteristic freshness, creativity, depth, and readability. But above all, those who are curious about the mother of Jesus, whether they are new to Christian faith or simply hoping to discover it anew, will likely find themselves swept up in the tide of Mary''s wise love for God.
— Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Menu Browse Table of Contents What's New Random Entry Chronological Archives About Editorial Information About the SEP Editorial Board How to Cite the SEP Special Characters Advanced Tools Contact Support SEP Support the SEP PDFs for SEP Friends Make a Donation SEPIA for Libraries Entry Navigation Entry Contents Bibliography Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top Philosophy and Christian Theology First published Fri Oct 15, 2021 Many Christian doctrines raise difficult philosophical questions. For example, Christians have traditionally insisted that they worship a single God, while simultaneously identifying that God with a trinity comprised of three numerically distinct, fully divine persons: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. It is not easy to see how three divine persons add up to one God. Similarly, Christians have also asserted that a human man, Jesus of Nazareth, is also God-the-Son, the second person of the divine trinity. It is not easy to see how a human man, who is born, lives, and dies, could also be a fully divine being. Consider also the relationship between divine providence and human freedom. Are human beings free to accept or reject God, or does God alone decide who will accept or reject God? Any answer to this theological question will also assume some specific philosophical account of human freedom and moral responsibility. Christian thinkers have always drawn on philosophy to help answer these kinds of questions. In the earliest years of Christianity, running roughly from the second to the seventh centuries CE, and often called the “Patristic” period, the emerging Christian Church faced the daunting task of defining doctrinal orthodoxy in the face of internal and external challenges. In pursuing this task, Patristic thinkers typically did not understand themselves as “theologians” in contrast to “philosophers”. Indeed, they may not have endorsed any sharp distinction between philosophy and theology at all. But they still reasoned about their Christian commitments in the intellectual idiom of the ancient Mediterranean world, which was the idiom of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy. Over the course of the Patristic period, as the early Church successfully established its own intellectual framework, it formally defined the boundaries of Christian orthodoxy through a series of ecumenical councils. These councils—including the Councils of Nicaea (325 CE), Constantinople (381), and Chalcedon (451)—established the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity and its corollary, the doctrine of the Incarnation (see Kelly 1978). Yet even after the parameters of orthodoxy were established, Christian thinkers continued to face difficult philosophical questions about the meaning, coherence, and plausibility of settled Christian doctrines. They continued to try to answer those questions using the best philosophy of their day—from Scholastic Aristotelianism in the Medieval period to analytic metaphysics today. For Christian thinkers, the already settled doctrines of Christian orthodoxy provide a normative framework within which this philosophical reflection occurs, by demarcating the logical space that constrains the field of acceptable solutions. For example, it is not open to an orthodox Christian thinker to dispel the logical problem of the Trinity (the problem of how God can be both three and one) by arguing that there is in fact no God, or that God is not triune, or that the Father and the Son are two stages in the temporal life of the one God. These theoretical options are ruled out by virtue of the philosopher’s own orthodox Christian commitments. As a general, formal matter, this point holds even though different Christian groups disagree about what the constraints of orthodoxy actually are. So Roman Catholic Christians and Protestant Christians will accept different constraints about, say, the nature of the Eucharist, and rival Protestant Christian groups will differ with each other in a similar way. But as a formal matter, Christian thinkers who think philosophically about Christian doctrines typically do so inside the intellectual framework provided by what they regard as authoritative Christian orthodoxy. Obviously, it is not the case that everyone who wants to think philosophically about Christianity must accept the constraints of Christian orthodoxy, even in this more relativistic sense of “orthodoxy”. Some modern and contemporary thinkers still identify as Christians even though they reject the very idea of normative orthodoxy, for example. And, of course, non-Christian thinkers, including non-theists, will reject any notion of Christian orthodoxy in its entirety. Yet they can still think philosophically about Christian doctrines. Because its twin foci are so broad, an encyclopedia entry on “Philosophy and Christian Theology” could legitimately go in many different directions. This entry has two related aims. First, the entry discusses methodological questions about how philosophy and theology should be related. Accordingly, it surveys some of the most important ways they have been related in the history of the Christian tradition (Section 1), before turning to contemporary debates about the way Anglo-American analytic philosophy of religion interacts with theology (Section 3). Second, in between these two methodological sections, the entry also discusses recent work in analytic philosophical theology (Section 2). Note that the previous version of this entry (Murray and Rea 2008 [2021]) focused on topics in contemporary philosophical theology. That version is archived and available via the Other Internet Resources but see, also, the topic-focused entries linked in the Related Entries for additional coverage. Philosophical critics of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion (APR) are often struck by just how Christian and theological much of it seems. This criticism expresses the worry that APR as such looks too much like Christian philosophical theology. At the same time, theological critics often fault APR for lacking theological sophistication (Section 3). In order to understand both poles of criticism, it is useful to have a better sense of the relevant historical background (Section 1). But it is also important to appreciate what the best contemporary work in analytic philosophical theology actually looks like (Section 2). 1. The Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology in the Christian Tradition 1.1 Integration 1.2 Contrast 1.2.1 Cooperation 1.2.2 Disjunction 1.2.3 Conflict 1.3 From Historical Models to Contemporary Philosophical Theology 2. Recent Work in Analytic Philosophical Theology 2.1 Trinity 2.2 Incarnation and Christology 2.3 Atonement and Salvation 2.4 Sin, Original Sin, and the Fall 2.4.1 The First Sin 2.4.2 The Fall of Adam and Eve 2.4.3 Original Sin 2.4.4 Personal Sin 2.5 Other Topics 2.6 The Rise of “Analytic Theology” 3. Philosophy of Religion, Philosophical Theology, Christian Theology: Is There A Difference and Does it Matter? 3.1 Analytic Philosophy of Religion: Too Theological? 3.1.1 Narrowness of Scope? 3.1.2 Inappropriate Methods? 3.1.3 Responses to the Worry that APR is “Too Theological” 3.2 Or Not Theological Enough? Theological Critiques of Analytic Philosophy of Religion Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. The Relationship Between Philosophy and Theology in the Christian Tradition Although modern thought tends to assume a sharp disjunction between philosophy and theology, it is not at all obvious how to distinguish them in a principled way. Suppose that we take philosophy in the broadest sense to be the systematic use of human reason in an effort to understand the most fundamental features of reality, and suppose that we take theology in the broadest sense to be the study of God and all things in relation to God. Then we should expect to see considerable overlap between the two: after all, God, if there is a God, is surely one of the fundamental features of reality, and one to which all the other features presumably relate. In practice, when we survey the history of Christian thought, we do see considerable overlap between philosophy and theology. With respect to their topics of inquiry, philosophers and theologians alike ask questions about epistemology, axiology, and political theory, as well as about metaphysics and fundamental ontology. Similarly, with respect to their methods of inquiry, philosophers and theologians alike interpret authoritative texts, deploy arguments, and marshal evidence to support their conclusions. Here one might insist that Christian theological claims are grounded by appeals to “faith” or “authority”, whereas philosophical claims are grounded by appeals to “reason”. This contrast is promising when suitably developed, but it is not as sharp as one might initially suppose. Theology also makes appeals to common sense and ordinary human reason, and philosophy also has its versions of faith and authority. Of the making of typologies there is no end, but it is still worth examining some of the most common ways that Christian thinkers throughout the centuries have understood the relationship between philosophy and theology. Without this historical background, it becomes all-too-easy to draw the relationship in naïve, anachronistic, and overly simplistic ways. In fact, no single interpretation of the relationship between philosophy and theology can claim overwhelming support from the Christian tradition. From outside the Christian tradition, while many non-Christian thinkers see philosophy and theology as quite distinct, others deliberately blur the distinction between them—because they think that theology is actually just misguided philosophy. At the top-level of the proposed typology, we can distinguish between “Integration” and “Contrast” views. Integration views do not distinguish philosophy and theology at all, whereas Contrast views do. We can disambiguate the “Contrast” category into “Cooperation” views, “Disjunction” views, and “Conflict” views. The most prominent Cooperation views treat philosophy as a valuable, perhaps even necessary, tool for theological inquiry, and still allow some degree of overlap between the two. Disjunction views, by contrast, regard philosophy and theology as non-overlapping forms of inquiry, which feature distinct and ultimately unrelated goals and methods. “Conflict” views treat philosophy and theology as not only distinct but mutually antagonistic. In fact, however, few Christian thinkers have endorsed outright conflict between philosophy and theology. But it is still worth discussing the Conflict view explicitly, because some prominent Christian theologians throughout history—for example, Tertullian, Martin Luther, or Karl Barth—initially seem to advocate Conflict. Upon closer inspection, however, their views are closer to those in the Disjunction category. These categories are crude. They could each be further divided, and subdivided again. They focus mainly on different Christian attitudes toward the interaction of philosophy and theology, rather than on the attitudes of non-Christian philosophers. Some non-empty categories are omitted altogether. But these categories do capture much of the landscape, and at least show that there are more options available than a naïve conflict between faith and reason. 1.1 Integration The Integration model treats philosophy and Christian theology as continuous, integrated activities. On this model, rational inquiry about God does not sharply divide into discrete activities called “philosophy” and “theology”. Instead, there is simply the single, continuous intellectual task of trying to understand God, and all things in relation to God, using all of one’s intellectual resources. This account does not deny the importance of faith or revelation to the Christian intellectual life; rather, it denies that faith and revelation properly belong to a separate activity called “theology” in distinction from another activity called “philosophy”. According to this view, when we engage in rational inquiry of any sort, we should draw on every available source of knowledge that is relevant to that inquiry. So when we engage in rational inquiry about Christian topics, we should draw on scripture, Church tradition, and other such sources of knowledge, whether we call the resulting inquiry “theology”, “philosophy”, or something else. To do anything else would be to hobble our inquiry from the outset, according to the Integration view. This account of the relationship between philosophy and theology has deep roots in the Christian tradition. Before the rise of the medieval university, it was the dominant view, and it still has contemporary defenders (discussed below). Patristic thinkers did not typically describe their own intellectual work as “theology”. The term “theology” already had a fixed meaning in late antiquity. It meant “poetic speech about the gods”, and was in general associated with pagan story-telling and myth-making: the great “theologians”, were Homer and Hesiod. Even though Christian thinkers like Gregory of Nazianzus sometimes acquired the honorific title “Theologian”, they did so because of the lyrical and poetic quality of their writing, not because they wrote about Christian doctrinal topics (Zachhuber 2020; McGinn 2008). The general term that early Christian thinkers used to describe their intellectual work was, more often than not, simply “philosophy” or “Christian philosophy”. Christianity was regarded as the “true philosophy” over against the false philosophical schools associated with pagan thought. (See Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 8.1; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.28.3, 1.28.4 1.80.5,6; Augustine of Hippo, Against Julian, 4.14.72.) This usage is consistent with Pierre Hadot’s (1995) claim that in Greco-Roman antiquity philosophy was understood as a comprehensive way of life. Christianity, on this model, is analogous to a philosophical school, in Hadot’s sense (see also Zachhuber 2020). The Integration account continued to be the default account of the relationship between philosophy and theology into the early Medieval period. Before the rise of scholasticism in the great Western universities, there was no sharp distinction between philosophy and theology. Anselm of Canterbury, for example, certainly has the concept of a line of inquiry that proceeds using reason alone, without appealing to revelation, but he does not label that inquiry “philosophy” in distinction from “theology”. Moreover, in his own writings, he frequently blurs any such distinction, as he seamlessly moves between rational reflection and argument, on the one hand, to prayers, meditations, and exclamations of thanksgiving, on the other (e.g., Proslogion 1–4). Like many premodern Christian thinkers, Anselm also held that intellectual inquiry and personal holiness are linked, so that the more one grows in Christian virtue, the more rationally one is able to think about God (Adams 2004; Sweeney, 2011). This understanding of inquiry and virtue is also a hallmark of the Integration account. 1.2 Contrast Unlike the Integration model, the Contrast model insists that philosophy and theology are fundamentally different forms of inquiry. Strictly speaking, there can be many different Contrast models, because the relevant sense of “contrast” comes in degrees. I focus on three: Cooperation, Disjunction, and Conflict. On the Cooperation account, philosophy and theology remain close cousins. When rightly pursued, they cannot really conflict, and they can even overlap in their respective topics of inquiry, sources, and methods. Nevertheless, the Cooperation account holds that the overlap between philosophy and theology is only partial, because they each begin from different intellectual starting points and appeal to different sources of evidence (Baker-Hytch 2016; Chignell 2009: 117; Simmons 2019). On another version of the Contrast model, Disjunction, philosophy and theology are even further apart: although they still do not conflict, and may even consider the same topics in an attenuated sense, their starting assumptions and methods of investigation are different enough that they share no significant conclusions. Finally, Conflict accounts assert that the conclusions of Christian theology are positively irrational from the point of view of philosophy. Although some historically important Christian thinkers might seem to endorse Conflict, closer inspection shows that they do not. Nevertheless, in the popular imagination, a persistent assumption holds that Christianity requires a sharp conflict between theology and philosophy—or at least faith and reason—and so it is worth briefly discussing why Conflict has had few traditional defenders. 1.2.1 Cooperation On the Cooperation account, philosophy and theology are understood to be different, but mutually supporting, intellectual activities. For Christian thinkers who advocate Cooperation, philosophy and theology form a coherent, mutually supportive whole. They are not in conflict with respect to their conclusions, since truth cannot contradict truth, but they differ with respect to their foundational axioms, goals, and sources of evidence. Philosophy is understood as a preamble to theology, while theology completes and fulfills philosophy. Thomas Aquinas is a foundational advocate of the Cooperation account (Summa Theologiae 1.1.1–8, Summa Contra Gentiles 1.1.1–9, Hankey 2001). Often the relationship between philosophy and theology is described in hierarchical and instrumental terms: theology draws on philosophy as needed, because philosophy is instrumentally useful to theology. According to a traditional metaphor, philosophy is the servant of theology (ancilla theologiae, literally “handmaid” of theology; see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1.1.5). In a more contemporary idiom, theology uses conceptual tools provided by philosophy in the pursuit of its own distinctive intellectual task: elucidating the meaning and truth of revealed Christian doctrines. On the Cooperation account, theology differs from philosophy chiefly because theology assumes the truth of divine revelation, whereas philosophy does not. Philosophy takes its foundational axioms and assumptions from generally available truths of human reason and sensory experience. Philosophy and theology also differ in the way they argue and in the kinds of intellectual appeals that are proper to each. Theologians can appeal to revelation—scripture and authoritative Church tradition—in order to generate new lines of inquiry, and can treat revealed truths as evidence in their investigations. For their part, philosophers must appeal only to premises and evidence that are in principle available to any rational inquirer. This distinction between “revealed truths” and “truths of reason” implies that at least some revealed truths are not also truths of reason. By hypothesis, such truths would have remained unknown and unknowable had they not been revealed by God. (It therefore follows that without revelation, Christian theology could not exist, on the Cooperation account.) Paradigmatic instances of revealed truths are the doctrine of the Trinity, and the doctrine of the Incarnation. Throughout the centuries, most, though not all, broadly orthodox Christian thinkers have held that human beings could not reason their way to the truth of these doctrines without the aid of divine revelation. According to Aquinas, theologians use the conceptual tools furnished by philosophy to elucidate the contents of revelation. Just like philosophers, theologians make arguments, and their arguments appeal to common standards of logic and rigor, even though they also draw on theology’s own unique (revealed) axioms and sources of evidence (Summa Theologiae 1.1.1). Philosophical arguments cannot prove the foundational truths of revelation, according to Aquinas, but at the same time, revelation and reason cannot conflict. (That God exists is a truth of reason, not revelation, for Aquinas—see Summa Theologiae 1.2.2, reply to obj. 1.) Theologians can therefore use common standards of philosophical reasoning to answer any putative objections to their theological claims, by showing that any alleged conflict is only apparent. So, for example, even though it is not possible to establish that God is triune by means of philosophical arguments, it is possible to use philosophical arguments in a defensive mode, to answer objections alleging that the doctrine of the trinity is logically incoherent. When arguing with other Christians, theologians can appeal to revelation to support their claims. When arguing with opponents who do not accept revelation, they cannot (Summa Theologiae 1.1.8). Yet this restriction is not really a disciplinary maxim designed to oppose philosophy to theology, but a pragmatic admission that one cannot successfully persuade opponents by appealing to premises they deny. 1.2.2 Disjunction Like Cooperation, the Disjunction view holds that philosophy and theology are different forms of inquiry. Similarly, like Cooperation, the Disjunction view also that agrees that there can be no real conflict between the conclusions of philosophy (when true) and those of theology. But the Disjunction view goes further: Disjunction advocates deny that there is any significant overlap between philosophy and theology at all. Disjunction does not subordinate philosophy to theology or treat philosophy as an essential tool for theology. Instead, to borrow a term from contemporary science and religion debates, philosophy and theology are “non-overlapping magisteria” (Gould 1997). In particular, Cooperation’s appeal to the distinction between truths of reason and truths of revelation does not suffice to distinguish philosophy from theology, according to Disjunction advocates, who instead appeal to various more fundamental distinctions of method or approach (see discussion below). Of course, even those who explicitly advocate Disjunction will occasionally deploy some methods associated with philosophy: carefully defining terms, making formally valid arguments, uncovering contradictions in opposing views, etc. Yet these methods are found in any form of rational inquiry, and so (presumably) they do not belong to philosophy alone. Any given thinker’s view of Disjunction will of course depend on their underlying construal of philosophy and theology. Some thinkers—even some Christian thinkers—endorse the Disjunction view because they deny that theology is really a propositional, truth-apt discourse that proceeds by way of arguments and evidence. Instead, theology is something else entirely—poetry, perhaps; or a form of worship, praise, or prayer (Caputo 2015). This view of theology implies a sharp contrast with Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy, modern philosophy, and contemporary Anglo-American Analytic philosophy, though perhaps not with philosophy tout court. Philosophers might associate this view with the “expressivist” or “emotivist” critiques of theology that were common in the heyday of logical positivism. But in fact, versions of the “theology as poetry” view are found throughout the history of Christian thought (Beggiani 2014). Other versions of the Disjunction view figure even more prominently in the Christian tradition. The foundational Protestant reformers, Martin Luther and John Calvin, both advocate Disjunction, in part because they both reject the synthesis of philosophy and theology that characterized late medieval scholasticism. According to Luther, philosophy and theology proceed from entirely different perspectives, with different starting points and different goals (1539 [1966: 244]; Grosshans 2017). Philosophy considers its objects of inquiry from the perspective of common human reason and sense experience, with the goal of trying to understand things as they actually are in the real world. Theology considers its objects of inquiry from a creational and eschatological perspective, with the goal of trying to understand them in relation to God as their creator and final end. Furthermore, for Luther, “creation” and its cognates are properly theological terms whose meaning derives from scripture and revelation, and which should not be identified with any philosophical notion of a first cause or prime mover; mutatis mutandis, the same point hold for creation’s final end in God (1539 [1966: 245, 248]). Even when philosophy and theology do consider the same object of inquiry—for example, the human being—this difference in perspective ensures that the lines of inquiry remain completely separate. Luther’s 1536 “Disputation Concerning Man”, for example opens with the thesis that “Philosophy or human wisdom defines man as an animal having reason, sensation, and body” and then goes on to explore this definition. But his exploration only serves to contrast this philosophical view of the human being with the perspective of theology. Theology, from the fulness of its wisdom, defines man as whole and perfect… made in the beginning after the image of God… subject to the power of the devil, sin and death…freed and given eternal life only through the Son of God, Jesus Christ. (1536 [1966: 137–138]) Luther’s theological account of the human being does not contradict the philosophical account, but it also does not complete or augment that account, because (according to Luther) properly theological claims are simply unintelligible to philosophy (1536 [1966: 137–140]; 1539 [1966: 240–241, 242]). They do not belong to the same universe of discourse. Calvin shares Luther’s basic understanding of the disjunction between philosophy and theology. Like Luther, Calvin holds that the Fall has corrupted the power of human reason, but has not destroyed it altogether (Institutes 2.2.12–17). When restricted to its proper sphere—matters pertaining to the natural world—philosophy remains valuable. But as a result of the Fall, “heavenly things” are inaccessible to unaided human reason (Institutes 2.2.13). By “heavenly things”, Calvin means the saving truths of the Gospel. So far, Calvin’s understanding might seem quite similar to the Cooperation view, which also denies that revealed truths are accessible to human reason. But Calvin further distinguishes philosophy from theology at the level of method, by denying that true theology engages in abstract, speculative reasoning, which he associates with philosophy, and insisting that any legitimate knowledge of God must be practical and affective (Institutes 1.12.1, 1.5.10). For example, according to Calvin, it would be impious and dangerous to speculate on all the actions that God could possibly do—God’s absolute power. Instead, we should focus our loving attention on what God has actually done, paradigmatically in the person and work of Christ (Institutes 3.24.2; Helm 2004: 24–26). Theology presupposes Christian faith, which is an affective response to Christ, and which requires “confidence and assurance of heart” (Institutes 3.2.33). Yet scholastic philosophy, with its “endless labyrinths” and “obscure definitions”, has “drawn a veil over Christ to hide him” (Institutes 3.2.2). For Luther and Calvin, then, there can be no genuinely philosophical theology. Even though both agree that philosophical speculation can arrive at some limited truths about, e.g., a first cause, or about the nature of human beings, those truths are of no theological interest; even as bare propositional claims, they are already better and more fully known in theological inquiry. From the other direction, the properly Christian notions of God as creator and of the human being as imago dei, e.g., resist all philosophical speculation. Of course, Luther and Calvin can only hold these views because of the way they understand philosophy and theology. They both identify philosophy with late medieval scholasticism, and they both understand theology as a kind of existential encounter with God and Christ, as revealed in the scriptures. Different accounts of philosophy and theology would yield different construals of the underlying disjunction, or no disjunction at all. 1.2.3 Conflict None of the three views considered so far—Integration, Cooperation, and Disjunction—assume any real, essential conflict between philosophy and theology. All three views allow for apparent conflict, due to errors of reasoning or interpretation, or when either discipline departs from its own proper sphere, but they do not assert that Christian theology or Christian faith is irrational from the point of view of philosophy, nor do they hold that any significant Christian doctrinal claims can be falsified by sound philosophical reasoning. Throughout the history of Christian thought, many prominent Christian philosophers and theologians have criticized philosophy, or fulminated against what they regard as philosophical overreach, but few if any have regarded philosophy and theology as essentially incompatible, in the sense just outlined. Popular understandings of “faith” and “reason” often posit a deep and abiding conflict between the two, and so it is important to emphasize just how rare that position has actually been among major Christian philosophers and theologians. Key figures who are often regarded as Conflict advocates, turn out, upon closer inspection, to hold a different view. For example, the Patristic theologian Tertullian famously asks “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” but he never actually asserted the irrationalist credo “I believe because it is absurd” (De praescriptione haereticorum 7; De carne Christi 5.4; see also Harrison 2017). Instead, like all the Patristic fathers, Tertullian regarded human reason as one of God’s greatest gifts; ratio (reason) is one of his most frequently used nouns, and his own writing draws heavily on the stoic philosophy of his day (Osborn 1997). Turning to a putative modern irrationalist, Søren Kierkegaard presents the incarnation as a paradox that offends human reason in his (pseudonymous) 1844 Philosophical Fragments, but close reading shows that “paradox” and “offence” do not equate to “formal contradiction” (1844 [1985: 53, 101]; Evans 1989). Rather, the incarnation seems paradoxical only to fallen, sinful human reason (1844, [1985: 46–47]). So the “offence” of the incarnation resolves into the claim that the doctrine of the incarnation had to be revealed, because its truth exceeds the limits of fallen reason. But, as discussed above, accepting this claim about the incarnation has been the norm throughout the Christian tradition. Moreover, according to Kierkegaard, even though the truth of the incarnation exceeds the limits of human reason, the claim that reason has limits is itself one that can be assessed by human reason (1846 [1992: 580]; Evans 1989: 355). Finally, the twentieth century theologian Karl Barth’s famous “No!” to philosophical reasoning about God is also best understood as a rejection of philosophical overreach rather than a rejection of philosophy per se (Brunner & Barth 1946). According to Barth, we cannot establish the truth of theological claims using generally persuasive arguments available to any rational enquirer. But Barth had no quarrel with using philosophy in an Anselmian mode, to elucidate and clarify the implications of divine revelation, and in principle he even allows that there could be a genuinely Christian philosophy (1932 [1975: 6]; Diller 2010). These prominent Christian thinkers all criticize what they see as philosophical hubris, but they do not set philosophy and theology as such in essential opposition, and they do not agree that any belief-worthy Christian doctrines actually are irrational—still less that they can be falsified by sound philosophical reasoning. In a way, this conclusion should be unsurprising. It is a basic claim of Christian orthodoxy that God is the very summit and source of rationality, and that human reason is one of God’s greatest gifts (Turner 2004; A. N. Williams 2007; Crisp et al. 2012). Christian thinkers have differed about the degree to which sin and the Fall have caused human reason to malfunction, but the suggestion that theological truths conflict with properly functioning human reason is alien to the orthodox Christian tradition, and so it is unsurprising that few major Christian thinkers have endorsed it. Far more common is the claim that some theological truths are inaccessible to philosophy because they somehow surpass human reason. On this line, when there is an apparent conflict between a philosophical conclusion and some Christian truth, the conflict is treated as a sign that philosophy has overstepped its own proper boundaries, not a sign that Christian truth actually conflicts with human reason. By and large, even the sharpest Christian critics of philosophy have held this view. 1.3 From Historical Models to Contemporary Philosophical Theology This historical survey has focused on prominent models of the relationship between philosophy and theology in the history of Christian thought. The survey also illuminates some contemporary philosophical and theological debates about how to understand this relationship. Notwithstanding its Patristic origins, the Integrationist view has been especially prominent in recent philosophy of religion. For example, Alvin Plantinga’s (1984) programmatic essay “Advice to Christian Philosophers” intentionally blurs the distinction between philosophy and theology. Plantinga argues that Christian philosophers qua philosophers are entitled to base their arguments on revealed truths, and urges them to investigate distinctively Christian questions that may be of no interest to the wider philosophical community. More recent defenders of “analytic theology” have also taken an integrationist line. According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, the demise of Enlightenment-style foundationalism has thoroughly blurred the distinction between philosophy and theology: What difference does [this distinction] make, now that analytic philosophers no longer believe that for some piece of discourse to be a specimen of philosophy, the writer must base all his arguments on public philosophical reason? Call it what you will. (Wolterstorff 2009: 168; see also Stump 2013: 48–49; Timpe 2015: 13) Yet this prominent Integrationist line has been strongly criticized by other philosophers of religion, who implicitly endorse some version of the Contrast view, on which philosophy cannot legitimately appeal to theological sources of evidence like revelation and Church authority (Simmons 2019; Schellenberg 2018; Oppy 2018; Draper 2019: 2–4). At the same time, according to many Christian theologians, analytic philosophy as such is almost uniquely unsuitable for investigating properly theological questions (Milbank 2009; Hart 2013: 123–134). On the view of these critics, analytic philosophical theology does not revive the Patristic integration of philosophy and theology at all; rather, it remains a distinctly anti-theological form of modern philosophy. Contemporary philosophers and theologians continue to debate the proper relationship between philosophy and theology. Before considering these debates in further detail (in Section 3), however, it is useful to briefly survey recent work in analytic philosophical theology. The fact that the Integrationist view has been so prominent among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion has helped shape a philosophical climate in which self-identified philosophers, working in departments of philosophy, find it completely natural to investigate explicitly Christian theological questions, from within the framework of normative Christian orthodoxy, in the course of their academic work. 2. Recent Work in Analytic Philosophical Theology Recent work in analytic philosophical theology has engaged with nearly every major Christian doctrine. But work has focused on the most central doctrines: Trinity, Incarnation and Christology, Salvation and Atonement, and Sin and Original Sin. This section lays out the most significant philosophical problems associated with each doctrine and identifies some of the foundational philosophical responses from contemporary thinkers. 2.1 Trinity Analytic philosophical theology on the Trinity has focused primarily on the “logical” problem of the Trinity, the problem of how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—construed as three really existing, really distinct divine entities—can also be exactly one God (Cartwright 1987). The Church’s first two ecumenical councils defined the orthodox terminology now used to state the doctrine, but the councils did not attempt a philosophical solution to the logical problem. In the traditional terminology, the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct divine persons (personae in Latin; hypostases in Greek) who share a single divine nature (substantia in Latin; ousia in Greek; see Tanner 1990: 5, 24, 28). The logical problem then becomes the problem of how three divine persons (whatever we mean by “persons”) can instantiate a single divine nature (whatever we mean by “nature”) while remaining numerically distinct. Responses to the logical problem can be grouped into several families, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. “Social” trinitarians defend an account of the Trinity on which the Father, Son, and Spirit are three distinct centers of consciousness, with three distinct centers of knowledge, will, and action, who nevertheless count as a single God. Social trinitarians attempt to secure the divine unity by arguing that a single divine nature can support three separate consciousnesses. They may also claim that the three persons necessarily love each other so perfectly and act in such harmony that they are properly regarded as a single God. Prominent social trinitarians include Richard Swinburne (1994), William Lane Craig (2006), Keith Yandell (2009), and William Hasker (2013). By contrast, “Latin” trinitarians deny that the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct centers of consciousness. On Latin trinitarianism, even though the Father, Son, and Spirit are numerically distinct persons, they are not numerically distinct divine agents. When they act, they do not merely act in perfect harmony (as on social trinitarianism). Rather they are (somehow) a single actor, with a single will, carrying out a single action. The special challenge for Latin trinitarianism is to explain how it can be the case that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, so construed, really do exist as concrete, distinct entities, and are not just different names for the same entity, or different phases in the life of a not-essentially triune God. Brian Leftow offers the most well-developed Latin model, which appeals to an extended analogy to a time-travelling chorus-line dancer (2004). Unsurprisingly, the sharpest critics of Latin trinitarianism are those who advocate a social trinity, and vice-versa: each side insists that the theoretical costs of the opposing view are too great. So Latin trinitarians charge that social trinitarians do not escape tri-theism (Leftow 1999; see also Merricks 2006); social trinitarians argue that their Latin counterparts cannot explain how the Father and Son could have a genuine, “I–you”, personal relationship, as the Biblical account seems to suggest (e.g., Matt 3:17, Mark 14:36; Hasker 2013: 114–118; McCall 2010: 87–88).
— What is the fruit of a searching dialogue between faith and reason? This book collects theological and philosophical perspectives on the richness of the faith-reason dialogue, including examples from literature, continental and analytic philosophy, worship and liturgy, and radical approaches to issues of racism and prejudice. The authors strongly resist the temptations to either disregard the faith-reason dialogue or take it for granted. Through their explorations and reflections they open up new vistas and horizons on a topic more necessary than ever.
— ⭐️ Donate $5 to help keep these videos FREE for everyone! Pay it forward for the next viewer: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/donate-youtube-a101 Faith does not frustrate reason. They are in harmony, which can be spelled out in seven principles. Harmony of Faith and Reason: Seven Principles (Aquinas 101) - Fr. James Brent For readings, podcasts, and more videos like this, go to http://www.Aquinas101.com. While you’re there, be sure to sign up for one of our free video courses on Aquinas. And don’t forget to like and share with your friends, because it matters what you think! Subscribe to our channel here: https://www.youtube.com/c/TheThomisticInstitute?sub_confirmation=1 -- Aquinas 101 is a project of the Thomistic Institute that seeks to promote Catholic truth through short, engaging video lessons. You can browse earlier videos at your own pace or enroll in one of our Aquinas 101 email courses on St. Thomas Aquinas and his masterwork, the Summa Theologiae. In these courses, you'll learn from expert scientists, philosophers, and theologians—including Dominican friars from the Province of St. Joseph. Enroll in Aquinas 101 to receive the latest videos, readings, and podcasts in your email inbox each Tuesday morning. Sign up here: https://aquinas101.thomisticinstitute.org/ Help us film Aquinas 101! Donate here: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/donate-youtube-a101 Want to represent the Thomistic Institute on your campus? Check out our online store! Explore here: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/store-youtube-a101 Stay connected on social media: https://www.facebook.com/ThomisticInstitute https://www.instagram.com/thomisticinstitute https://twitter.com/thomisticInst Visit us at: https://thomisticinstitute.org/ #Aquinas101 #ThomisticInstitute #ThomasAquinas #Catholic #ScienceAndFaith #ScienceAndReligion This video was made possible through the support of grant #61944 from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
— Video message of the Holy Father to mark the International Meeting “Science for peace”, 2 July 2021
— St. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 14 ("On faith") Article 2: What is faith? In Hebrews 11:1 the Apostle says that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument (argumentum) of things that are not apparent. IT SEEMS THAT IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY THIS: 1. No quality is a substance. Faith is a quality, since it is a virtue, i.e., a good quality of the mind, etc. Therefore, faith is not a substance. 2. Further, spiritual being is added to natural being and is its perfection; hence, it must be similar to it. But in the natural being of a human being the substance is said to be the very essence of the soul, which is a first act, but not the power of the soul, which is the principle of a second act. Therefore, in a spiritual being one should not say that the essence itself is faith or any other virtue, since a virtue is a proximate principle of an operation and hence perfects a power. Rather, one should say that the essence is grace, from which (i) spiritual being derives as from a first act and which (ii) perfects the very essence of the soul. 3. Someone will claim that faith is called a substance because it is the first among the different virtues. -- Against this one should reply that virtues are considered in three ways, viz., (i) as regards their habits, (ii) as regards their objects, and (iii) as regards their powers. But as regards their habits, faith is not prior to the others. For the definition under discussion seems to be a definition of faith only insofar as faith is formed, since it is only in this sense that it is the foundation, as Augustine says; but all the gratuitous virtues are infused simultaneously. Similarly, as regards their objects, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues. For it is not the case that faith tends toward the true itself, which seems to be its proper object, more than charity tends toward the highest good or more than hope tends toward what is most difficult thing or toward the God's supreme liberality. Similarly, as regards their powers, faith does not seem to be prior to the other virtues, since all the gratuitous virtues seem to be referred back to desire. Therefore, faith is in no way prior to the other virtues, and so faith should not be called the foundation or the substance of the other virtues. 4. Further, things to be hoped for subsist in us more through charity than through faith. Therefore, the definition under discussion seems to belong to charity rather than to faith. 5. Further, hope is generated from faith, as is evident in the Gloss on Matthew 1:2, since 'faith' is posited in the definition of hope. But 'hope' is posited in the definition of a thing to be hoped for. Therefore, if 'a thing to be hoped for' is posited in the definition of faith, there will be a circularity in the definitions--which is absurd, since in that case there will be something that is prior to and better known than itself. For it will be possible for the same thing to be posited in the definition of itself when the definitions are substituted for the names [defined], and it will also be possible for the definitions to be infinite. 6. Further, diverse habits have diverse objects. But a theological virtue has the same thing for both its end and its object. Therefore, among the theological virtues it is necessary that the diverse virtues have diverse ends. But a thing to be hoped for is the proper end of hope. Therefore, 'a thing to be hoped for' should not be posited in the definition of faith either as an object or as an end. 7. Further, faith is perfected more by charity than by hope; that is why it is said to be formed by charity. Therefore, in the definition of faith one ought to posit the object of charity, which is a good or a thing to be loved, rather than the object of hope, which is a thing to be hoped for. 8. Further, faith is related precisely to the articles themselves. But the articles do not all pertain to things to be hoped for--just one or two do, viz., the resurrection of the flesh and life everlasting. Therefore, 'a thing to be hoped for' should not be posited in the definition of faith. 9. Further, arguing is an act of reason. But faith pertains to things that are beyond reason. Therefore, it should not be called an argument. 10. Further, in the soul there are two movements, viz., toward the soul and from the soul. Now in a movement toward the soul the principle is extrinsic, whereas in a movement from the soul the principle is intrinsic. But it is impossible for the same thing to be both an intrinsic principle and an extrinsic principle. Therefore, it is impossible for the same movement to be both toward the soul and from the soul. But cogitation is perfected in a movement toward the soul, whereas desire is perfected in a movement from the soul. Therefore, neither faith nor anything else can be both a principle of desire and a principle of cogitation. Therefore, in the definition of faith it is incorrect to posit both something that pertains to desire, viz., 'the substance of things to be hoped for', and something that pertains to cogitation, viz., 'the argument of things that are not apparent'. 11. Further, a single habit cannot belong to diverse powers. But the affective power and the intellective power are diverse powers. Therefore, since faith is a single habit, it cannot pertain both to cognition and affection; and so the same conclusion follows as before. 12. Further, a single habit has a single act. Therefore, since two acts are being posited in the definition of faith, viz., (i) to make the things that are hoped for subsist in us, in accord with which act one says 'the substance of things to be hoped for', and (ii) to convince the mind, in accord with which one says 'the argument of things that are not apparent', it seems that faith is not being correctly described. 13. Further, understanding is prior to desire. But the phrase 'the substance of things to be hoped for' pertains to desire, whereas what is afterwards joined to it, viz., 'the argument of things that are not apparent', pertains to understanding. Therefore, the parts of the definition in question are incorrectly ordered. 14. Further, what is called an argument is that which induces the mind to assent to something. But the mind is induced to assent to given things because those things are apparent to it. Therefore, there seems to be an opposition in the phrase that it is added, when one says 'the argument of things that are not apparent'. 15. Further, faith is a kind of cognition. But every cognition is about something that is apparent to the one who is cognizing. For by means of a cognition something is apparent both in the sentient part of the soul and in the intellective part of the soul. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say that faith is of things that are not apparent. I REPLY: One should reply that, according to some people, the Apostle intended by this definition to show not what faith is but rather what faith does. However, it seems better to reply that this explanation of faith is the most complete definition of it--not in the sense that it is rendered in the form appropriate to a definition, but rather because it adequately touches upon all the things that are required for a definition of faith. For sometimes it is sufficient for even philosophers themselves to touch upon the principles of [given] syllogisms and definitions, and once these principles are had, it is not difficult to reduce them to forms that are in keeping with the doctrine of the art [of logic]. Now there are three indications of this point. I. The first is the fact that all the principles on which the existence of faith depends are touched upon in the definition under discussion. For since, as was said above, the condition of one who believes is such that his intellect is determined to something by his will, whereas the will does nothing except insofar as it is moved by its object, which is a desirable good and an end, [it follows that] two principles are required for the end. One [A] is the good that moves the will, and the second [B] is that to which the intellect assents when the will makes it [assent]. A. Now there are two ultimate goods of a human being which move the will primarily as ultimate ends. One of these goods is proportionate to human nature, since natural powers are sufficient to obtain it. And this is the happiness that philosophers have spoken about, be it (i) contemplative happiness, which consists in the act of wisdom, or (ii) active happiness, which consists primarily in the act of prudence and derivatively in the acts of the other moral virtues. The other good for a human being exceeds a proportion to human nature, since natural powers are not sufficient to obtain it, or even to cogitate about it or desire it; instead, this good is promised to a human being by God's liberality alone--1 Corinthians 2:9: "Without you, O God, eye has not seen the things which you have prepared for those who await you"--and this good is eternal life. And it is by this good that the will is inclined toward assenting to those things which it holds on faith; thus it is said in John 6:40, "Whoever sees the Son and believes in him has eternal life." Now nothing can be ordered to an end unless some sort of proportion to the end preexists in it, a proportion from which there arises in it a desire for the end. And this happens insofar as a sort of inception of the end comes to exist in it, since it desires nothing except to the extent that it desires some likeness of that [inception]. And so it is that in human nature itself there is a sort of inception of that good which is proportionate to [human] nature. For in human nature there naturally preexist (i) principles of demonstration, known per se, which are seeds of wisdom, and (ii) certain principles of the natural law, which are seeds of the moral virtues. Hence, in order for a human being to be ordered toward the good of eternal life, it is also necessary that a sort of inception of that good should come to exist in the one who is promised eternal life. But eternal life consists in the full cognition of God, as is evident from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they should know you, the only true God." Hence, it is necessary that some inception of this supernatural cognition should come to exist in us. And this inception comes through faith, which on the basis of an infused light holds fast to things that by nature exceed our cognition. Now in wholes that have ordered parts it is customary for the first part, in which there exists an inception of the whole, to be called the substance of the whole, e.g., the foundation of a house and the keel of a ship. This is why the Philosopher claims in Metaphysics II that if being were a single whole, its first part would be substance. And so it is that faith, insofar as it is a sort of inception within us of the eternal life that we hope for because of God's promise, is called the substance of things to be hoped for. And so here one touches upon the relation of faith to the good that moves the will when it determines the intellect. B. Now the will, moved by the aforementioned good, proposes something that is not apparent to the intellect as being worthy of its assent, and it determines the intellect to that which is not apparent in such a way that [the intellect] assents to it. Therefore, just as an intelligible thing that is seen by the intellect determines the intellect and because of this is said to convince the mind, so too something that is not apparent to the intellect determines it and induces it necessarily to assent to it by the very fact that it is accepted by the will. This is why another reading has 'conviction' (convictio), since it convinces the intellect in the way just explained. And so in saying 'the argument of things that are not apparent' one touches upon the relation of faith to that which the intellect assents to. So, then, we have (i) the matter or object of faith from the fact that he says 'about things that are not apparent', (ii) the act of faith from the fact that he says 'the argument', and (iii) the ordering of faith to its end from the fact that he says 'the substance of things to be hoped for'. Now on the basis of the act one also grasps (i) the genus, viz., habit, which is known through the act, as well as (ii) the subject [of the habit], viz., the mind. And nothing further is required for the definition of a virtue. Hence, in accord with what has been said it is easy to formulate the definition in an artful way. So we may say that faith is a habit of the mind by which eternal life begins in us, a habit which makes the intellect assent to things that are not apparent. II. The second indication is that through the definition in question faith is distinguished from all other things. For by saying 'of things that are not apparent' one distinguishes faith from knowledge (scientia) and understanding (intellectus). Again, by saying 'the argument' one distinguishes faith from (i) opinion (opinio) and doubt (dubitatio), in which the mind is not convinced, i.e., not determined to some one thing, and also from (ii) all habits which are not cognitive. Again, by saying 'the substance of things to be hoped for' one distinguishes [faith in the proper sense] from (i) faith as it is commonly understood (fides communiter accepta), in accord with which we are said either to believe that which we strongly opine or to believe in the testimony of some human being, and also from (ii) prudence (prudentia) and the other cognitive habits, which are not ordered toward the things to hoped for or which, if they are so ordered, are not such that a proper inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us through them. III. The third indication is the fact that none of those who have wanted to define faith has been able to define it otherwise than by positing this whole definition or some part of it in different terms. For when Damascene says, viz., "Faith is the hypostasis of things that are hoped for and the proof of things that are not seen," it is manifestly obvious that this is the same thing that the Apostle says. On the other hand, when Damascene goes on to add, "The unshakable and unquestionable hope in the things that have been announced to us by God and in the efficacy of our prayers," this is a sort of explication of what the Apostle had said, viz., "the substance of things to be hoped for." For the things to be hoped for are, first of all, the rewards that have been promised to us by God and, secondly, any other things we seek from God as necessary for [obtaining] those rewards, things with respect to which a firm hope is had through faith. This hope cannot fail, and this is why it is called unshakable; nor can it be justifiably be reprehended as a vain hope, and this is why it is called unquestionable. Now when Augustine says, "Faith is a virtue by which things that are not seen are believed," and, again, when Damascene says, "Faith is not an examined consent," and when Hugo of St. Victor says, "Faith is a sort of certitude of the soul with respect to absent, a certitude that is superior to opinion and inferior to knowledge," this is the same thing that the Apostle means by "the argument of things that are not apparent." For faith is said to be inferior to knowledge because, unlike knowledge, it does not include vision, even though it does include firm adherence; on the other hand, faith is said to be superior to opinion because of the firmness of the assent. And so faith is said to be inferior to knowledge to the extent that it is of things that are not apparent, and superior to opinion to the extent that it is an argument. And from what has been said it is evident [what one should say] about the other [authorities]. Moreover, when Dionysius says, "Faith is the enduring foundation of those who believe, putting them in the truth and putting the truth in them," this is the same thing that the Apostle means by "the substance of things to be hoped for." For the cognition of truth is a thing to be hoped for, since beatitude is nothing other than a rejoicing in the truth, as Augustine says in the Confessions. AD 1. To the first objection one should reply that faith is called a substance not because it is in the genus of substance, but because it bears a certain similarity to a substance, viz., insofar as it is a first inception of and, as it were, a sort of foundation for the whole spiritual life--in just the way that a substance is the foundation of all beings. AD 2. To the second objection one should reply that the Apostle means to be comparing faith not to those things that are within us but to those things that are outside us. Now even though in natural being it is the essence of the soul that is the first thing and the substance with respect to the powers and the habits and all the resulting things which are in [the soul], one nonetheless finds a relation to external things not in the essence but primarily in the power; and, similarly, one finds a relation to external things not in grace [itself] but in virtue, and primarily in faith. This is why he was not able to say that grace, rather than faith, is the substance of things to be hoped for. AD 3. To the third objection one should reply that faith is prior to the other virtues (i) on the part of its object and (ii) on the part of its power and (iii) on the part of its habit. It is prior on the part of its object not because it tends toward its object more than the other virtues do, but because its object naturally moves [the soul] before the object of charity and the objects of the other virtues do. This is evident from the fact that what is good never moves the appetite except through the intellect, as is said in On the Soul III. By contrast, in order for what is true to move the intellect, it does not need any movement on the part of the appetite. And this is why the act of faith is naturally prior to the act of charity; and the same holds for the habit of faith, even though [the habit of faith and the habit of charity] exist together when the faith is formed faith. And for this same reason a cognitive power is naturally prior to an affective power. Now faith exists in a cognitive power. This is evident from the fact that the proper object of faith is the true and not the good. However, faith does in a certain sense have its completion in the will, as will be explained below in articles 4 and 9. AD 4. To the fourth objection one should reply that it is already evident from what has been said that the first inception of the things to be hoped for comes to exist in us not through charity but through faith. Nor, again, is charity an argument. Thus, the description under discussion does not in any way belong to charity. AD 5. To the fifth objection one should reply that since the good that inclines us toward faith exceeds reason, it does not have a name. And so by a sort of circumlocution one substitutes 'things to be hoped for' for [this good]. This frequently happens in definitions. AD 6. To the sixth objection one should reply that even though every power has an end, which is its good, nonetheless not every power, but only the will, is related to the nature of an end or a good insofar as it is good. And this is why the will moves all the other powers; for every motion begins with the intending of the end. Therefore, even though the true is the end of faith, still 'the true' does not express the nature of an end; hence, it is not the true, but rather something pertaining to desire, that should be posited as the end of faith. AD 7. To the seventh objection one should reply that a thing to be loved can be either present or absent, whereas only what is absent is a thing to be hoped for. Romans 8:24: "For who hopes for what he sees?" Hence, since faith is of absent things, its end is more properly expressed by 'thing to be hoped for' than by 'thing to be loved'. AD 8. To the eighth objection one should reply that an article [of the faith] is, as it were, the matter of faith, whereas a thing to be hoped for is posited not as the matter but as the end. Hence, the argument does not follow. AD 9. To the ninth objection one should reply that 'argument' (argumentum) is said in many ways. For (i) sometimes it signifies the very act of reason by which one reasons discursively from principles to conclusions. And (ii) because the whole force of an argument consists in the middle term, the middle term is also sometimes called an argument. Further, (iii) it is also the case that the introductions to books, which contain a sort of foretaste of the work that follows, are called arguments. And (iv) because something is made manifest through an argument, the principle of manifestation, as well as the very light by which something is cognized, can be called an argument. And faith can be called an argument in each of these four ways. It can be called an argument in the first way to the extent that reason assents to something because it is said by God. And so because of the authority of the speaker an assent is effected in the one who believes, since in dialectics it is also the case that some arguments are taken from authority. Now in the second sense faith is called the argument of things that are not apparent either (i) to the extent that the faith of believers is a middle term for proving that things that are not apparent exist, or (ii) to the extent that the faith of our fathers is for us a middle term that induces us to believe, or (iii) to the extent that faith with respect to one article is a middle term for faith with respect to another article, in the way that Christ's resurrection is a middle term with respect to the general resurrection, as is evident from 1 Corinthians 16:12. Faith is called an argument in the third sense to the extent that faith is a sort of meager foretaste of the cognition that we will have in the future. And faith is called an argument in the fourth sense as regards the light of faith itself, through which the things believed are cognized. Now faith is said to be beyond reason not because faith does not involve an act of reason but rather because the reason involved in faith cannot lead one to see the things which pertain to faith. AD 10. To the tenth objection one should reply that the act of faith consists essentially in cognition, and therein lies its perfection as regards its form and species. This is evident from its object, as was explained in the body of this article. But it is in affection that faith is perfected as regards its end, since it is because of charity that faith is meritorious with respect to the end. The inception of faith also lies in affection to the extent that the will determines the intellect to assent to the things which pertain to faith. But that act of will is neither an act of charity nor a species of charity, but is instead a certain desire for the promised good. And so it is evident that faith does not exist in two powers as in a subject. AD 11. The reply to the eleventh objection is evident from this. AD 12. To the twelfth objection one should reply that in saying 'the substance of things to be hoped for' one touches upon not the act of faith but only upon its relation to the end. One touches upon the act of faith when one relates faith to its object by saying 'the argument of things that are not apparent'. AD 13. To the thirteenth objection one should reply that that to which the intellect assents moves the intellect not because of its own power but because of the inclination of the will. Hence, the good which moves the desire is like a first mover in the act of faith, whereas that to which the intellect assents is like a moved mover. And this is why in the definition of faith the relation of faith to the good of the desire is posited before its relation to its proper object. AD 14. To the fourteenth objection one should reply that faith convinces or induces the mind not because of the evidentness of the matter but rather because of the will's inclination, as was explained in the body of this article. Hence, the argument does not follow. AD 15. To the fifteenth objection one should reply that 'cognition' can convey two things, viz., (i) vision and (ii) assent. Insofar as it conveys vision, cognition is distinguished from faith. This is why Gregory says that things that are seen have cognition rather than faith. According to Augustine in On Seeing God, those things are said to be seen which are present to the senses or to the intellect. But things that are said to be present to the intellect do not exceed its capacity. However, as far as the certitude of the assent is concerned, faith is a cognition, a cognition by virtue of which it can be called a knowledge and a vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now darkly through a mirror." And this is what Augustine says in On Seeing God: "If it is not improper to say that we know that which we believe most certainly, then from this it follows that we are rightly said to see with the mind the things that are believed, even though they are not present to our senses." Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso University of Notre Dame
On one interpretation faith and reason are opposed since faith involves believing something without reason, while reason rejects belief that does not have evidence or other direct rational support. This, however, is a caricature of what are in fact complex and interconnected notions. On the one hand it is important to distinguish between a) believing something in the face of evidence and reasoning to the contrary, and b) believing it though evidence and reasoning are insufficient of themselves to determine its truth. On the other hand, reasoning does not operate in a mental vacuum. It has a context which involves assuming things for which one does not oneself have evidence or rational proof. Believing that there is a material world, that is has existed for a vast period of time, that one was born, that there are other people, that there are chemical elements, that 2+2=4, the English word ‘man’ means man, and so on are taken to be rational but they are all generally assumed rather than personally established by reason or empirical evidence. Indeed, in some cases it is hard to see how they could be established. So, believing without evidence or reason is a widespread phenomenon. Similarly, faith does not operate in isolation from empirical evidence and reasoning. Here it is also important to distinguish between faith-in, and faith-that. Mutually trusting partners have faith-in one another, subscribers to a set of beliefs (religious or otherwise) believe-that such and such is the case. As with faith and reason, these two phenomena are intertwined. If you have faith in someone then you have reason to believe that what they say on certain matters is true. Likewise, if you believe that someone is trustworthy then you have reason to have faith in them. Christians believe a number of things most centrally articles of faith as expressed in Creeds, but the opening words “I believe in God …’ in their original use, derived from Hebrew beliefs in the Abrahamic covenant, express both belief that there is one and only one God and trust in God. Natural theology refers to that field of thought which seeks to establish truths about God on the basis only of natural evidence and reason, i.e. without appeal to revelation. Its central preoccupation has been devising and assessing arguments for the existence of God such as from the existence and nature of the world.