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Virtue Ethics

A full moral evaluation of a human action or activity involves assessing the character and motives of a) the agent, b) the nature of what they did, and c) the consequences of this - typically those intended, foreseen, or reasonably. The most common and favoured philosophical approach is to attach primacy to the value of either a) or b) or c) and then to explain the value of the others and of the overall action or activity in terms of that. On this basis it is possible to classify ethical theories. Consequentialism is that family of theories that begins with an evaluation of sorts of outcomes or consequences and judges a type of action or activity good (or bad) according to whether it promotes consequences of that sort, and assesses character and motive in terms of whether they are directed towards good (or bad action) so defined. Deontological or duty-based theories take b) to have priority and explain the goodness or badness of a) and c) in terms of this, e.g. suppose lying is a bad kind of action then the consequence of lying in as much as it was due to that is itself morally bad, and likewise the motive to lie is bad because of the intrinsic badness of lying. Virtue ethics in its purest form is the approach which attaches evaluative priority to character and motive, and derives the value of action and outcome by reference to this. So, for example, giving money to the poor is not morally good (though it may be consequentially beneficial) if it is done from the motive of displaying one’s affluence, or seeking praise. A more limited version of virtue ethics is one which allows that other considerations matter in themselves, e.g. type of action, and outcome, but that character is an ineliminable and non-reducible aspect of moral evaluation.

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    Modern Moral Philosophy G. E. M. Anscombe Philosophy 33, No. 124 January 1958 I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer generally sur- vives, and are only harmful without it. My third thesis is that the differences between the well-known English writ- ers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. Anyone who has read Aristotle's Ethics and has also read modern moral philosophy must have been struck by the great contrasts between them. The concepts which are prominent among the moderns seem to be lacking, or at any rate buried or far in the background, in Aristotle. Most noticeably, the term "moral" itself, which we have by direct inheritance Aristotle, just doesn't seem to fit, in its modern sense, into an account of Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle dis- tinguishes virtues as moral and intellectual. Have some of what he calls "intellectual” virtues what we should call a “moral” aspect? It would seem so; the criterion is presum- ably that a failure in an “intellectual" virtue like that of having good judgment in calculating how to bring about something useful, say in municipal government may be blameworthy. But it may reasonably be asked - can- not any failure be made a matter of blame or reproach? Any derogatory criticism, say of the workmanship of a product or the design of a machine, can be called blame or reproach. So we want to put in the word "morally" again: sometimes such a failure may be morally blameworthy, sometimes not. Now has Aristotle got this idea of moral blame, as opposed to any other? If he has, why isn't it more central? There are some mistakes, he says, which are causes, not of involun- tariness in actions but of scoundrelism, and for which a man is blamed. Does this mean that there is a moral obligation not to make certain intellectual mistakes? Why doesn't he discuss obligation in general, and this obligation in partic- ular? If someone professes to be expounding Aristotle and talks in a modern fashion about "moral" such-and-such he must be very imperceptive if he does not constantly feel like someone whose jaws have somehow got out of alignment: the teeth don't come together in a proper bite. We cannot then, look to Aristotle for any elucidation of the modern way of talking about "moral" goodness, obligation, etc. And all the best-known writers on ethics in modern times, from Butler to Mill, appear to me to have faults as thinkers on the subject which make it impossible to hope for any direct light on it from them. I will state these objections with the brevity which their character makes possible. Butler exalts conscience, but appears ignorant that a man's conscience may tell him to do the vilest things. Hume defines “truth” in such a way as to exclude ethical judgments from it, and professes that he has proved that they are so excluded. He also implicitly defines "passion" in such a way that aiming at anything is having a passion. His objection to passing from “is” to “ought” would ap- ply equally to passing from “is" to "owes" or from "is" to "needs." (However, because of the historical situation, he has a point here, which I shall return to.) Kant introduces the idea of "legislating for oneself," which is as absurd as if in these days, when majority votes com- mand great respect, one were to call each reflective deci- sion a man made a vote resulting in a majority, which as a matter of proportion is overwhelming, for it is always 1-0. The concept of legislation requires superior power in the legislator. His own rigoristic convictions on the sub- ject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him 2 seems to me a that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-such circumstances"). His rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stip- ulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it. Bentham and Mill do not notice the difficulty of the concept "pleasure." They are often said to have gone wrong through committing the “naturalistic fallacy"; but this charge does not impress me, because I do not find accounts of it coher- ent. But the other point about pleasure fatal objection from the very outset. The ancients found this concept pretty baffling. It reduced Aristotle to sheer bab- ble about "the bloom on the cheek of youth" because, for good reasons, he wanted to make it out both identical with and different from the pleasurable activity. Generations of modern philosophers found this concept quite unperplex- ing, and it reappeared in the literature as a problematic one only a year or two ago when Ryle wrote about it. The reason is simple: since Locke, pleasure was taken to be some sort of internal impression. But it was superficial, if that was the right account of it, to make it the point of actions. One might adapt something Wittgenstein said about "meaning" and say "Pleasure cannot be an internal impression, for no internal impression could have the consequences of plea- sure." Mill also, like Kant, fails to realize the necessity for stip- ulation as to relevant descriptions, if his theory is to have content. It did not occur to him that acts of murder and theft could be otherwise described. He holds that where a proposed action is of such a kind as to fall under some one principle established on grounds of utility, one must go by that; where it falls under none or several, the several sug- gesting contrary views of the action, the thing to do is to calculate particular consequences. But pretty well any ac- tion can be so described as to make it fall under a variety of principles of utility (as I shall say for short) if it falls under any. with I will now return to Hume. The features of Hume's phi- losophy which I have mentioned, like many other features of it, would incline me to think that Hume was a mere brilliant sophist; and his procedures are certainly so- phistical. But I am forced, not to reverse, but to add to, this judgment by a peculiarity of Hume's philosophizing: namely that although he reaches his conclusions which he is in love by sophistical methods, his consid- erations constantly open up very deep and important prob- lems. It is often the case that in the act of exhibiting the sophistry one finds oneself noticing matters which deserve a lot of exploring: the obvious stands in need of investiga- tions as a result of the points that Hume pretends to have made. In this, he is unlike, say, Butler. It was already well known that conscience could dictate vile actions; for But- ler to have written disregarding this does not open up any new topics for us. But with Hume it is otherwise: hence he is a very profound and great philosopher, in spite of his sophistry. For example: Suppose that I say to my grocer "Truth consists in either relations of ideas, as that 20s=£1, or matters of fact, as that I ordered potatoes, you supplied them, and you sent me a bill. So it doesn't apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such-and-such a sum." 3 Now if one makes this comparison, it comes to light that the relation of the facts mentioned to the description "X owes Y so much money" is an interesting one, which I will call that of being "brute relative to” that description. Further, the "brute" facts mentioned here themselves have descrip- tions relatively to which other facts are "brute" as, e.g., he had potatoes carted to my house and they were left there are brute facts relative to "he supplied me with potatoes." And the fact X owes Y money is in turn “brute” relative to other descriptions e.g. "X is solvent." Now the rela- tion of "relative bruteness" is a complicated one. To men- tion a few points: if xyz is a set of facts brute relative to a description A, then xyz is a set out of a range some set among which holds if A holds; but the holding of some set among these does not necessarily entail A because ex- ceptional circumstances can always make a difference; and what are exceptional circumstance relatively to A can gen- erally only be explained by giving a few diverse examples, and no theoretically adequate provision can be made for ex- ceptional circumstances, since a further special context can theoretically always be imagined that would reinterpret any special context. Further, though in normal circumstances, xyz would be a justification for A, of which institution A is of course not itself a description. (E.g. the statement that I give someone a shilling is not a description of the institution of money or of the currency of the country.) Thus, though it would be ludicrous to pretend that there can be no such thing as a transition from, e.g., "is" to "owes," the charac- ter of the transition is in fact rather interesting and comes to light as a result of reflecting on Hume's arguments. ¹ ¹The above two paragraphs are an abstract of a paper "On Brute Facts," Analysis That I owe the grocer such-and-such a sum would be one of a set of facts which would be "brute" in relation to the description "I am a bilker.” “bilking" is of course a species of "dishonesty" or "injustice." (Naturally the consideration will not have any effect on my actions unless I want to com- mit or avoid acts of injustice.) So far, in spite of their strong associations, I conceive "bilk- ing," "injustice" and "dishonesty" in a merely factual way. That I can do this for "bilking" is obvious enough; "justice" I have no idea how to define, except that its sphere is that of actions which relate to someone else, but "injustice," its defect, can for the moment be offered as a generic name covering various species. E.g.: "bilking,” “theft” (which is relative to whatever property institutions exist), "slander," "adultery," "punishment of the innocent." In present-day philosophy an explanation is required how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one; to give such an explanation belongs to ethics; but it cannot even be begun until we are equipped with a sound philos- ophy of psychology. For the proof that an unjust man is a bad man would require a positive account of justice as a "virtue." This part of the subject-matter of ethics, is how- ever, completely closed to us until we have an account of what type of characteristic a virtue is a problem, not of ethics, but of conceptual analysis and how it relates to the actions in which it is instanced: a matter which I think Aristotle did not succeed in really making clear. For this we certainly need an account at least of what a human action is at all, and how its description as "doing such-and-such" 2 18, 3 (1958). is affected by its motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this an account of such concepts is required. The terms "should" or "ought" or "needs" relate to good and bad: e.g. machinery needs oil, or should or ought to be oiled, in that running without oil is bad for it, or it runs badly without oil. According to this conception, of course, "should" and "ought” are not used in a special “moral” sense when one says that a man should not bilk. (In Aris- totle's sense of the term "moral" (ńÐɩxóc), they are being used in connection with a moral subject-matter: namely that of human passions and (non-technical) actions.) But they have now acquired a special so-called "moral" sense i.e. a sense in which they imply some absolute verdict (like one of guilty/not guilty on a man) on what is described in the "ought" sentences used in certain types of context: not merely the contexts that Aristotle would call “moral” passions and actions but also some of the contexts that he would call "intellectual." The ordinary (and quite indispensable) terms "should," "needs," "ought," "must" — acquired this special sense by being equated in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound," or "is required to," in the sense in which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law. How did this come about? The answer is in history: be- tween Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law con- ception of ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical no- tions from the Torah. (One might be inclined to think that a law conception of ethics could arise only among people who accepted an allegedly divine positive law; that this is not so is shown by the example of the Stoics, who also thought that whatever was involved in conformity to hu- man virtues was required by divine law.) In consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded in our language and thought. The Greek word "auaotáveiv," the aptest to be turned to that use, acquired the sense "sin," from having meant "mistake," "missing the mark," "going wrong." The Latin peccatum which roughly corresponded to àμagtnua was even apter for the sense "sin," because it was already associated with "culpa" - "guilt" - a juridical notion. The blanket term “illicit,” “unlawful,” meaning much the same as our blanket term "wrong," explains itself. It is in- teresting that Aristotle did not have such a blanket term. He has blanket terms for wickedness - "villain," "scoundrel"; but of course a man is not a villain or a scoundrel by the per- formance of one bad action, or a few bad actions. And he has terms like "disgraceful," "impious"; and specific terms signifying defect of the relevant virtue, like “unjust”; but no term corresponding to "illicit." The extension of this term (i.e. the range of its application) could be indicated. in his terminology only by a quite lengthy sentence: that is "illicit" which, whether it is a thought or a consented-to passion or an action or an omission in thought or action, is something contrary to one of the virtues the lack of which shows a man to be bad qua man. That formulation would yield a concept co-extensive with the concept "illicit." To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua 5 craftsman or logician) that what is needed for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of "obligation," of being bound or required as by a law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word “ought” has become in- vested in certain contexts with the sense of "obligation," it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and special feeling in these contexts. It is as if the notion "criminal" were to remain when crim- inal law and criminal courts had been abolished and for- gotten. A Hume discovering this situation might conclude that there was a special sentiment, expressed by "criminal," which alone gave the word its sense. So Hume discovered the situation which the notion "obligation" survived, and the notion "ought" was invested with that peculiar for hav- ing which it is said to be used in a “moral” sense, but in which the belief in divine law had long since been aban- doned: for it was substantially given up among Protestants at the time of the Reformation. The situation, if I am right, was the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one. When Hume produced his famous remarks about the tran- 2They did not deny the existence of divine law; but their most characteristic doc- trine was that it was given, not to be obeyed, but to show man's incapacity to obey it, even by grace; and this applied not merely to the ramified prescriptions of the Torah, but to the requirements of “natural divine law." Cf. in this connection the decree of Trent against the teaching that Christ was only to be trusted in as mediator, not obeyed as legislator.

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    Editors: David Carr0, James Arthur1, Kristján Kristjánsson2 David Carr University of Edinburgh, Edinburg, United Kingdom View editor publications You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar James Arthur Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, Birmingham, United Kingdom View editor publications You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar Kristján Kristjánsson Edgbaston, Birmingham, United Kingdom View editor publications You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar Presents accessible and informative analysis of recent developments in ethics of virtue Collates the work of numerous authors and crosses disciplines in order to examine ethics in psychology, sociology and theology Enables understanding of global perspectives and influences upon the concept of virtue 25k Accesses 68 Citations 2 Altmetric Sections Table of contents About this book Keywords Editors and Affiliations About the editors Bibliographic Information Buying options eBook USD 129.00 Price excludes VAT (Mexico) ISBN: 978-1-137-59177-7 Instant EPUB and PDF download Readable on all devices Own it forever Exclusive offer for individuals only Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout Buy eBook Hardcover Book USD 169.99 Price excludes VAT (Mexico) ISBN: 978-1-137-59176-0 Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days Exclusive offer for individuals only Free shipping worldwide See shipping information. Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout Buy Hardcover Book Learn about institutional subscriptions This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Table of contents (19 chapters) Search within book Search Front Matter Pages i-xi PDF Varieties of Virtue Ethics: Introduction David Carr, James Arthur, Kristján Kristjánsson Pages 1-13 Philosophical Varieties of Virtue and Virtue Ethics Front Matter Pages 15-15 PDF Varieties of Virtue Ethics Robert C. Roberts Pages 17-34 Which Variety of Virtue Ethics? Julia Annas Pages 35-51 Against Idealization in Virtue Ethics Howard J. Curzer Pages 53-71 Virtue Ethics in the Medieval Period John Haldane Pages 73-88 Iris Murdoch and the Varieties of Virtue Ethics Konrad Banicki Pages 89-104 Confucian and Daoist Virtue Ethics May Sim Pages 105-121 Virtue Ethics in the Wider Academic Context Front Matter Pages 123-123 PDF Aristotelian Ethical Virtue: Naturalism Without Measure Jonathan Jacobs Pages 125-142 Categorizing Character: Moving Beyond the Aristotelian Framework Christian B. Miller Pages 143-162 Human Practice and God’s Making-Good in Aquinas’ Virtue Ethics Richard Conrad Pages 163-179 Recovered Goods: Durkheimian Sociology as Virtue Ethics Philip S. Gorski Pages 181-198 The Deep Psychology of Eudaimonia and Virtue: Belonging, Loyalty and the Anterior Cingulate Cortex Blaine J. Fowers Pages 199-216 Virtue, the Common Good and Self-Transcendence Candace Vogler Pages 217-229 Virtue Ethics and the Wider Professional and Educational Context Front Matter Pages 231-231 PDF Plato on the Necessity of Imitation and Habituation for the Cultivation of the Virtues Mark E. Jonas Pages 233-248 Maintaining Primary Professional Virtues by Protecting Properly Oriented Relationships: Medical Practice as a Case Study Justin Oakley Pages 249-266 “Till We Have Faces”: Second-Person Relatedness as the Object, End and Crucial Circumstance of Perfect or “Infused” Virtues Andrew Pinsent Pages 267-279 Back to top About this book This book explores recent developments in ethics of virtue. While acknowledging the Aristotelian roots of modern virtue ethics – with its emphasis on the moral importance of character – this collection recognizes that more recent accounts of virtue have been shaped by many other influences, such as Aquinas, Hume, Nietzsche, Hegel and Marx, Confucius and Lao-tzu. The authors also examine the bearing of virtue ethics on other disciplines such as psychology, sociology and theology, as well as attending to some wider public, professional and educational implications of the ethics of virtue. This pioneering book will be invaluable to researchers and students concerned with the many contemporary varieties and applications of virtue ethics.  Back to top Keywords virtueethicsvirtue ethicsphilosophyThomas AquinasIris MurdochConfuciousidealizationresearch ethics Back to top Editors and Affiliations University of Edinburgh, Edinburg, United Kingdom David Carr Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, Birmingham, United Kingdom James Arthur Edgbaston, Birmingham, United Kingdom Kristján Kristjánsson Back to top About the editors James Arthur is Deputy Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Staffing and Professor of Education and Civic Engagement at the University of Birmingham, UK. He is Director of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues. Among his many works on the education of character and virtue are The Communitarian Agenda in Education (2001) and Education with Character (2003). David Carr is Emeritus Professor at the University of Edinburgh and currently Professor of Ethics and Education in the University of Birmingham Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, UK.  He has written much on the significance of art and literature for educating moral character and recently edited a volume of essays entitled Perspectives on Gratitude: An Interdisciplinary Approach (2016). Kristján Kristjánsson is Professor of Character Education and Virtue Ethics, and Deputy Director of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of Birmingham, UK. His research focuses on issu es at the intersection of moral philosophy, moral psychology and moral education. His latest book is Aristotelian Character Education (2015). Back to top Bibliographic Information Book Title: Varieties of Virtue Ethics Editors: David Carr, James Arthur, Kristján Kristjánsson DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59177-7 Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan London eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0) Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-137-59176-0Published: 20 December 2016 eBook ISBN: 978-1-137-59177-7Published: 30 November 2016 Edition Number: 1 Number of Pages: XI, 352 Number of Illustrations: 5 b/w illustrations Topics: Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics, Science Ethics, Philosophical Traditions Back to top

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    Why Study Aristotle's Virtue Ethics?

    This talk is part of the Royal Institute of Philosophy's 15-Minute Masterclass series, in which eminent philosophers provide an accessible overview of a philosophical topic. These videos follow the A-Level Philosophy syllabus and as such are prefect for anyone studying philosophy at that level. However they're also designed to be a useful and engaging resource for anyone desiring to know more about these problems in philosophy. In this video, Dr Angie Hobbs, Professor of the Public Understanding at the University of Sheffield, looks at Aristotle's Virtue Ethics. This episode on is one of a pair of videos on Virtue Ethics, although both can be viewed independently. The other episode, What is the Good Life?, can be found in this playlist and focuses on Aristotle's Function Argument.

  • Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues

    This study locates Aquinas's theory of infused and acquired virtue in his foundational understanding of nature and grace. Aquinas holds that all the virtues are bestowed on humans by God along with the gift of sanctifying grace. Since he also holds, with Aristotle, that we can create virtuous dispositions in ourselves through our own repeated good acts, a question arises: How are we to understand the relationship between the virtues God infuses at the moment of grace and virtues that are gradually acquired over time? In this important book, Angela McKay Knobel provides a detailed examination of Aquinas's theory of infused moral virtue, with special attention to the question of how the infused and acquired moral virtues are related. Part 1 examines Aquinas's own explicit remarks about the infused and acquired virtues and considers whether and to what extent a coherent "theory" of the relationship between the infused and acquired virtues can be found in Aquinas. Knobel argues that while Aquinas says almost nothing about how the infused and acquired virtues are related, he clearly does believe that the "structure" of the infused virtues mirrors that of the acquired in important ways. Part 2 uses that structure to evaluate existing interpretations of Aquinas and argues that no existing account adequately captures Aquinas's most fundamental commitments. Knobel ultimately argues that the correct account lies somewhere between the two most commonly advocated theories. Written primarily for students and scholars of moral philosophy and theology, the book will also appeal to readers interested in understanding Aquinas's theory of virtue.

  • Target Centred Virtue Ethics

    Virtue ethics in its contemporary manifestation is dominated by neo Aristotelian virtue ethics primarily developed by Rosalind Hursthouse. This version of eudaimonistic virtue ethics was ground breaking, but has been subject to considerable critical attention. Christine Swanton shows that the time is ripe for new developments and alternatives. The target centred virtue ethics proposed by Swanton is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. First, it rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of Neo Aristotelian virtue ethics owed to Philippa Foot in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics inspired by the Continental tradition and McDowell. Second, it rejects the well -known 'qualified agent' account of right action made famous by Hursthouse in favour of a target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts. Swanton develops the target centred view with discussions of Dancy's particularism, default reasons and thick concepts, codifiability, and its relation to the Doctrine of the mean. Target Centred Virtue Ethics retains the pluralism of Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003) but develops it further in relation to a pluralistic account of practical reason. This study develops other substantive positions including the view that target centred virtue ethics is developmental, suitably embedded in an environmental ethics of "dwelling"; and incorporates a concept of differentiated virtue to allow for roles, narrativity, cultural and historical location, and stage of life.

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    Conversations at the Crossroads

    Friends, it is my pleasure to share the latest “Bishop Barron Presents” discussion, featuring American legal scholar, political philosopher, and public intellectual Robert George. In our conversation, we discuss virtue, focusing on topics such as: - Natural law - The “woke” phenomena - How we can engrain virtue in our society today - And more Stay tuned for future “Bishop Barron Presents” conversations. These intellectually invigorating discussions feature varying religious and political perspectives to encourage greater understanding and civility. ———WATCH——— Subscribe to this Channel: https://bit.ly/31LV1sn Word on Fire Institute Channel: https://bit.ly/2voBZMD Word on Fire en Español Channel: https://bit.ly/2uFowjl ———WORD ON FIRE——— Word on Fire: https://www.wordonfire.org/ FREE Daily Gospel Reflections (English or Español): https://dailycatholicgospel.com/ ———SOCIAL MEDIA——— Bishop Barron Instagram: https://bit.ly/2Sn2XgD Bishop Barron Facebook: https://bit.ly/2Sltef5 Bishop Barron Twitter: https://bit.ly/2Hkz6yQ Word on Fire Instagram: https://bit.ly/39sGNyZ Word on Fire Facebook: https://bit.ly/2HmpPpW Word on Fire Twitter: https://bit.ly/2UKO49h Word on Fire en Español Instagram: https://bit.ly/38mqofD Word on Fire en Español Facebook: https://bit.ly/2SlthaL Word on Fire en Español Twitter: https://bit.ly/38n3VPt ———SUPPORT WORD ON FIRE——— Donate: https://www.wordonfire.org/donate/ Word on Fire Store: https://store.wordonfire.org/ Pray: https://bit.ly/2vqU7Ft

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    Virtue in the Mean (Aquinas 101)

    ⭐️ Donate $5 to help keep these videos FREE for everyone! Pay it forward for the next viewer: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/donate-youtube-a101 According to Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue, a virtue is a disposition to choose according to the mean relative to us as determined by the one who is prudent. Now, many questions commonly come up about the mean of virtue. A little thought reveals that the mean is not the same for everybody—even in one and the same matter. Virtue in the Mean (Aquinas 101) - Fr. James Brent, O.P. For readings, podcasts, and more videos like this, go to http://www.Aquinas101.com. While you’re there, be sure to sign up for one of our free video courses on Aquinas. And don’t forget to like and share with your friends, because it matters what you think! Subscribe to our channel here: https://www.youtube.com/c/TheThomisticInstitute?sub_confirmation=1 -- Aquinas 101 is a project of the Thomistic Institute that seeks to promote Catholic truth through short, engaging video lessons. You can browse earlier videos at your own pace or enroll in one of our Aquinas 101 email courses on St. Thomas Aquinas and his masterwork, the Summa Theologiae. In these courses, you'll learn from expert scientists, philosophers, and theologians—including Dominican friars from the Province of St. Joseph. Enroll in Aquinas 101 to receive the latest videos, readings, and podcasts in your email inbox each Tuesday morning. Sign up here: https://aquinas101.thomisticinstitute.org/ Help us film Aquinas 101! Donate here: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/donate-youtube-a101 Want to represent the Thomistic Institute on your campus? Check out our online store! Explore here: https://go.thomisticinstitute.org/store-youtube-a101 Stay connected on social media: https://www.facebook.com/ThomisticInstitute https://www.instagram.com/thomisticinstitute https://twitter.com/thomisticInst Visit us at: https://thomisticinstitute.org/ #Aquinas101 #ThomisticInstitute #ThomasAquinas #Catholic

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    The Virtuous Life

    Fr. Thomas Joseph White, O.P. is the rector magnificus of the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome, commonly known as the Angelicum. In this video, he talks about how pursuing a virtuous life is also a pursuit of human flourishing and happiness. Virtues allow us to have freedom of excellence, rather than freedom of indifference or a legal obligation to be virtuous such as in deontological ethics. _______________________ FIND US ONLINE HERE: https://openlightmedia.com https://twitter.com/DSMMEVocations https://www.instagram.com/openlight_media/ https://www.facebook.com/DSMME 0:00 What is virtue? 1:53 Human Flourishing 3:41 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics