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Emotions

The word ‘emotion’ derives from terms meaning disturbance, excitement and movement, and it retains some of these connotations but now in relation to psychological responses. It has been common to contrast the emotional with the rational, presenting the former as subjective and the latter as objective, but as a general account this is mistaken. To respond emotionally is to have a positive or negative felt attitude towards something real or imagined. In this respect emotions are different from moods. Someone may be irascible or melancholic, that is have a general disposition to become angry or to be sad, but an emotion itself such as anger or grief is directed towards something. Like thoughts, emotions have ‘objects’ – things, conditions, situations, states of affairs. This feature makes them like judgements and thereby opens them to assessment as appropriate, proportionate, reasonable, warranted and so on. If someone says they are angry it is always relevant (though not necessarily wise) to ask them a) about what? and b) why? Confronted with direct evidence of child neglect or abuse it is common to feel angry: the object of this response is the neglect or abuse, and the reason for the anger is the felt wrongness of the behaviour. By contrast, if someone said they were angry at or about a glass of water or a passing cloud we would struggle to make sense of this without some intelligible explanation such as that the cloud threatened rain which would spoil an outdoor event, and even then it would unreasonable to blame a cloud. The fact that emotions express implicit judgements of value makes them relevant to the domains of ethics, politics and aesthetics and to education and reasoning in these fields. Particularly in the tradition of deriving from Plato and Aristotle and developed by Aquinas that emphasises virtue and vice the issue of emotion is important as a dimension of ethical character, judgement and behaviour.  

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    Problems of the Self - June 1973

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    The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and Activity Judith Barad The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review The Catholic University of America Press Volume 55, Number 3, July 1991 pp. 397-413 10.1353/tho.1991.0007 Article View Citation Related Content Additional Information Purchase/rental options available: Buy Article for $14.00 (USD) In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: AQUINAS ON THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN MORAL JUDGMENT AND ACTIVITY JUDITH BARAD Indiana State University Terre Haute, Indiana MONG PHILOSOPHERS who have discussed the role of emotion in morality there is much disagreement. At one extreme there is a tradition of ethical thinkers, represented by David Hume, who juxtapose reason and emotion and hoM that the choice of ultimate va:1ues is always made by the emotional side of our natul'e. Insisting that emotion, not reason, is the foundation of moral philosophy, Hume says "Reason is, and ought to he, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any office other than to serve and obey them." 1 Conv:erseily, Immanuel Kant adamantly insists that reason must be the sole determinant of morality. Since morality is stricrtly a rational endeavor, the emotions (or what he more generrully called the incJinations), whethei!.' beneficent or ma1e:fiicent, should never be alilowed to intrude into our moral judgments. Each extreme claims that a part of our nature, respectiv 'e,ly reason or emotion, is not essentirul to the moral life. Hut the be1lief that we shouM sev;er any part of our nature from swch a pervasive area of our lives leads to unfortunate consequen1ces . If we base our understanding of morality on Hume's call for the slavish submission of reason, we can justify all kinds of social exploitation and sensuous indulgence. On the other hand, if we follow Kant's ideal of suppressing our emotions, then bodi1ly desires can appear ba:d to us, and we may irrationaHy disaJfow many human needs, both to ourselv;es and to others. i David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3, 3. 397 398 .TUDITH BARAD But on this question of the role of emotion in mol'lwl judgment , Aquinas oiooupies a position intermediate between Kant and Hume. He neither dismisses reason as a guide to practical affairs nor regards emotions as mere obstacles to be overcome in form.mating a moral judgment. For Aquinas even though e&ch of the human £acmlties has a unique role to perform, an individual £unctions in his entirety in the moral sphere. This essay will focus on how our emotions can support as well as impruir our moraJ conduct. The purpose of this study is to show thrut emotion may be either 1an impediment or a usefuJ srtimu1us to obj·ectiv;e moral decision malcing, obscuring our morrul judgments or 11einfol'lcing our commitments. Obviously, Hume's argument ·that reason cannot judge or criticize the emotions is very foreign to Aquinas's thought, and no one has yet ruttemp ;!Jed 1to subsume one •ruooount under the other. Afan Donagan , however, has clwimed that Aquinas's moll"al theory " anticipates Kant's metaphysics of morals," because of what " both ~are] found to 1say about motiViation." 2 But, contrary to Donagan 's claim, this study will make clear rlihat in the area of how emotions a:ffrect our moral life ·the two g11eat thinkers pal'lt company. To understand how emotion :liun:ctions mthe moral judgment , we must fust examine what Aquinas means by "emotion ." 3 He describes :emotion as a spontaneous .feeling consisting of both a phy;siofogical 1and an affective response to an object.4 He observes that emotion involves virtually ithe en2 Alan Donagan, " Teleology and Consistency in Theories of :Morality as Natural Law," in Georgetown Symposium on Ethics, edited by Rocco Porreca (Lanham, :Md.: University Press of America, 1984), p. 96. a Throughout this paper I will use the word "emotion " for the Latin passia, since " passion" has a more intense connotation in contemporary English than the term employed by Aquinas. "Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, (Westminster, :Md.: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q.22. In the first article of this question, Aquinas says that " Passion . . . is only in respect of a bodily transmutation." Quoting Damascene in the third article, he says " Passion is a movement of the sensi· tive appetite when we think of good or evil." I have combined both passages to arrive at Aquinas's description of emotion. AQUINAS ON EMOTIONS AND MORALS 399 tire human being: intd1ect, sense cognition, spontaneous volition , and bodily changes. Aquinas bases this position on his hylomorphic... collapse You are not currently authenticated. If you would like to authenticate using a different subscribed institution or have your own login and password to Project MUSE Authenticate

  • Feeling & Knowing: Making Minds Conscious
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    'A truly awe-inspiring piece of writing' David Robson, author of The Intelligence TrapIn recent decades, many philosophers and cognitive scientists have declared the question of consciousness unsolvable, but Antonio Damasio is convinced that recent findings in neuroscience, psychology and artificial intelligence have given us the necessary tools to solve its mystery. In Feeling & Knowing, Damasio elucidates the myriad aspects of consciousness and presents his analysis and new insights in a way that is faithful to our own intuitive sense of the experience. In forty-eight brief chapters, Damasio helps us understand the relation between consciousness and the mind; why being conscious is not the same as either being awake or sensing; the central role of feeling; and why the brain is essential for the development of consciousness. He synthesises the recent findings of various sciences with the philosophy of consciousness, and, most significantly, presents his original research which has transformed our understanding of the brain and human behaviour. Here is an indispensable guide to understanding the fundamental human capacity for informing and transforming our experience of the world around us and our perception of our place in it.

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    Hope as an Emotion Versus Hope as a Virtue

    Fr. Thomas Aquinas Pickett, OP, DSPT Alumnus, and Vicar of Blessed Sacrament Church, will share important distinctions about hope as a feeling versus hope as a moral, spiritual quality. Using the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, he will examine the similarities and differences so that we may better understand the hope we experience in our own lives. Learn more about the Dominican School of Philosophy & Theology at www.dspt.edu

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    Fragility, Emotions, Capabilities

    Brian E. Butler interviewed philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum on the topic of "Philosophy and Life: Fragility, Emotions, Capabilities" in the annual Frederic R. and Molly S. Kellogg Biennial Lecture in Jurisprudence at the Library of Congress. For transcript and more information, visit https://loc.gov/item/webcast-9467

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    Emotion, Rhetoric, and Thomas Aquinas

    Palestra ministrada pelo Prof. Dr. Nicholas Lombardo a convite do Grupo PARE e do Programa de Pós-graduação em Linguística da Universidade de Franca, em 20 de agosto de 2020.

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    Feeling and Consciousness

    BrainMind Summit hosted at Stanford Antonio Damasio, MD, PhD Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, Psychology & Philosophy, Director, Brain and Creativity Institute, USC Antonio Damasio is David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, Professor of Psychology, Professor of Philosophy, and Director and Founder of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California. He is also an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California. Damasio has made seminal contributions to the understanding of brain processes underlying emotions, feelings, decision-making and consciousness. His work has had a major influence on current understanding of the neural systems which underlie memory, language, and consciousness. He is the author of Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, which was adapted into a musical composition performed by Yo-Yo Ma at the American Museum of Natural History. Dr. Damasio is the author of numerous scientific articles and his research has received continuous federal funding for 30 years. He is the recipient of many awards: the Grawemeyer Award, 2014; the Honda Prize, 2010; the Asturias Prize in Science and Technology, 2005; and the Signoret Prize, 2004, which he shared with his wife Hanna Damasio. He is a member of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, and the European Academy of Sciences and Arts. He has been named “Highly Cited Researcher” by the Institute for Scientific Information.