Given the historical understanding of marriage as the natural union of man and woman for the purpose of companionship and the having and rearing of children, the idea of same-sex marriage seems contradictory, and it was on that basis that some rejected it entirely, while others argued for the legal recognition of a different kind of relationship, namely ‘civil partnership’. Advocates and defenders of same-sex marriage argue that the latter is insufficient as it lacks equality of esteem. This assumes that the status of legally and socially acknowledged marriage is something valued in society, that it is in effect a public good to which everyone who wishes it should have access. There are, however, two important points to note. First, this involves a different conception of the nature and purpose of marriage, one focused on sexual partnership; second, this conception may be displacing the older one even among heterosexuals who do not assume that marriage is for the sake of having a family; and third, the decline of formal marriage, and the rise of divorce suggests that society in general is changing its views of these matters.
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— Too much of the same-sex marriage "debate" in Australia has been slogans, spin and public bullying of opponents. The real debate has hardly begun, and we should resist being railroaded into this social change too quickly.
— To coincide with the Parliamentary debate on the Government’s Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, the latest publication from ResPublica, Marriage: Union for the future or contract for the present, criticises the Bill for compromising the meaning of both traditional heterosexual marriage and homosexual partnership. Written by ResPublica Director Phillip Blond and ResPublica Fellow Professor Roger […]
— Home > Bulletin > Pubblico > 2021 > 03 Responsum of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to a dubium regarding the blessing of the unions of persons of the same sex, 15.03.2021 Responsum of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to a dubium regarding the blessing of the unions of persons of the same sex TO THE QUESTION PROPOSED: Does the Church have the power to give the blessing to unions of persons of the same sex? RESPONSE: Negative. Explanatory Note In some ecclesial contexts, plans and proposals for blessings of unions of persons of the same sex are being advanced. Such projects are not infrequently motivated by a sincere desire to welcome and accompany homosexual persons, to whom are proposed paths of growth in faith, “so that those who manifest a homosexual orientation can receive the assistance they need to understand and fully carry out God’s will in their lives”[1]. On such paths, listening to the word of God, prayer, participation in ecclesial liturgical actions and the exercise of charity can play an important role in sustaining the commitment to read one's own history and to adhere with freedom and responsibility to one's baptismal call, because “God loves every person and the Church does the same”[2], rejecting all unjust discrimination. Among the liturgical actions of the Church, the sacramentals have a singular importance: “These are sacred signs that resemble the sacraments: they signify effects, particularly of a spiritual kind, which are obtained through the Church’s intercession. By them men are disposed to receive the chief effect of the sacraments, and various occasions of life are sanctified”[3]. The Catechism of the Catholic Church specifies, then, that “sacramentals do not confer the grace of the Holy Spirit in the way that the sacraments do, but by the Church’s prayer, they prepare us to receive grace and dispose us to cooperate with it” (#1670). Blessings belong to the category of the sacramentals, whereby the Church “calls us to praise God, encourages us to implore his protection, and exhorts us to seek his mercy by our holiness of life”[4]. In addition, they “have been established as a kind of imitation of the sacraments, blessings are signs above all of spiritual effects that are achieved through the Church’s intercession”[5]. Consequently, in order to conform with the nature of sacramentals, when a blessing is invoked on particular human relationships, in addition to the right intention of those who participate, it is necessary that what is blessed be objectively and positively ordered to receive and express grace, according to the designs of God inscribed in creation, and fully revealed by Christ the Lord. Therefore, only those realities which are in themselves ordered to serve those ends are congruent with the essence of the blessing imparted by the Church. For this reason, it is not licit to impart a blessing on relationships, or partnerships, even stable, that involve sexual activity outside of marriage (i.e., outside the indissoluble union of a man and a woman open in itself to the transmission of life), as is the case of the unions between persons of the same sex[6]. The presence in such relationships of positive elements, which are in themselves to be valued and appreciated, cannot justify these relationships and render them legitimate objects of an ecclesial blessing, since the positive elements exist within the context of a union not ordered to the Creator’s plan. Furthermore, since blessings on persons are in relationship with the sacraments, the blessing of homosexual unions cannot be considered licit. This is because they would constitute a certain imitation or analogue of the nuptial blessing[7] invoked on the man and woman united in the sacrament of Matrimony, while in fact “there are absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family”[8]. The declaration of the unlawfulness of blessings of unions between persons of the same sex is not therefore, and is not intended to be, a form of unjust discrimination, but rather a reminder of the truth of the liturgical rite and of the very nature of the sacramentals, as the Church understands them. The Christian community and its Pastors are called to welcome with respect and sensitivity persons with homosexual inclinations, and will know how to find the most appropriate ways, consistent with Church teaching, to proclaim to them the Gospel in its fullness. At the same time, they should recognize the genuine nearness of the Church – which prays for them, accompanies them and shares their journey of Christian faith[9] – and receive the teachings with sincere openness. The answer to the proposed dubium does not preclude the blessings given to individual persons with homosexual inclinations[10], who manifest the will to live in fidelity to the revealed plans of God as proposed by Church teaching. Rather, it declares illicit any form of blessing that tends to acknowledge their unions as such. In this case, in fact, the blessing would manifest not the intention to entrust such individual persons to the protection and help of God, in the sense mentioned above, but to approve and encourage a choice and a way of life that cannot be recognized as objectively ordered to the revealed plans of God[11]. At the same time, the Church recalls that God Himself never ceases to bless each of His pilgrim children in this world, because for Him “we are more important to God than all of the sins that we can commit”[12]. But he does not and cannot bless sin: he blesses sinful man, so that he may recognize that he is part of his plan of love and allow himself to be changed by him. He in fact “takes us as we are, but never leaves us as we are”[13]. For the above mentioned reasons, the Church does not have, and cannot have, the power to bless unions of persons of the same sex in the sense intended above. The Sovereign Pontiff Francis, at the Audience granted to the undersigned Secretary of this Congregation, was informed and gave his assent to the publication of the above-mentioned Responsum ad dubium, with the annexed Explanatory Note. Rome, from the Offices of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the 22nd of February 2021, Feast of the Chair of Saint Peter, Apostle. Luis F. Card. Ladaria, S.I. Prefect ✠ Giacomo Morandi Archbishop tit. of Cerveteri Secretary _______________________ [1] FRANCIS, Apostolic Exhortation Amoris laetitia, 250. [2] SYNOD OF BISHOPS, Final Document of the XV Ordinary General Assembly, 150. [3] SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy Sacrosanctum Concilium, 60. [4] RITUALE ROMANUM ex Decreto Sacrosancti Oecumenici Concilii Vaticani II instauratum auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. Il promulgatum, De bendictionibus, Praenotanda Generalia, n.9. [5] Ibidem, n. 10. [6] Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2357. [7] In fact, the nuptial blessing refers back to the creation account, in which God's blessing on man and woman is related to their fruitful union (cf. Gen 1:28) and their complementarity (cf. Gen 2:18-24). [8] FRANCIS, Apostolic Exhortation Amoris laetitia, 251. [9] Cf. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Letter Homosexualitatis problema On the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons, 15. [10] De benedictionibus in fact presents an extended list of situations for which to invoke the blessing of the Lord. [11] CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Letter Homosexualitatis problema On the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons, 7. [12] FRANCIS, General Audience of December 2, 2020, Catechesis on Prayer, the blessing. [13] Ibidem. Audiences Notice of Press Conference in live streaming Article of Commentary on the Responsum ad dubium Holy See Press Office Communiqué: Audience with the Captains Regent of the Most Serene Republic of San Marino
— The Meaning of Marriage Sexual Difference En Español What is marriage? Why does it matter that humanity is male and female? Why does a person’s sex mat...
— Modern culture is obsessed with identity. Since the landmark Obergefell v. Hodges Supreme Court decision in 2015, sexual identity has dominated both public discourse and cultural trends—and yet, no historical phenomenon is its own cause. From Augustine to Marx, various views and perspectives have contributed to the modern understanding of self. In The Rise and Triumph of the Modern Self, Carl Trueman carefully analyzes the roots and development of the sexual revolution as a symptom, rather than the cause, of the human search for identity. This timely exploration of the history of thought behind the sexual revolution teaches readers about the past, brings clarity to the present, and gives guidance for the future as Christians navigate the culture’s ever-changing search for identity.
— Before the Second Vatican Council, America's Catholics operated largely as a coherent voting bloc, usually in connection with the Democratic Party. Their episcopal leaders generally spoke for Catholics in political matters; at least, where America's bishops asserted themselves in public affairs there was little audible dissent from the faithful. More than occasionally, the immigrant Church's eagerness to demonstrate its patriotic bona fides furthered its tendency to speak with one voice about national matters, and in line with the broader societal consensus. And, notwithstanding the considerable conflict which Catholics encountered, and generated, in American political life, there was before the Council broad agreement in American culture about the centrality of Biblical morality to the success of Americans' experiment with republican government. In other words: before the Council, American Catholics' relationship to the political common good was mediated, somewhat uncritical, and insulated from conflict (both within and without the Church) over such fundamental matters as protection of innocent life, marriage and family life, and (to a lesser extent) religious liberty. This has all changed since the mid-1960s. For the first time in the Church's pilgrimage on these shores, controversial questions about the basic moral requirements of the political common good are front and center for America's Catholics. These questions require Catholics to confront matters which heretofore they either took for granted, read off from the background culture, or which they left to the bishops to handle. But the Council Fathers rightly recognized that Jesus calls upon a formed and informed laity to act as leaven in the public realm, to bring Gospel values to the temporal sphere. In this book of essays touching upon Catholic social doctrine, the truth about human equality and political liberty, and religious faith as it bears upon public life and the public engagement of lay Catholics, Gerard Bradley supplies indispensable aid to those seeking to answer Jesus' call.
— CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUCATION (for Educational Institutions) "MALE AND FEMALE HE CREATED THEM" TOWARDS A PATH OF DIALOGUE ON THE QUESTION OF GENDER THEORY IN EDUCATION VATICAN CITY 2019 INTRODUCTION 1. It is becoming increasingly clear that we are now facing with what might accurately be called an educational crisis, especially in the field of affectivity and sexuality. In many places, curricula are being planned and implemented which "allegedly convey a neutral conception of the per- son and of life, yet in fact reflect an anthropology opposed to faith and to right reason".¹ The disorientation regarding anthropology which is a widespread feature of our cultural landscape has undoubtedly helped to destabilise the family as an institution, bringing with it a tendency to cancel out the differences between men and women, presenting them instead as merely the product of historical and cultural conditioning. 2. The context in which the mission of education is carried out is charac- terized by challenges emerging from varying forms of an ideology that is given the general name 'gender theory', which "denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and envisages a society with- out sexual differences, thereby eliminating the anthropological basis of the family. This ideology leads to educational programmes and legislative enactments that promote a personal identity and emotional intimacy rad- ically separated from the biological difference between male and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the individual, one which can also change over time".² 3. It seems clear that this issue should not be looked at in isolation from the broader question of education in the call to love, which should offer, 3 ¹ BENEDICT XVI, Address to Members of the Diplomatic Corps, 10 January 2011. 2 FRANCIS, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia, 19 March 2016, 56. 3 Cf. JOHN PAUL II, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Familiaris Consortio, 22 November 1981, 6; Cf. JOHN PAUL II, Letter to Families Gratissimam Sane, 2 February 1994, 3 as the Second Vatican Council noted, “a positive and prudent education in sexuality" within the context of the inalienable right of all to receive "an education that is in keeping with their ultimate goal, their ability, their sex, and the culture and tradition of their country, and also in harmony with their fraternal association with other peoples in the fostering of true unity and peace on earth".4 The Congregation for Catholic Education has already offered some reflections on this theme in the document Ed- ucational Guidance in Human Love: Outlines for Sex Education'.5 4. The Christian vision of anthropology sees sexuality as a fundamen- tal component of one's personhood. It is one of its mode of being, of manifesting itself, communicating with others, and of feeling, expressing and living human love. Therefore, our sexuality plays an integral part in the development of our personality and in the process of its education: "In fact, it is from [their] sex that the human person receives the charac- teristics which, on the biological, psychological and spiritual levels, make that person a man or a woman, and thereby largely condition his or her progress towards maturity and insertion into society". As each person grows, "such diversity, linked to the complementarity of the two sexes, allows a thorough response to the design of God according to the vo- cation to which each one is called". In the light of this, "affective-sex education must consider the totality of the person and insist therefore on the integration of the biological, psycho-affective, social and spiritual elements".8 5. The Congregation for Catholic Education, as part of its remit, wish- es to offer in this document some reflections which, it is hoped, can 16; Cf. JOHN PAUL II, General Audience, 8 April 1981 in Insegnamenti, IV/1 (1981), pp. 903- 908. 4 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Decl. On Christian Education, Gravissimum Educationis, 28 October 1965, 1. 5 CONGREGATION FOR CATHOLIC EDUCATION, Educational Guidance in Human Love, Outlines for Sex Education, 1 November 1983. 6 CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, Persona Humana, Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics, 29 December 1975, 1. 7 Educational Guidance in Human Love, Outlines for Sex Education, 5. 8 Ibid., 35. 4 guide and support those who work in the education of young people, so as to help them address in a methodical way (and in the light of the uni- versal vocation to love of the human person) the most debated questions around human sexuality. The methodology in mind is based on three guiding principles seen as best-suited to meet the needs of both individ- uals and communities: to listen, to reason and to propose. In fact, listening carefully to the needs of the other, combined with an understanding of the true diversity of conditions, can lead to a shared set of rational elements in an argument, and can prepare one for a Christian education rooted in faith that “throws a new light on everything, manifests God's design for man's total vocation, and thus directs the mind to solutions which are fully human",10 6. If we wish to take an approach to the question of gender theory that is based on the path of dialogue, it is vital to bear in mind the distinction between the ideology of gender on the one hand, and the whole field of research on gender that the human sciences have undertaken, on the other. While the ideologies of gender claim to respond, as Pope Francis has indicated, "to what are at times understandable aspirations", they also seek "to assert themselves as absolute and unquestionable, even dictating how children should be raised",¹¹ and thus preclude dialogue. However, other work on gender has been carried out which tries instead to achieve a deeper understanding of the ways in which sexual difference between men and women is lived out in a variety of cultures. It is in relation to this type of research than we should be open to listen, to reason and to propose. 7. Against this background, the Congregation for Catholic Education has seen fit to offer this text to all who have a special interest in edu- cation, and to those whose work is touched by the question of gender theory. It is intended for the educational community involved in Catholic 9 Cf. Ibid., 21-47, in which the Christian vision of sexuality is set out. 10 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes, 7 December 1965, 11. 11 Amoris Laetitia, 56. 5
— Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Menu Browse Table of Contents What's New Random Entry Chronological Archives About Editorial Information About the SEP Editorial Board How to Cite the SEP Special Characters Advanced Tools Contact Support SEP Support the SEP PDFs for SEP Friends Make a Donation SEPIA for Libraries Entry Navigation Entry Contents Bibliography Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top Sex and Sexuality First published Thu Jul 5, 2018; substantive revision Fri May 5, 2023 Sex has received little attention in the history of western philosophy, and what it did receive was not good: Plato denigrated it, arguing that it should lead to something higher or better (Phaedrus, Symposium), Aristotle barely mentioned it, and Christian philosophers condemned it: Augustine argued that its pleasures are dangerous in mastering us, and allowed sex only for procreation (City of God, bk 14; On Marriage and Concupiscence), while Aquinas confined its permissibility to conjugal, procreative acts (Summa contra gentiles III.2; Summa theologica IIa–IIae). Immanuel Kant (Lectures on Ethics) considered it the only inclination that cannot satisfy the Categorical Imperative, and Jean-Paul Sartre claimed that sexual desire aims to capture the other’s freedom (1943: pt. III, ch. 3]). The Marquis de Sade (a philosopher of sorts) went to the opposite extreme, celebrating all types of sexual acts, including rape (1785; 1791; 1795). Only during contemporary times do philosophers, beginning with Bertrand Russell (1929) and including Sigmund Freud (1905), think of sex as generally good (see Soble 2006b and 2008, ch. 2 for this history; Belliotti 1993, Pt. I). The philosophy of sex and sexuality includes conceptual issues about what sexual desire, sexual activity, and sexual pleasure are, and which of the three has conceptual priority. It also addresses the concepts of sexual orientation, preferences, and identity. Normative issues are paramount, too, especially the morality of sexual activity and sexual desire, where consent and objectification have taken pride of place. Normative issues also include whether some of the moral questions that confront sex are unique to sex, the nonmoral goodness (and badness) of sex, sexual perversion, and the value of sex. 1. Conceptual Issues 1.1 Sexual Desire 1.2 Sexual Activity 1.3 Sexual Pleasure 1.4 Sexual Preferences and Orientation 1.5 Sexual Identity 2. Normative Issues 2.1 Good and Bad Sex 2.2 Sex and Morality 2.2.1 Consent 2.2.2 Objectification 2.3 Sexual Perversion 2.4 Sex and Technology 3. The Value of Sex Bibliography Abbreviations for Classic Anthologies Secondary Literature Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries 1. Conceptual Issues 1.1 Sexual Desire The concept of sexual desire is a central concept in the philosophy of sex, one connected to other central concepts, especially sexual attraction, sexual pleasure, sexual motives, arousal, and sexual activity (all of which make an appearance in the discussion below). It refers to a biological capacity that human beings have to be attracted to others and to seek sexual pleasure and activity, and it refers to specific instances of desiring specific people or activities (when, e.g., X experiences sexual desire for Y). Five broad issues are prominent regarding sexual desire: (1) whether it is merely a biological drive, an intentional mental state, or both; (2) how it should be defined; (3) whether it is benign or malignant; (4) whether acting on it should be morally restricted to particular contexts; and (5) whether it admits of perverted forms. (Section 2 discusses (4) and (5).) Definitions of sexual desire in terms of sexual pleasure seem to understand sexual desire as basically an appetite. On one such definition, “sexual desire” is “desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces” (Goldman 1977, 268) or “sexual desire” is “the desire for certain bodily pleasures” (Primoratz 1999, 46; see also Halwani 2020; Soble 1991, 139–151 and 1996, 83). Thus, if X feels sexual desire, then X desires the touch of another person’s (Y’s) body and the sexual pleasure derived through that touch. An alternative definition avoids the conceptual involvement of another person, understanding sexual desire instead as desire for sexual pleasures, period. This accommodates cases in which the desire is not for the touch of another’s body: some cases of masturbation, voyeurism, and exhibitionism, for example. These views have in common the idea that sexual desire is desire for brute bodily pleasures, possibly implying that sexual desire is merely a biological appetite. If so, they face the objection that they mischaracterize the nature of sexual desire, which should instead be understood as intentional through and through (Morgan 2003b). That is, whenever X sexually desires someone or something, X does so under a description: X desires Y because something about Y appeals to X. Even when X desires anonymous sex, X desires “the pleasure of anonymous sex” (Morgan 2003b). On the intentional view, sexual desire is no mere appetite but thoroughly infused with meaning. Although the intentional view need not insist on the conceptual requirement of another person, its most common instantiation is the idea that sexual desire is interpersonal—that the agent’s sexual desire always seeks fulfillment with another person, or at least always ought to seek fulfillment with another person. Interpersonal sexual desire involves the “marshalling and directing of animal urges toward an interpersonal aim, and an interpersonal fulfillment” (Scruton 1986, 289) and might be thought to involve multiple levels of awareness: X desires Y, desires that Y desire X, desires to be aroused by Y’s desire of X, and so on (Nagel 1969). Some have thought it should, additionally, be directed to love (Scruton 1986: 339; cf. Giles 2008, ch. 3). A normative view that sexual desire ought to be interpersonal or interpersonal in a specific way might be rejected as an account of what sexual desire is. To be an account of what sexual desire is, an interpersonal account would need to articulate a normatively neutral interpersonal view. The pleasure view of sexual desire, however, is not committed to understanding sexual desire as mere appetite. For example, if X wants to masturbate, X is not being led by blind instinct; X can be thinking, “I look forward to enjoying the sensations of rubbing my clitoris with my favorite vibrator as I fantasize about having sex with my neighbor.” In other words, “sexual desire can be focused or selective at the same time as being physical” (Goldman 1977, 279; Halwani 2020, 124–127). The intentional view is plausible in that sexual desire can be quite complex and that its complexity is not captured well (or at all) by the pleasure view, given that human mentality infuses our most basic urges and appetites. But it depends on what we want the pleasure view to accomplish. If it is meant to capture the “essence” of sexual desire, the two are compatible with each other; if it is meant as a detailed description of the depth, complexity, and variety of the phenomenon, the pleasure view falls short. Given that definitions are not usually meant to convey the complexity of what they define, we should not expect a definition of sexual desire to be a full-blown theory of it, and we can agree that sexual desire is a complex phenomenon. This does not mean that the pleasure view of sexual desire is correct, only that its aim or strategy need not be misguided. Indeed, depending on how it is stated, the pleasure view might be wrong. For example, if it conceptually ties sexual desire to sexual pleasure obtained through the touch of another person, sexual desire would then be necessarily interpersonal and might implausibly render many sexual desires as nonsexual, such as some masturbatory desires, voyeurism, and exhibitionism. Furthermore, the touch of another person’s body implies that zoophiliac desires are nonsexual. Necrophiliac desires would also be nonsexual if “person” refers to a living person. A non-interpersonal definition—for sexual pleasures, period—avoids such implications (Soble 1991 and later editions of the essay, the last being 2013a; Halwani 2018b, ch. 5). Even a non-interpersonal pleasure view might face difficulties stemming from understanding desire in terms of what it seeks (sexual pleasure). Calling the approach that defines sexual desire in terms of what it seeks the “object-based strategy,” Rockney Jacobsen raises difficulties with it (2017, 30). One is defining “sexual pleasure” (see below), which the object-based strategy needs to do to be complete (2017, 33). Second, Jacobsen rejects the idea that all sexual desires are for sexual pleasure, giving the example of a couple who has sex to have a baby, not for pleasure (2017, 33; see also 1993). Third, our sexual partners would in principle be dispensable if there are other ways to attain the pleasure. This third objection is not moral—that we use our sexual partners as mere instruments—but ontological: sexual pleasure cannot be the only or common goal to all sexual desires otherwise the agent would be indifferent between the available ways of attaining sexual pleasure. Since this is not true, Jacobsen concludes that sexual desire is not solely for sexual pleasure (2017, 33). Jacobsen prefers the “feature-based” approach, which defines “sexual desire” in terms of “sexual arousal,” which is the state of being turned on (and that we often find ourselves in), manifested in erections, lubricated vaginas, flushed faces, and “tingling earlobes” (Jacobsen 2017, 35; cf. Shaffer 1978; see also Jacobsen 2006, 226–227). So when X sexually desires something (another person, an object, or an activity), X desires it because it has a feature that X expects to affect X’s sexual arousal (Jacobsen 2017, 36). The feature-based strategy is supposed to be superior to the object-based one because it does not face the above-mentioned three difficulties. The feature-based view, however, might pass the buck: either “sexual arousal” means what we usually mean by “sexual desire” (the examples of sexual arousal—erections, lubricated vaginas—might serve equally well as examples of sexual desire), or it does not. If the former, we would still need a definition of “sexual arousal,” much like we needed a definition of “sexual desire.” If the latter, we would need an account of what “sexual arousal” is, because if it is not the same as sexual desire, what exactly is it? Referring back to erections and lubricated vaginas will not do, because we may ask, “Why aren’t they states of sexual desire?” So defining “sexual desire” in terms of sexual arousal might be convincing only if we can understand “sexual arousal” independently of “sexual desire” (Halwani 2018b, 170–171). Jacobsen’s example of the couple having sex to procreate merits discussion. Jacobsen intends it to be a case of sexual desire but not for sexual pleasure. However, the example is under-described because the desire can be understood as the nonsexual desire for procreation. To better address such cases, it is useful to distinguish sexual motives—motives to engage in an activity to experience sexual pleasure—from nonsexual motives, such as to conceive a child, to make someone jealous, to exact revenge, and to pass the time. One can argue that if the couple in question indeed experience sexual desire for the act or each other, their nonsexual motive for procreation does not replace their sexual motive and can be added to it. Although people can have sex from purely nonsexual motives (e.g., many cases of sex work), once we postulate the presence of sexual desire, the motive of seeking sexual pleasure is present. Motives for having sex, like motives for nonsexual activities, can be mixed, involving sexual and nonsexual ones. One reason for the insistence on the sexual motive in understanding sexual desire is that if sexual desire is partly a biological or physiological state (even if in human beings it is also a mental, intentional state), it exerts its pull even with the presence of nonsexual motives (see Dent 1984, ch. 2; see also Hamilton 2001, ch. 9; Webber 2009). Another reason is that without the motive for sexual pleasure, the idea of sexual desire becomes so broad as to refer to any desire for sexual activity, with the danger of obfuscation: we would have to understand a sex worker’s desire for sex with a client as sexual, whereas in fact it is solely financial. Sexual desire’s pull supports pessimist views of sexual desire. Although pessimism and optimism have moral implications – some of which are addressed below – they are based in how pessimism and optimism perceive the nature of sexual desire. Pessimists consider sexual desire morally dangerous and threatening to our rationality (including Christian philosophers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer [1859, ch. 44], and, among contemporary philosophers of sex Alan Soble, whose views in “Sexual Use” [2013b; 2017b; 2022c] imply with some certainty that he is also a pessimist). Optimism considers sexual desire as generally benign and as bringing people together (it commands a large majority of the philosophers of sex, including Bertrand Russell 1929, passim; Irving Singer 2001, passim; and Martha Nussbaum 1995, 1998), though it recognizes that it can be morally problematic (Morgan 2003a). The issue, then, between pessimism and optimism concerns not whether sexual desire can be morally problematic, but whether it is so by its nature (Soble, with Halwani 2017, 5–8). Sexual pessimism can be deep. Jean-Paul Sartre’s version is that sexual desire aims to capture a person in their entirety through their body. To do so, the agent must also make him or herself pure flesh by allowing sexual desire to “clog” their consciousness (Sartre 1943 [1956, 504]). Thus, “I make myself flesh in the presence of the Other in order to appropriate the Other’s flesh” (Sartre 1943 [1956, 506]). Another version of deep pessimism is Kant’s, which considers sexual desire to be for the sexual parts or body of another person, not the person’s “work and services” (Kant 1930 [1963, 163]; see also 1797, 6:424–6:427; see below the moral implications of this view). Sexual desire sets aside another’s humanity and targets their flesh. This does not mean that in desiring Y, X would be as happy with Y’s corpse or with Y unconscious as with Y alive (as Shrage and Stewart [2015, 6] claim); for X, Y-dead is not at all equally preferable to Y-alive. It also does not mean that during sex X treats Y as an object with no desires or interests of Y’s own. Instead, X treats those interests as merely instrumental to the satisfaction of X’s sexual desires (Halwani 2018b, ch. 8; Soble 2013b, 2017b; 2022c; see also Herman 1993; O’Neill 1985; Papadaki 2007). A phenomenology of sexual desire seems to support the above views, according to which in sexually desiring Y, X is attracted to the bodily, physical attributes of Y. Sexual optimists claim that although sexual desire can be morally dangerous, it need not be and is usually not. They agree that it focuses on the body but do not see this as a problem. Sex intimately and pleasurably brings two (or more) people together. It is a force for good, establishing trust and strengthening human bonds. Unlike appetites, sexual interest … [is] … an interpersonal sensitivity, one that enables us to delight in the mind and character of other persons as well as in their flesh… [S]ex may be seen as an instinctual agency by which persons respond to one another through their bodies. (Singer 1984, 382; see also Goldman 1977, 282–283; Russell 1929 [1970, passim]) For the optimist, Soble notes, “Sexual pleasure is … a valuable thing in its own right, something to be cherished and promoted because it has intrinsic and not merely instrumental value” (Soble, with Halwani 2017, 8). 1.2 Sexual Activity It is difficult to define “sexual act” or “sexual activity.” Various proposed criteria face difficulties (Soble 2006a). This is especially so when closely related concepts (e.g., “having sex”) do not have the same extension. In ordinary language use, and according to some studies, people distinguish between having sex and sexual activity; they count many activities as sexual but not as having sex, such as solo masturbation, cyber-sex, and even oral sex (Soble 2006a,: 15–16). Solo masturbation counts as sexual activity and as a sexual act, but not as having sex, though Soble has recently argued that solo masturbation is on a continuum with other forms of sexual activity, both physically and psychologically (2022a). There are a few criteria to define “sexual activity” (Soble 2006a). One criterion is reproduction: for an activity to be sexual it has to be or aim at being reproductive. This faces obvious counter-examples, such as same-sex sexual activities and heterosexual oral and anal sex (Soble 2006a, 18–19). Another criterion is bodily contact: sexual activities are those that involve contact with sexual body parts (though we need to figure out what these parts are). This fails as a sufficient condition (doctors sometimes have to touch patients’ genitals) and as a necessary one (achieving orgasm during a phone-sex chat) (Soble 2006a, 19–20). Sexual pleasure is a third criterion: “Those activities … are sexual … which give rise to sexual pleasure” (Gray 1978, 191–192). But the production of sexual pleasure is not necessary because many acts do not produce such pleasure; and this criterion conceptually rules out non-pleasurable sex (Soble 2006a, 21–22). It might also not be sufficient: a man might see someone on the street and feel a twinge of sexual pleasure (Soble 1996, 130). The presence of sexual pleasure in this case does not suffice for the man’s experience to be sexual activity (perhaps if the man continues to look the experience becomes a sexual activity because of his intention to keep looking; Soble 1996, 130). Another criterion is intention, though we need to figure out what the intention is for. One reasonable candidate is “the intention to produce sexual pleasure in oneself or in another.” But this is not necessary: two people who have sexual intercourse to procreate engage in a sexual act. The experience, if any, of sexual pleasure is a by-product of the action (Soble 1996, 132). This criterion is also not sufficient. Suppose that X intends to produce sexual pleasure in Y by “whistling ‘Dixie’,” but what X does is not a sexual act (Soble 2006a, 22). Another criterion for defining “sexual activity” is sexual desire: sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfill such desire of the agent. (Goldman 1977, 268) A “sexual act” (or “activity”, in Goldman’s terms) is activity “which tends to fulfill” sexual desire. The definition sounds right: what else is a sexual act if not one that satisfies or “tends to” satisfy sexual desire? But it faces counter-examples. Consider a sex worker performing fellatio on a man: while fellatio fulfills or tends to fulfill the man’s sexual desire, it does not fulfill or tend to fulfill the sex worker’s sexual desire if she does not desire the client (as is often the case). Thus satisfying sexual desire is not necessary for an activity to be sexual. Whether it is sufficient depends on what we mean by “satisfaction” or “fulfillment.” If it means “the desire is no longer felt for the time being” or “the desire is gone,” satisfying sexual desire would not be sufficient. Taking a cold shower, a powerful sleeping pill, or even focusing on something else might get rid of the sexual desire, yet these activities are not sexual. If “satisfying sexual desire” means, “the desire achieves its goal” (which is sexual fulfillment), satisfying sexual desire by a particular activity would be sufficient for that activity to be sexual, but the definition becomes circular. The criterion of sexual desire, then, does not succeed in defining “sexual act”. By the above criteria, a definition of “sexual activity” is hard to find. One crucial reason might be that what we commonly think is a sexual act does not depend on one criterion: behavior, intentions, contact with specific body parts, etc., play a role depending on the context. This reason motivates a disjunctive definition, according to which an activity is sexual if and only if it is done from a sexual motive, it tends to fulfill sexual desire, it involves contact with the genitalia (or sexual body parts) or one or more of the parties to the activity, or it behaviorally fits paradigmatic cases of sexual activity (this is just one example of a disjunctive definition). Whether such a definition succeeds depends on various factors, such as that each disjunct is itself philosophically unproblematic, the list of disjuncts is exhaustive, and the definition is not too unwieldy to be plausible or useful. Another reason why a definition of sexual activity is hard to find (and one that might go against a disjunctive definition) is that there are many concepts closely related to each other that nonetheless commonly mean different things. “To have sex” or “to engage in sex” almost always refer to sexual activity with at least one more person, whereas “engaging in a sexual activity” and “having a sexual experience” do not have this reference, and they are not common expressions. Thus, defining these concepts is tricky if we want the definitions to agree with common linguistic usage, or if we rely on such usage to formulate these definitions. More worrisome, if we need to define these concepts for help with practical, moral, and legal issues, the rift between them and common language should give us pause. 1.3 Sexual Pleasure “Pleasure” refers to various phenomena: (a) physical sensations, with specific bodily locations (e.g., scratching an itch); (b) enjoyment, as when one takes pleasure in solving a jigsaw puzzle or lying under the sun (enjoyment does not have a specific bodily location, though the same phenomenon can be experienced as sensation and as enjoyment (e.g., lying under the sun); (c) a “pure” feeling that is felt all over but has no specific bodily location, and that need not be focused on a particular activity, such as being elated (Goldman 2016, 88); and (d) an attitude, to be “pleased at something”; the belief that what one is pleased at is good (Goldman 2016, 83–90). We thus have four types of pleasure: pleasure-as-sensation, pleasure-as-enjoyment, pleasure-as-feeling, and pleasure-as-pro-attitude. All four concepts can be relevant to sex, but the first two are especially important, because each can be a type of sexual pleasure, whereas the third is typically consequent to sexual activity and the fourth is an attitude about sex. (a) The pleasure of orgasm is an obvious example of the first, and (b) enjoying sexual activity is a usual experience that people undergo. (c) One can experience elation because of having had great sex, and (d) one can feel pleased at that (Halwani 2020, 111–122). Moreover, one or more parties to the act might experience pleasure-as-sensation, yet not enjoy the activity itself ((a) and (b)). One can experience the pleasurable sensations of sex and enjoy the act, yet feel repulsion at the act later and be displeased with oneself at having engaged in the act ((c) and (d)). We can also see how each pleasure has its opposite when it comes to sex: one can feel painful sensations during sex (e.g., anal penetration), one can endure a sexual act (not enjoy it), one can feel nausea at what one has done sexually, and one can have a negative attitude at one’s sexual activity. Although orgasm does not exhaust the pleasures of sex, there is something to the idea that the pleasure of orgasm is unique. As a sensation, it is unique in the way it feels and in its intensity, though this feeling might differ between men and women, especially since women seem to experience various types of orgasm (Meston et al. 2004, 174–176; but see Wallen and Lloyd 2011, 780–783). Moreover, it contrasts with other sensation-pleasures in its physiological aspects and ability to be produced through genital stimulation. For example, the sensation of having one’s ear licked is not as such a pleasure and depends on whom one thinks is licking it. But the sensation of orgasm is not like this, which makes orgasm a pleasure that cuts across social layers, a bodily sensation unmediated by social meanings or concepts; “the trait of female orgasm [is] a physiological trait or reflex, not a social trait” (Lloyd 2005, 48). Of course its frequency, significance, and meaning vary socially, culturally, and contextually (Blair et al. 2017; Janssen 2007; Mah and Binik 2002). This feature of orgasm might explain how we can speak of sexual desire across times and cultures as a unified phenomenon, even though sexual desires and bodily sensations are socially and linguistically mediated. If the pleasure of orgasm is unique, why do people usually prefer sex with someone else to masturbating, given that masturbating produces orgasms, often more intense than partnered sex? This shows that orgasm is not the only pleasure sought in sexual activity, not that its pleasure is not unique. Touching, smelling, kissing, and licking, for example, are other goals of sexual desire (Soble 1996, 85–86). We can even claim that people prefer the pleasure of orgasm through the other goals just mentioned. The discussion of sexual pleasure is important in itself and, as we have seen, for understanding “sexual desire.” For example, according to Igor Primoratz, “sexual desire is sufficiently defined as the desire for certain bodily pleasures, period” (1999, 46). But which bodily pleasures? One answer is pleasure-as-sensation: those “experienced in the sexual parts of the body, i.e., the genitals and other parts that differentiate the sexes” (Primoratz 1999, 46). More generally, and accounting for sexual pleasures not located in the genitals, sexual pleasure is the sort of bodily pleasure experienced in the sexual parts of the body, or at least related to those parts in that if it is associated with arousal, the arousal occurs in those parts. (Primoratz 1999, 46) To distinguish a sexual from a nonsexual kiss, we ask which of the two is associated with arousal, and we understand the notion of arousal as essentially linked to the sexual body parts. Because the above view relies solely on sexual pleasure-as-sensation, it would have to understand the other two types ultimately in terms of pleasure-as-sensation. That is, what makes sexual pleasure-as-enjoyment sexual is its connection to arousal. This implies that “sensory pleasure is more fundamental when it comes to sex” (Goldman 2016, 95). In most activities, the pleasure and the activity are intertwined—we do not watch a movie and then feel the pleasure. Instead, we enjoy the movie as we watch it. The pleasures here are pleasures-as-enjoyment. Things are different with sex because of pleasure-as-sensation, specifically, orgasm. Sexual pleasure-as-enjoyment supervenes on sexual pleasure-as-sensation, and it often culminates in orgasm, a result that comes at the end of the activity (though the orgasm as an end differs between men and women). We can then see why some prominent philosophers have considered temperance and intemperance to be about bodily appetites satisfied especially through touch (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1118a–1118b). Sexual pleasures-as-enjoyment and as-feeling might thus be parasitic on sexual pleasures-as-sensations. The butterflies one feels in one’s stomach at the prospect of sex exist because of the expectation of sensual pleasure, and so does enjoying a sexual act. Sexual pleasure, especially as-sensation, stands out as a crucial motivation for having sex, and its concept supplies us with a good way of defining “sexual desire.” Sexual pleasure need not be the primary motive for sexual activity, and people have sex for various reasons. Cindy Meston and David Buss identify 237 expressed reasons for why people have sex (though in a few cases they count the same reason more than once), including, in addition to sexual pleasure, finding the other person attractive, expressing love, feeling desired by the other, deepening the relationship, and trying new experiences (2007, 480). They are silent on how many of the nonsexual motives are mingled with the motive for sexual pleasure. This question is important because it gets to the issue of how primary the sexual motive is in having sex, given that not being attracted to one’s potential sexual partner, even being repulsed by them, might be powerful enough to trump other reasons for wanting sex (people might not have sex just to exercise, to boost their self-image, etc.). 1.4 Sexual Preferences and Orientation Sexual orientation is commonly understood as a person’s standing sexual preference for men, women, or both. It is a basic preference, unlike, say, the preference for hair color or buttock size. It is also an organizing preference: other sexual preferences are built upon it (Stein 1999, ch. 2). A foot fetishist is either gay, straight or bisexual, before he is a foot fetishist, though it is an empirical question whether there can be sexual orientations for body parts (or objects) regardless of the gender or sex of the person’s body part (Stein 1999, ch. 2; Wilkerson 2013). It is unclear, however, how to distinguish orientations from mere preferences; saying that the former are basic whereas the latter are not seems to merely reflect common views of the distinction (Dembroff 2016, 12; Stock 2019, 315). Halwani (forthcoming) argues that, given the importance we attach to orientations, it is a necessary condition for a sexual desire to be an orientation that its fulfillment is needed for the well-being of the person with the desire, whereas preferences are not tied to well-being in such strong ways. Mere sexual preferences vary tremendously, targeting people, objects, activities, and sexual positions, probably because they are a function of the person’s individual history and the available social and cultural options (on this variety, see Love 1992). Some preferences are considered perverted (e.g., coprophilia), some immoral (e.g., pedophilia), and some both. Yet with others it is not so obvious, such as sexual preferences for members of particular races or ethnic groups. Perhaps X’s preference for Asian women is innocent, on a par with the preference for tall people. But it might also indicate an ethical fault if, say, racially ugly stereotypes inform it (Barn 2022; Halwani 2017b [2022]; Kershnar 2019; Zheng 2016). Returning to sexual orientation, some philosophers have claimed that its popular conception relies on dubious assumptions (Corvino 2006a; Dembroff 2016). (1) It assumes three basic orientations: homosexual, heterosexual, and bisexual (or only two if one thinks, as does Kathleen Stock, that bisexuality is not a third orientation but an amalgam of the other two, such that bisexuals have two sexual orientations, heterosexuality and homosexuality [2019, 298–300]). (2) It includes the gender or sex of the person who has the orientation as an essential element of the orientation; X’s being gay means that X has the same sex/gender as the target of the orientation. (3) It is ambiguous between sex and gender: is a straight man attracted to the gender or the sex of women? And is the man straight because of his gender or sex? (4) It assumes a binary of gender/sex for both parties, excluding people who exist outside the binary. (5) It is ambiguous between sexual and emotional attraction: if a man is emotionally attracted to other men, does that mean that he is gay or something else? (6) It is silent on what counts as the basic components of the orientation: is it behavior, desires, or fantasies? (7) Finally, it assumes the cross-temporal and cross-cultural existence of the three sexual orientations: there were gay men and gay women in 15th century Russia just as there were in 21st century North America, albeit with adjustment for cultural variances. (1) Is there a good reason to believe that there are only three sexual orientations? Some men are attracted to people with female features from the waist up but male features from the waist down (a penis), thus not easily accommodated by the above three-way division of sexual orientations. It is also unclear whether the many men who are attracted to both young boys and women—this is true of many cultures around the world, past and present—are bisexual. It is also possible that there are age- and species-orientations, such as pedophilia and zoophilia. Such potential orientations threaten to seriously expand the number of sexual orientations (consider that genuine zoophiles—people who have long-standing desires to have sex with nonhuman animals—will have as many sexual orientations as there are different types of animals to which they are attracted (Wilkerson 2013)). Whether we can maintain that there are only three (or two) sexual orientations depends on the answers to these questions and our tolerance for exceptions to the three. It also depends on the reasons for classifying people by sexual orientation (see Andler 2020; Dembroff 2016; Stock 2019). (2) It is unclear why the gender/sex of the person with the orientation should be a component of the conception of sexual orientation. Under the popular conception, if a formerly straight man is currently a woman (after transitioning), they would now be a lesbian (assuming that their sexual desires for women does not change). But if we omit the person’s own gender from the conception, the person’s sexual orientation remains the same. Perhaps the answer to this issue depends on the political and moral gains reaped by conceiving of sexual orientation in one or the other way (Dembroff 2016; Stock 2019, 307–313). (3) The lack of distinction between sex and gender makes it hard to classify cases such as this: X is attracted to Y who is anatomically male (sex) but who self-presents as a woman (gender). Assume that X’s own gender and sex are male. Then, whether we claim that X is gay or is straight, we face obstacles: if X is gay, X would not be attracted to someone who appears as a woman. If X is straight, X would not be attracted to someone who is anatomically male. The popular concept of orientation leaves such cases unclassified (Corvino 2006a; Wilkerson 2013; but see Stock 2019, 303–307 for a way to accommodate gender attractions on the sex-based account of sexual orientations). The difficulty of such cases has led some philosophers to include both sex and gender as the bases of sexual orientation (Diamond 2022; Dembroff 2016). Perhaps the distinction between orientations and preferences is relevant here, such that gender-based attractions might be considered preferences, whereas sex-based attractions are orientations (or vice versa). (4) Connected to the previous point is that the popular understanding of sexual orientation assumes a binary conception of sex/gender, albeit one that can include trans people. A straight woman is a woman, cis or trans, who is attracted to men, cis or trans (a cisperson is someone whose gender identity—e.g., being a man—matches their biological sex—being male). Thus, there is no room for people who are gender fluid or whose gender or sex identification exists outside the binary (Dembroff 2016). (5) Both the American Psychological Association (APA) and the Human Rights Campaign understand “sexual orientation” as including emotional attraction. The former’s definition states, Sexual orientation refers to an enduring pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or both sexes. (American Psychological Association, Introduction to “Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality”, Other Internet Resources) Thus, the APA believes that a man would be straight were he to be emotionally (even if neither romantically nor sexually) attracted to a woman. Yet it is possible that he is nonetheless sexually attracted to men, a result that leads to conceptual trouble. Perhaps keeping the conception of sexual orientation limited to sexual attraction so as to avoid such trouble is better (though adding romantic attractions is plausible, given that they usually include a sexual dimension) (Dembroff 2016). (6) The popular conception of sexual orientation is not so crude as to rely solely on behavior, but it is silent about on what we should rely. Desires and fantasies are obvious candidates. But occurrent desires are not a good guide to sexual orientation: a shepherd can sexually desire sex with a sheep, but he need not be a zoophile, even were his desire for the sheep to recur. David—a straight guy—might desire oral sex from another man (Tom) or other men. Recourse to “enduring desires,” as in the APA’s definition, might not do the trick if the conditions under which David desires oral sex from other men recur. Other information, such as counter-factual information as to what the person would do under such-and-such conditions (e.g., Stein’s “ideal conditions”; 1999, ch. 2), is needed—if David prefers a woman’s mouth under ideal conditions, then he is straight. But stating these conditions is tough. What if David prefers the way that Tom performs oral sex? David might, under some conditions, still opt for Tom (Corvino 2006a; cf. Díaz-León, 2022). Perhaps fantasies are a better guide if there is a good way to distinguish between fantasies that indicate the person’s sexual orientation and those that don’t (after all, David’s desire for Tom is a fantasy of sorts; Storms 1980). This might push us to ideal conditions again, to distinguish between someone’s real and “fake” fantasies. Or we might rely on initial sexual impulses: what sexually catches the eye of someone, without much thought: David does desire Tom’s oral skills, but what captures David’s sexual eye are women, not men. (7) Philosophers and historians of sex are roughly divided into social constructionists and essentialists. Weak social constructionism claims that the concepts of “homosexuality,” “heterosexuality,” “natural sexuality,” and similar concepts are limited to a specific time period and geographical region. This version is weak because it is only concerned with how sexuality is conceptualized: there might have been homosexuals in ancient Greece, but the ancient Greeks did not think about them using the concept “homosexual.” Strong social constructionism—more in line with Michel Foucault’s views (1976)—claims that the very existence of homosexual and heterosexual orientations is geographically and temporally limited; our concepts of “homosexual” and “heterosexual” do not refer to anything when used to refer to other times and regions. Essentialists claim that homosexuals, heterosexuals, and bisexuals have existed in various times
— Dear Friends: CREATED MALE AND FEMALE An Open Letter from Religious Leaders December 15, 2017 As leaders of various communities of faith throughout the United States, many of us came together in the past to affirm our commitment to marriage as the union of one man and one woman and as the foundation of society. We reiterate that natural marriage continues to be invaluable to American society. We come together to join our voices on a more fundamental precept of our shared existence, namely, that human beings are male or female and that the socio-cultural reality of gender cannot be separated from one's sex as male or female. We acknowledge and affirm that all human beings are created by God and thereby have an inherent dignity. We also believe that God created each person male or female; therefore, sexual difference is not an accident or a flaw-it is a gift from God that helps draw us closer to each other and to God. What God has created is good. "God created mankind in his image; in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them" (Gen 1:27). A person's discomfort with his or her sex, or the desire to be identified as the other sex, is a complicated reality that needs to be addressed with sensitivity and truth. Each person deserves to be heard and treated with respect; it is our responsibility to respond to their concerns with compassion, mercy and honesty. As religious leaders, we express our commitment to urge the members of our communities to also respond to those wrestling with this challenge with patience and love. Children especially are harmed when they are told that they can “change” their sex or, further, given hormones that will affect their development and possibly render them infertile as adults. Parents deserve better guidance on these important decisions, and we urge our medical institutions to honor the basic medical principle of “first, do no harm." Gender ideology harms individuals and societies by sowing confusion and self-doubt. The state itself has a compelling interest, therefore, in maintaining policies that uphold the scientific fact of human biology and supporting the social institutions and norms that surround it. The movement today to enforce the false idea—that a man can be or become a woman or vice versa—is deeply troubling. It compels people to either go against reason— —that is, to agree with something that is not true or face ridicule, marginalization, and other forms of retaliation. We desire the health and happiness of all men, women, and children. Therefore, we call for policies that uphold the truth of a person's sexual identity as male or female, and the privacy and safety of all. We hope for renewed appreciation of the beauty of sexual difference in our culture and for authentic support of those who experience conflict with their God-given sexual identity. Sincerely Yours: Most Rev. Joseph C. Bambera Bishop of Scranton Chairman USCCB Committee on Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs The ſost Rev. Dr. Foley Beach Archbishop and Primate Anglican Church in North America The Rev. John F. Bradosky Bishop North American Lutheran Church Most Rev. Charles J. Chaput, O.F.M. Cap. Archbishop of Philadelphia Chairman USCCB Committee on Laity, Marriage, Family Life and Youth Most Rev. James D. Conley Bishop of Lincoln Chairman USCCB Subcommittee for the Promotion and Defense of Marriage The Rt. Rev. John A. M. Guernsey Bishop, Diocese of the Mid-Atlantic Anglican Church in North America Rev. Dr. Matthew Harrison President Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod Imam Faizal Khan Founder and Leader Islamic Society of the Washington Area Most Rev. Joseph E. Kurtz Archbishop of Louisville Chairman USCCB Committee for Religious Liberty Melchisedek Archbishop of Pittsburgh Orthodox Church in America The Rt. Rev. Eric V. Menees Bishop of San Joaquin Anglican Church in North America Rev. Eugene F. Rivers, III Founder and Director Seymour Institute for Black Church and Policy Studies Church of God in Christ Rev. Dr. Gregory P. Seltz, PhD Executive Director The Lutheran Center for Religious Liberty The Rev. Paull Spring Bishop Emeritus The North American Lutheran Church Rev. Tony Suarez Executive Vice President National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference Very Rev. Nathanael Symeonides Ecumenical Officer Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America The Rev. Dr. L. Roy Taylor Stated Clerk of the General Assembly Presbyterian Church in America Andrew Walker Director of Policy Studies Southern Baptist Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission The Rev. Dr. David Wendel Assistant to the Bishop for Ministry and Ecumenism The North American Lutheran Church Paul Winter Elder Bruderhof
Given the historical understanding of marriage as the natural union of man and woman for the purpose of companionship and the having and rearing of children, the idea of same-sex marriage seems contradictory, and it was on that basis that some rejected it entirely, while others argued for the legal recognition of a different kind of relationship, namely ‘civil partnership’. Advocates and defenders of same-sex marriage argue that the latter is insufficient as it lacks equality of esteem. This assumes that the status of legally and socially acknowledged marriage is something valued in society, that it is in effect a public good to which everyone who wishes it should have access. There are, however, two important points to note. First, this involves a different conception of the nature and purpose of marriage, one focused on sexual partnership; second, this conception may be displacing the older one even among heterosexuals who do not assume that marriage is for the sake of having a family; and third, the decline of formal marriage, and the rise of divorce suggests that society in general is changing its views of these matters.