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The definition of lying is not uncontroversial. Some restrict it to intentionally saying what one believes to be false with the intention of getting someone else to believe that falsehood to be true, usually for some benefit to oneself resulting from the deception. Others regard this as too narrow as it does not include intentionally leading someone to believe what is false other than by saying the false oneself. In response to a Gestapo group going from house to house in search of innocent Jews a homeowner hiding some of them in the cellar of an outhouse might reply ‘No’ to the question ‘Are there any Jews here?’. If ‘here’ is understood restrictively then what he says is true but of course he expects the Gestapo to understand it more broadly. There is also the practice of saying less where more is expected again with the aim of withholding the truth. However one defines lying or deception there is an assumption that these are to be avoided as somehow bad, even if they may sometimes be excusable as in the idea of a little ‘white’ lie, or a lesser evil. There are two broad approaches to the moral issues of lying. One sees it as a matter of what is generally beneficial or harmful, arguing that we depend on people telling the truth when asked to do so. The other believes there is something wrong about lying independently of its consequences. Some think this is because it ‘perverts’ the function of declarative speech which is to say what one believes is true. Others hold that it is because it involves denying people what they have a right to and so is a kind of theft ‘stealing the truth from them’.

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    Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers: What Can We Learn from Mill and Kant? ALASDAIR MACINTYRE THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Princeton University April 6 and 7, 1994 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE is Arts and Sciences Professor of Philosophy at Duke University. He was educated at Queen Mary College, University of London, and at the University of Manchester. He taught at various British universities, including Oxford and Essex, until 1970. Since then he has taught at a number of American universities, most recently at Vanderbilt University where he was the W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy from 1982 to 1988, and from 1989 to 1994 at the University of Notre Dome, where he was the McMahon/Hank Professor of Philosophy. He is past president of the eastern division of the American Philosophical Association. His numerous publications include Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990), First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues (1990), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), After Virtue (1981), Secularization and Moral Change (1967), and A Short History of Ethics (1966). When children are still quite young, they learn not one, but two rules concerning truth-telling and lying and these in very different ways. One of those rules they learn by explicit instruction, characteristically when they have first been discovered in a lie. What they are then taught is that ti is wrong to lie, but what the rule is that is invoked notoriously varies from culture to culture and sometimes within cultures. For some lying as such is prohibited. For others some types of lie are permitted or even enjoined, but about which types of lie are permitted or enjoined there are also significant differences. It is not difficult to understand why. Among those types of lie that are often permitted or enjoined in different social orders are certain types of protective lie, lies designed to defend oneself or one's household or community from invasive hostility, perhaps from religious persecutors or witches or the tax-collectors of some alien power, or to shield the vulnerable, perhaps children or the dangerously ill, from knowledge thought to be harmful to them. since who is judged to need protection from what varies from one social and cultural order to another, which of these types of lie are permitted oreenjoined can be expected to vary accordingly. But these are not the only types of exception that are sometimes accorded social recognition and sanction. And, unsurprisingly, reflection upon how the rule that provides for such different types of exception should be formulated and justified commonly gives rise to controversy. Consider as on contributor to those controversies a moral tradition that belongs to the background history of our own moral culture. One of the earlier statements of that tradition, often appealed to later on, is in Book III of the Republic (382c-d), where Socrates is represented as describing some lies as useful against enemies or for the prevention of evils. Some Greek patristic theologians, among them St. Clement of Alexandria, held similarly that on occasion untruths might be told, for example, to protect the Christian community from the invasive enquiries of persecutors. About precisely what classes of untruths were permitted they and later writers sometimes differ from each other, and they also disagree among themselves in the precise [309] 310 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values statement of the view that they share, some saying that all lying is prohibited, but that an untruth told for a just reason is not a lie, others that some lying is not prohibited. Newman in summarizing their shared standpoint emphasized that all of them agree that the occurrence of such a just reason “is, in fact, extreme, rare, great, or at least special" (Apologia pro Vita Sua, note G). Modern exponents of this view, he adds, include John Milton, Jeremy Taylor, and St. Alfonso di Liguorio. None of these were, of course, consequentialists. Their position was expressed succinctly by Samuel Johnson: "The general rule is, that Truth should never be violated, because it is of the utmost importance to the comfort of life, that we should have a full security by mutual faith ….... There must, however, be some exceptions. If, for instance, a murderer should ask you which way a man is gone, you may tell him what is not true, because you are under a previous obligation not to betray a man to a murderer .... But I deny the lawfulness of telling a lie to a sick man for fear of alarming him. You have no business with consequences; you are to tell the truth" (James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, June 13, 1784). John Milton, Jeremy Taylor, and Alfonso di Liguorio would all have agreed with Johnson that there is indeed an hierarchical ordering of duties and obligations and that any type of exception to an otherwise universal binding rule can be justified only as required by some other binding rule that is superior in that ordering. But Johnson's statement suggests at the very least consequentialist questions. If there is indeed an ordering of duties and obligations, what is the principle by which they are ordered, if it is not a consequentialist principle? The consequentialism of J. S. Mill, for example, was intended to provide, by means of the principle enjoining the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, a standard for just such an ordering. What an evaluation of consequences by means of that principle is to tell us is which binding rules in practice at least have no exceptions (or almost so; see the penultimate paragraph of chapter 5 of Utilitarianism) -the rules prescribing justice, for example [MACINTYRE] Truthfulness, Lies, and Moral Philosophers - and which do have a few well-defined classes of exception, such as that otherwise prohibiting lying. And the onus seems to be on the adherents of Johnson's Christian anticonsequentialism to offer us an alternative and rationally superior principle of ordering. Moreover, if the rule prescribing truthfulness is to be defended as Johnson defends it, further consequentialist questions are raised. Conformity to the rule prescribing truth-telling seems for Johnson to be a means to a further end, what Johnson calls "the comfort of life," a necessary condition for which is "that we should have full security by mutual faith." But insofar as this rule is treated only as a means to some such further end, no matter how important, the possibility of evaluating the consequences of making a few well-defined exceptions to it has been opened up. And once again we need to know why we should not move to some more general consequentialist position, such as Mill's. 311 One answer to this question may well be that I have only reached a point at which it seems difficult to reply to consequentialist claims, because I erred in my starting point. I began after all by considering the kinds of explicit rules that are taught to young children when they are first detected in a lie, perhaps at three or four years of age, and at once noted that often such rules allow for exceptions to the general prohibition of lying. But, it may be said, I ought to have begun with another, more fundamental exceptionless rule, one learned somewhat earlier and not by explicit instruction. This is the rule prescribing truth-telling that we all learned to follow by learning to speak our native language, whatever it is. That rule governs speech-acts of assertion. To assert is always and inescapably to assert as true, and learning that truth is required from us in assertions is therefore inseparable from learning what it is to assert. So two Danish philosophers of language, H. Johansen and Erik Stenius, suggested that “the utterance of a falsehood is really a breach of a semantic rule” (Erik Stenius, "Mood and Language Games," Synthèse 17, no. 3 [1967), 269), although Stenius understood the relevant rule as one concerning what he called the language-game of reporting, while in fact it is assertion

  • Truth and Governance: Religious and Secular Views

    Taking the long view of conflicts between truth and political powerWhat role does truth play in government? In context of recent political discourse around the globe—and especially in the United States—it is easy to believe that truth, in the form of indisputable facts, is a matter of debate.But it’s also important to remember that since ancient times, every religious and philosophical tradition has wrestled with this question. In this volume, scholars representing ten traditions—Western and Eastern, religious and secular—address the nature of truth and its role in government. Among the questions they address: When is deception permissible, or even a good thing? What remedies are necessary and useful when governments fail in their responsibilities to be truthful?The authors consider the relationship between truth and governance in democracies, but also in non-democratic regimes. Although democracy is distinctive in requiring truth as a fundamental basis for governing, non-democratic forms of government also cannot do without truth entirely. If ministers cannot give candid advice to rulers, the government’s policies are likely to proceed on false premises and therefore fail. If rulers do not speak truthfully to their people, trust will erode.Each author in this book addresses a common set of issues: the nature of truth; the morality of truth-telling; the nature of government, which shapes each tradition’s understanding of the relationship between governance and truth; the legitimacy and limits of regulating speech; and remedies when truth becomes divorced from governance.Truth and Governance will open readers’ eyes to the variety of possible approaches to the relationship between truth and governance. Readers will find views they thought self-evident challenged and will come away with a greater understanding of the importance of truth and truth-telling, and of how to counter deliberate deception.

  • Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue

    Honesty is an important virtue. Parents want to develop it in their children. Close relationships depend upon it. Employers value it in their employees. Surprisingly, however, philosophers have said very little about the virtue of honesty over the past fifty years. In this book, Christian B. Miller aims to draw much greater attention to this neglected virtue. The first part of the book looks at the concept of honesty. It takes up questions such as: What does honesty involve? What are the motives of an honest person? How does practical wisdom relate to honesty? Miller explores what connects the many sides of honesty, including not lying, not stealing, not breaking promises, not misleading others, and not cheating. He argues that the honest person reliably does not intentionally distort the facts as she takes them to be. Miller then examines the empirical psychology of honesty. He takes up the question of whether most people are honest, dishonest, or somewhere in between. Drawing extensively on recent studies of cheating and lying, the model Miller articulates ultimately implies that most of us have a long way to go to reach an honest character. Honesty: The Philosophy and Psychology of a Neglected Virtue provides both a richer understanding of what our character looks like, as well as what the goal of being an honest person actually involves. Miller then leaves it up to us to decide if we want to take steps to shrink the character gap between the two.

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    Holy Mass for the community of the faithful of Myanmar resident in Rome, 16 May 2021

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    Is Lying Always Wrong?

    Dr. Janet Smith and Fr. Gregory Pine (bio's below) will debate the morality of lying. We will be taking questions from super chatters and patrons. Patrons ask here: https://www.patreon.com/posts/48533214 Join my email list and get my FREE ebook! https://pintswithaquinas.com/understanding-thomas/ 🔴 SPONSORS Catholic Chemistry: https://www.catholicchemistry.com/?ut...​ Hallow: https://hallow.com/mattfradd/​ 🔴 GIVING Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/mattfradd​​​​​ This show (and all the plans we have in store) wouldn't be possible without you. I can't thank those of you who support me enough. Seriously! Thanks for essentially being a co-producer coproducer of the show. 🔴 BIO's of Debaters Fr. Gregory Pine, O.P. is a doctoral candidate in dogmatic theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). He served previously as Assistant Director of Campus Outreach for the Thomistic Institute. Born and raised near Philadelphia, PA, he attended the Franciscan University of Steubenville and entered the Order of Preachers upon graduating. He was ordained a priest in 2016 and holds an STL from the Dominican House of Studies. He is the co-author of Marian Consecration with Aquinas (TAN Books) and has published articles in Nova et Vetera, The Thomist, and Angelicum. He is also a regular contributor to the podcasts Pints with Aquinas and Godsplaining. Janet E. Smith recently retired from Sacred Heart Major Seminary in Detroit, MI. She is the author of HumanaeVitae: A Generation Later and A Right to Privacy. Self-Gift is a volume of her already published essays on HumanaeVitae and the thought of John Paul II. She edited Why Humanae Vitae right: A Reader, Life Issues, MedicalChoices (with Christopher Kaczor) Living the Truth in Love: Pastoral Approaches to Same-Sex Attractions (with R.Paul Check) and Why Humanae Vitae is still Right. Prof Smith served three terms as a consulter to the PontificalCouncil on the Family and also served as a member of the Anglican RomanCatholic International Commission, III for 8 years. She has a regular column in the National Catholic Register. She has received three honorary doctorates and several other awards for scholarship and service. She has appeared on the Geraldo show, FoxMorning News, CNN International, CNN Newsroom, Al Jazeera and has done many shows for various series on EWTN. More than two million copies of her talk,“Contraception: Why Not” have been distributed. Her materials can be found at janetsmith.org. Free copies of her talks are available there. 🔴 LINKS Website: https://pintswithaquinas.com/​​​​​ Merch: teespring.com/stores/matt-fradd​ FREE 21 Day Detox From Porn Course: https://www.strive21.com/​​​​​ 🔴 SOCIAL Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/mattfradd​​​​​ Twitter: https://twitter.com/mattfradd​​​​​ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mattfradd

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    Access to the full content is only available to members of institutions that have purchased access. If you belong to such an institution, please log in or find out more about how to order. Share Cite Cite close Loading content We were unable to load the content Print Contents Article Summary content locked 1 Grice’s theory content locked 2 Reactions content locked 3 Prospects and alliances content locked Bibliography Thematic Communication and intention By Blackburn, Simon DOI 10.4324/9780415249126-U006-1 DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-U006-1 Version: v1,  Published online: 1998 Retrieved April 27, 2023, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/communication-and-intention/v-1 Article Summary The classic attempt to understand communication in terms of the intentions of a person making an utterance was put forward by Paul Grice in 1957. Grice was concerned with actions in which a speaker means something by what they do and what is meant might just as much be false as true. He looked for the essence of such cases in actions intended to effect a change in the recipient. Grice saw successful communication as depending on the recognition by the audience of the speaker’s intention. Since then there have been many attempts to refine Grice’s work, and to protect it against various problems. There has also been worry that Grice’s approach depends on a false priority of psychology over semantics, seeing complex psychological states as existing independently of whether the agent has linguistic means of expressing them. Share Cite Cite close Loading content We were unable to load the content Print Citing this article: Blackburn, Simon. Communication and intention, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-U006-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/communication-and-intention/v-1. Copyright © 1998-2023 Routledge. Related Searches Topics Philosophy of language Related Articles Meaning and communication By Blackburn, Simon Meaning and rule-following By Smith, Barry C.

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    The tangibility and simplicity of the small: Morning Meditation by Pope Francis in the Chapel of the Domus Sanctae Marthae, 29 April 2020

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    The Ethics of Sex and Lying

    Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/intellectualconservatism Podcast: https://intellectualconservatism.libsyn.com/ Facebook Page: https://www.facebook.com/intellectualconservatism The purpose of Intellectual Conservatism is to defend the true, good and beautiful things of life that are jeopardized in mainstream academia and society. On this page, you will find artwork, music, satire, academic papers, lectures and my own projects defending the duty of conserving these true, good and beautiful things.