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— A Times Literary Supplement’s Book of the Year 2020A New Statesman's Best Book of 2020A Bloomberg's Best Book of 2020A Guardian Best Book About Ideas of 2020The world-renowned philosopher and author of the bestselling Justice explores the central question of our time: What has become of the common good?These are dangerous times for democracy. We live in an age of winners and losers, where the odds are stacked in favor of the already fortunate. Stalled social mobility and entrenched inequality give the lie to the American credo that "you can make it if you try". The consequence is a brew of anger and frustration that has fueled populist protest and extreme polarization, and led to deep distrust of both government and our fellow citizens--leaving us morally unprepared to face the profound challenges of our time.World-renowned philosopher Michael J. Sandel argues that to overcome the crises that are upending our world, we must rethink the attitudes toward success and failure that have accompanied globalization and rising inequality. Sandel shows the hubris a meritocracy generates among the winners and the harsh judgement it imposes on those left behind, and traces the dire consequences across a wide swath of American life. He offers an alternative way of thinking about success--more attentive to the role of luck in human affairs, more conducive to an ethic of humility and solidarity, and more affirming of the dignity of work. The Tyranny of Merit points us toward a hopeful vision of a new politics of the common good.
— EQUAL HUMAN WORTH? A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY EGALITARIANISM 1 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood (United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). Theories of equal human rights have experienced an exponential growth during the past thirty or forty years. From declarations of human rights, such as the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to arguments about the rights of fetuses versus the rights of women, to claims and counter claims about the rights of minorities to preferential hiring, the rights of animals to life and well-being, and the rights of trees to be preserved, the proliferation of rights affects every phase of our socio-political discourse. Hardly a month goes by without a new book appearing on the subject.¹ As J. L. Mackie used to say, "Rights are pleasant. They allow us to make claims of others. Duties are onerous. They obligate us to others." Rights threaten to replace responsibility as the central focal point of moral theory. But this need not be the case. A rights theory balanced by a strong sense of the social good and individual responsibility may well be the best kind of moral- political theory we can have. 2 Virtually the only candidate for a rights theory today is egalitarianism, at least with regard to rational human beings. While there are differences between contemporary egalitarian arguments, they all accept what Ronald Dworkin calls "the egalitarian plateau," the "deepest moral assumption" of our time, that each person is of equal intrinsic value, of "dignity" and thus ought to be treated with equal respect and be given equal rights. The phrase, dignity of the human person, signifies in the words of Jacques Maritain, that "the human person has the right to be respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights. These are things which are owed to [a person] because of the very fact that he is a [person]".³ Will Kymlicka states that "Every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality. They are `egalitarian 1 theories." 4 2 Ronald Green says that egalitarianism is the presupposition for morality itself, the precondition of moral discourse and the necessary first assumption of any moral system, whatever its resultant values. Political theories as diverse as Robert Nozick's Libertarianism John Rawls' Liberalism, Peter Singer's Utilitarianism and Kai Nielsen's Marxism all share the notion that each person matters and matters equally. What distinguishes most contemporary egalitarianism from earlier natural law models is its self-conscious secularism. There is no appeal to a God or a transcendental realm. Although Kant's doctrine of Ends ("Human beings qua rational have an inherent dignity and so ought to treat each other as ends and never merely as means") is the touchstone of most egalitarians, they generally distance themselves from the metaphysical grounding of Kant's doctrine. In the words of Dworkin, contemporary egalitarianism is "metaphysically unambitious." Yet it may well be that without some deeper metaphysical underpinnings equal rights theories fail to persuade thoughtful persons. If a deconstructed Kant is the father of contemporary egalitarians, their enemies are Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes. Aristotle thought that humans were essentially unequal, depending on their ability to reason. Hobbes rejected the notion of humans having any intrinsic worth at all. "The value or worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price -that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power - and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another."7 In this paper I want to examine the principal arguments for equal human rights given by contemporary egalitarians. Specifically, I want to explore the basis for attributing equal worth to all human beings or all minimally rational persons, since it is the doctrine of equal worth that undergirds most egalitarian theories of both rights and justice. In Part One I argue that in their present form none of the arguments given for the doctrine of equal human worth are sound. In Part Two I suggest that the doctrine of equal human worth has its home in a deeper metaphysical system than secular egalitarians are able to embrace: non-natural systems, not necessarily religious, but typically so. My conclusion is that on the secularist's naturalistic assumptions, 2 there is reason to give up egalitarianism altogether. 3 PART I Contemporary Secular Arguments for Equal Human Worth Ten arguments (or strategies) for equal human rights based on equal human worth appear in current philosophical literature. They are: (1) The Presumption Argument; (2) The Properly Basic Belief Strategy; (3) The Existential Strategy; (4) The Libertarian Argument; (5) The Family Argument; (6) The Pragmatic Argument; (7) The Utilitarian Argument; (8) The Coherentist Argument; (9) The Rational Agency Argument; and (10) The Argument from Moral Personality. Let me briefly describe them and point out their deficiencies. I regret the cursory treatment of important theories, but my purpose is primarily to show how little attention has been paid to justifying the egalitarian plateau. Having until recently simply taken egalitarianism for granted, I now am puzzled by this idea or ideal and wonder whether it's simply a left over from a religious world view now rejected by all of the philosophers discussed in this essay. At any rate, my discussion is meant to be exploratory and provocative, not the final word on the subject. (1) The Presumption of Equality Argument. 118 R. S. Peters, Stanley Benn, Monroe Beardsley, E. F. Carritt, and James Rachels interpret equal worth in terms of equal consideration or impartiality and argue that there is a presumption in favor of treating people equally. "All persons are to be treated alike, unless there are good reasons for treating them differently.' But there are problems. First of all, this type of egalitarianism is unduly formal. It lacks a material criterion or metric to guide deliberation. One might as well say that "all sentient beings should be treated alike, unless there are good reasons for treating them differently." The formula only shifts the focus onto the idea of good reasons. We need to know by virtue of what material criterion people are to be treated equally or differently. What are the material criteria? Need, effort, contribution, intelligence, sentience, self-consciousness, or moral merit? And if there is more than one, how do we weight them in various circumstances? As far as I know, the problem of material criteria has not been solved. Plato's hierarchical theory and Aristotle's aristocracy could accommodate this formal notion of equality (treating equals equally and unequals unequally), and even Hitler could have used it to 3 4 justify his atrocities. Inegalitarians simply claim that there is a good reason for unequal treatment of human beings. They are of unequal worth. The presumption of equality argument reduces to the notion of impartiality (what R. M. Hare calls "universalizability") and is not really an egalitarian argument at all. It makes no restrictions upon what reasons may be given to warrant inequalities. It merely prescribes that we not act arbitrary, but consistently. We should make our discriminations according to a proper standard, but doing so does not commit us to egalitarianism. For all rational action is governed by the idea of consistency. Furthermore, there seems something arbitrary about the Presumption Argument. Why should we start off with a bias towards equality and not inequality? Why don't we have a principle presuming unequal treatment: "All persons are to be treated unequally unless there is some reason for treating them equally"? Neither a presumption of equality nor one of inequality is necessary, though there may be pragmatic or utilitarian considerations that incline us to opt for a presumption of equality rather than inequality. We will consider those strategies later. 2. The properly Basic Belief Strategy. Sometimes, no argument at all is given for the claim of equal human worth and the equal human rights that flow from it. Ronald Dworkin begins Taking Rights Seriously with a rejection of metaphysical assumptions. Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them. That characterization of a right is, of course, formal in the sense that it does not indicate what rights people have or guarantee, indeed, that they have any. But it does not suppose that rights have some special metaphysical character, and the theory defended in these essays therefore departs from older theories of rights that do rely on that supposition (p. xi, italics mine). 4 5 Nowhere in his book does Dworkin parse out the notion of "some reason" to override "collective goals." It is a given. The notion of equal human rights based on equal human worth simply becomes the assumption that replaces earlier religious or Kantian metaphysical assumptions. Every plausible political theory is egalitarian in that it holds that all members of the community have a right to equal concern and respect. "The Deepest Moral Assumption: the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to an equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not in virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice."9 In other words, we don't need to argue for this thesis. In a series of lengthy articles on welfare and resource egalitarianism Dworkin simply assumes the ideal of equality: that "people matter and matter equally." Dworkins' view seems similar to what Alvin Plantinga calls "a properly basic belief," a foundational belief which doesn't need any further justification. But whatever merits this strategy has for religious beliefs, it seems unsatisfactory when employed to justify moral and political equality. At the very least, we should want to know why the capacity to "make plans and give justice" grants all and only humans equal concern and respect. 3. The Existential Strategy. Closely related to Dworkins' view is Kai Nielsen's "Radical Egalitarianism", which holds that the ideal of equal human life prospects is something to which we arbitrarily, that is, existentially, choose to commit ourselves. It enjoins treating equal life prospects as both a goal to be aimed at and a right to be claimed, but one cannot rationally justify these commitments. Instead of putting out, "All people are of equal worth regardless of merit?" as some kind of mysterious truth-claim which appears in fact to be at best groundless and at worst false, would it not have been clearer and less evasive of the human-rights advocate simply to remark that he starts with a commitment on which he will not bend, namely a commitment to the treatment of all people as beings who are to have quite unforfeitably an equality of concern and respect? It is that sort of world that he or she most deeply desires and it is there that he stands pat. There are other equally intelligible and no doubt 5
— An Urgent and Timely Release from Charles Camosy, the award-winning author of Resisting Throwaway Culture There is perhaps no more important value than fundamental human equality. And yet, despite large percentages of people affirming the value, the resources available to explain and defend the basis for such equality are few and far between. In his newest book Charles Camosy provides a thoughtful defense of human dignity. Telling personal stories like those of Jahi McMath, Terri Schiavo, and Alfie Evans, Camosy, a noted bioethicist and theologian, uses an engaging style to show how the influence of secularized medicine is undermining fundamental human equality in the broader culture. And in a disturbing final chapter, Camosy sounds the alarm about the next population to fall if we stay on our current trajectory: dozens of millions of human beings with dementia. Heeding this alarm, Camosy argues, means doing two things. First, making urgent and genuine attempts to dialogue with a secularized culture which cannot see how it is undermining one of its most foundational values. Second, religious communities which hold the Imago Dei sacred must mobilize their existing institutions (and create new ones) to care for a new set of human beings our throwaway culture may deem non-persons.
— Erika Bachiochi offers an original look at the development of feminism in the United States, advancing a vision of rights that rests upon our responsibilities to others. In The Rights of Women, Erika Bachiochi explores the development of feminist thought in the United States. Inspired by the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft, Bachiochi presents the intellectual history of a lost vision of women's rights, seamlessly weaving philosophical insight, biographical portraits, and constitutional law to showcase the once predominant view that our rights properly rest upon our concrete responsibilities to God, self, family, and community. Bachiochi proposes a philosophical and legal framework for rights that builds on the communitarian tradition of feminist thought as seen in the work of Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Jean Bethke Elshtain. Drawing on the insight of prominent figures such as Sarah Grimké, Frances Willard, Florence Kelley, Betty Friedan, Pauli Murray, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Mary Ann Glendon, this book is unique in its treatment of the moral roots of women's rights in America and its critique of the movement's current trajectory. The Rights of Women provides a synthesis of ancient wisdom and modern political insight that locates the family's vital work at the very center of personal and political self-government. Bachiochi demonstrates that when rights are properly understood as a civil and political apparatus born of the natural duties we owe to one another, they make more visible our personal responsibilities and more viable our common life together. This smart and sophisticated application of Wollstonecraft's thought will serve as a guide for how we might better value the culturally essential work of the home and thereby promote authentic personal and political freedom. The Rights of Women will interest students and scholars of political theory, gender and women's studies, constitutional law, and all readers interested in women's rights.
— Bernadette Tobin, Director of the Plunkett Centre for Ethics in Sydney, Australia, discusses the question, “Is religious freedom a threat to equality, or an aspect of it?” Daniel Sulmasy, Director of Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics, provides the response.
— John Haldane unpacks two key ideas at the core of secular liberalism.
— The economy must serve people, not the other way around. Work is more than a way to make a living; it is a form of continuing participation in God’s cre...
— A Times Literary Supplement’s Book of the Year 2020A New Statesman's Best Book of 2020A Bloomberg's Best Book of 2020A Guardian Best Book About Ideas of 2020The world-renowned philosopher and author of the bestselling Justice explores the central question of our time: What has become of the common good?These are dangerous times for democracy. We live in an age of winners and losers, where the odds are stacked in favor of the already fortunate. Stalled social mobility and entrenched inequality give the lie to the American credo that "you can make it if you try". The consequence is a brew of anger and frustration that has fueled populist protest and extreme polarization, and led to deep distrust of both government and our fellow citizens--leaving us morally unprepared to face the profound challenges of our time.World-renowned philosopher Michael J. Sandel argues that to overcome the crises that are upending our world, we must rethink the attitudes toward success and failure that have accompanied globalization and rising inequality. Sandel shows the hubris a meritocracy generates among the winners and the harsh judgement it imposes on those left behind, and traces the dire consequences across a wide swath of American life. He offers an alternative way of thinking about success--more attentive to the role of luck in human affairs, more conducive to an ethic of humility and solidarity, and more affirming of the dignity of work. The Tyranny of Merit points us toward a hopeful vision of a new politics of the common good.
— Part I (Pojman's critique of secular arguments for egalitarianism) starts at 07:05. Part II (Counter-evidence to secular egalitarianism) begins at 1:03:33. Conclusion - 1:15:07 Pojman, Louis. “On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism.” In Equality: Selected Readings, edited by Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland, 282-98. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
The ideas of human dignity and equality are central to much moral and political philosophy especially since the 18th century Enlightenment, but the roots of them can be traced to Jewish and Christian beliefs about the special status of human beings as images of God (imagines Dei). One of the most famous pronouncements of equality is in the US Declaration of Independence (1776) "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” which appears to quote in part from Milton who in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649) connects equality with the Imago Deo doctrine "No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself”. There is, therefore, a seeming irony in the fact that affirmations of human dignity and equality have become more common and more stridently affirmed at the same time as religious belief has declined. The problem for a secular account is to specify what dignity is and what is the relevant respect in which all possess dignity and equality and then find a justification for the idea that these holds universally. It is often said that all are morally equal, but this does not mean that all are equally morally good or even equally capable of being morally good. Rather, it seems too mean that all have intrinsic equal worth or are equally morally considerable, i.e. no-one is more valuable or matters more morally than anyone else. Finding a basis for this is challenging as all physical or mental human properties are possessed in varying degrees. Efforts to ground dignity and moral equality not in empirical facts but in notions of transcendent nature and idealised rationality then begin to look like the religious notions they were intended to replace. For the reason the secular philosopher Richard Rorty proposed that instead of regarding dignity and equality as fact they should instead be treated as a policy, i.e. even if people aren’t equal we should treat them as if they were. But that raises the question why?
The ideas of human dignity and equality are central to much moral and political philosophy especially since the 18th century Enlightenment, but the roots of them can be traced to Jewish and Christian beliefs about the special status of human beings as images of God (imagines Dei). One of the most famous pronouncements of equality is in the US Declaration of Independence (1776) "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” which appears to quote in part from Milton who in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649) connects equality with the Imago Deo doctrine "No man who knows ought, can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of God himself”. There is, therefore, a seeming irony in the fact that affirmations of human dignity and equality have become more common and more stridently affirmed at the same time as religious belief has declined. The problem for a secular account is to specify what dignity is and what is the relevant respect in which all possess dignity and equality and then find a justification for the idea that these holds universally. It is often said that all are morally equal, but this does not mean that all are equally morally good or even equally capable of being morally good. Rather, it seems too mean that all have intrinsic equal worth or are equally morally considerable, i.e. no-one is more valuable or matters more morally than anyone else. Finding a basis for this is challenging as all physical or mental human properties are possessed in varying degrees. Efforts to ground dignity and moral equality not in empirical facts but in notions of transcendent nature and idealised rationality then begin to look like the religious notions they were intended to replace. For the reason the secular philosopher Richard Rorty proposed that instead of regarding dignity and equality as fact they should instead be treated as a policy, i.e. even if people aren’t equal we should treat them as if they were. But that raises the question why?